Michael Auslin lambastes President Obama’s kid-glove treatment of China:

Most glaring was Mr. Obama’s timid handling of cybersecurity. Knocked off-balance by news leaks about the National Security Agency’s Internet surveillance programs, Mr. Obama could barely muster any strong public words about the extent of Chinese theft of American industrial and technological information (worth perhaps up to $250 billion per year, according to the head of the National Security Agency), let alone the hacking into nearly every significant U.S. weapons system. After eight hours of private talks, the U.S. public could be forgiven for expecting more from Mr. Obama than a recital of Washington’s displeasure and an instruction to wait for the results of a Sino-U.S. working group that will convene this summer.

The fact that Mr. Obama’s negotiating partner is robbing America blind did not intrude on the U.S. president’s desire to make his guest feel welcome.

Though Auslin makes a strong case, his op-ed reminded me of Michael Beckley’s “China’s Century?,” which offers a more sanguine interpretation:

Economies and militaries used to consist primarily of physical goods (e.g., conveyor belts and tanks), but today they are composed of systems that link physical goods to networks, research clusters, and command centers. Developing countries may be able to purchase or steal certain aspects of these systems from abroad, but many lack the supporting infrastructure, or “absorptive capacity,” necessary to integrate them into functioning wholes. For example, in the 1960s, Cummins Engine Company, a U.S. technological leader, formed joint ventures with a Japanese company and an Indian company to produce the same truck engine. The Japanese plant quickly reached U.S. quality and cost levels while the Indian plant turned out second-rate engines at three to four times the cost. The reason, according to Jack Baranson, was the “high degree of technical skill…required to convert techniques and produce new technical drawings and manufacturing speciªcations.” This case illustrates how an intangible factor such as skill can lead to signiªcant productivity differences even when two countries have access to identical hardware.

Compared to developing countries such as China, the United States is primed for technological absorption. Its property rights, social networks, capital markets, ºexible labor laws, and legions of multinational companies not only help it innovate, but also absorb innovations created elsewhere. Declinists liken the U.S. economic system to a leaky bucket oozing innovations out into the international system. But in the alternative perspective, the United States is more like a sponge, steadily increasing its mass by soaking up ideas, technology, and people from the rest of the world. If this is the case, then the spread of technology around the globe may paradoxically favor a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States.

This is small consolation when the Chinese steal detailed information concerning U.S. weapons systems designed to counter Chinese investment in asymmetric warfare capabilities, and it doesn’t undermine Auslin’s essential argument. But it is worth keeping in mind that for all China’s success in stealing U.S. industrial and technological information, no one in their right mind would choose to be in China’s shoes rather than America’s.