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The Santorum Conundrum
Why don’t pundits take him seriously as a presidential contender?


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Rick Santorum is the most frequently underestimated politician of our lifetimes. Santorum is always the underdog. Perhaps that’s one reason his sympathies lie with underdogs, his message is crafted toward underdogs, and his support often comes from those a bit lower on the socioeconomic scale than the voters Republican office-seekers typically attract.

But Santorum is determined to do things his own way, while significantly outworking all his competitors. As he makes the national rounds with his new book, Blue Collar Conservatives, while obviously looking toward another possible presidential run, Santorum again faces deep skepticism from most political handicappers. There is every reason to believe he’ll give those prognosticators some anxious moments again in the early spring of 2016.

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That’s what underdogs do, especially when other underdogs rally around them: They make the supposed cognoscenti look silly.

The mystery, the conundrum, is why the pundits continue to repeat the same mistake of underestimating Santorum. One would think they would instead try to figure out the reasons for his successes, so they won’t be burned again.

Let’s zip through three different aspects of Santorum’s appeal: first, his new book; second, a what if look back at his 2012 campaign; and finally, very briefly, a look ahead at 2016. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that Santorum endorsed and campaigned for me when I ran for Congress last year, but this analysis is consistent with what I’ve been writing for well over a decade.

Fortunately, Patrick Brennan already has done a great job introducing NRO readers to the essence of Blue Collar Conservatives. Wrote Brennan:

[Santorum is] tapping into a rising trend in the conservative movement: the realization that the solutions of the Reagan years don’t match up with today’s problems, and that conservatives need reform-minded ideas that focus on working Americans.

This isn’t a new idea for Santorum: In his 2005 book, he derides his deficit-obsessed GOP colleagues in the Senate as essentially “cheap liberals,” and he proudly worked on a number of anti-poverty bills while a legislator. He even turned his Senate office into a welfare-to-work program: He describes in his book how, when setting up his constituent office in depressed Harrisburg, Pa., he hired five employees who were on welfare. One of them, a single mother, risked losing her subsidized child care by taking the job, and could swing it only by finding family members who were able to help take care of her kids.

More broadly, Santorum for decades has been making the same critique of Republican rhetoric that Alabama’s Senator Jeff Sessions has finally gotten attention for pounding home in the past year or two. At the heart of his approach, as he writes in his book, is this:

We need to think about, listen to, and talk about the jobholder as well [as the entrepreneur]. If conservatives got the vote of every job creator in the country, we’d still lose. We must earn a large proportion of the votes of jobholders, because there are far more of them.

Santorum’s book is admirably replete with specific policy suggestions that fit this template of a conservatism for jobholders, along with his uniquely emphasized (and perhaps a bit too repetitive) linkage between the erosion of traditional values and the economic plight of non-professionals. This was one of the things the media missed in 2012: When Santorum spoke about social mores during his presidential battle, he did so not as a scold but, instead, almost always in the context of economics, as in his mantra that “the most effective antipoverty tool is a combination of work, education, and marriage.” His new book, in a fashion more enjoyably readable than most political manifestos, effectively explores the implications of that thesis both for policy and for politics.

On the latter, Santorum quite effectively revisits the arguments that he, Andy McCarthy, and others (me included) made during the 2012 primaries about why Mitt Romney would have a very difficult time defeating Barack Obama — not as a slam against Romney, whom he mostly praises in this book, but as part of his argument about what Republicans must do better if they are to win in 2016. In sum, as Sean Trende has shown at length, Romney lost largely because 6 million expected voters who “tended to be downscale, blue-collar whites” — 20 years ago known as Perot voters, and before that as a large portion of the broader set known as “Reagan Democrats” — stayed home.

The key thing with those voters is that they already had mostly decided against Obama. The question was, Would they be motivated enough by the Republican nominee to stand in line to vote after a long work day, or just stay home and wish a pox on both houses? As Santorum relates in his book, Romney pollster Neil Newhouse concluded that these are precisely the voters who in primary after primary turned out in late afternoon or early evening to give Santorum electoral surges well exceeding the projections of early exit polls.

Herein lies a counterfactual argument that I’ll go to my grave believing. Probably half or more of NRO’s readers might not just disagree but think the argument is utterly absurd, but one could certainly read the data to support it. To wit: While it would have been close, Santorum probably would have beaten Obama in November 2012.



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