The U.S. economy is at risk of falling into either an inflationary or a deflationary spiral, which is a consequence of the Federal Reserve’s having been either too loose or too tight. The only point of consensus among economists and financial journalists seems to be that Fed policy is dangerously wrong.
Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke has been on both sides of the debate within the last few months. In late August he said that “falling into deflation is not a significant risk for the United States at this time.” In mid-October he said that “the risk of deflation is higher than desirable.” The Fed is expected to engage in another round of “quantitative easing”: creating money and using it to buy assets from banks. The banks will then use their increased reserves to lend more, thus stimulating the economy and easing deflationary pressures. That’s Bernanke’s plan, anyway. Executing it — and then beating a retreat before inflation begins, as the Fed also promises to do — will require the technocrat to exercise a kind of statesmanship.
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Bernanke’s shift probably reflects a change in economic indicators, but may also be a response to pressures from inside and outside the Fed. Several members of the Fed board believe that the economy needs easier money. Charles Evans, head of the Chicago Fed, believes that the inflation rate should average 2 percent per year over time. Since we have undershot that mark recently, we should have a higher inflation rate for a while to catch up. William Dudley, Tim Geithner’s successor at the New York Fed, says that “very low interest rates can help smooth the adjustment process by supporting asset valuations, including making housing more affordable and by allowing some borrowers to reduce debt interest payments.”
Many academic and journalistic commentators agree. Columbia University economist Michael Woodford backs Evans’s contention. Paul Krugman is looking for stimulus anywhere he can get it. Martin Wolf, an influential columnist at the Financial Times, is worried about deflation.
Debates over monetary policy typically have a left-right dimension. Conservatives have traditionally worried that an excessively loose Fed policy would generate inflation, while liberals have been more concerned that overly tight policy would increase unemployment. (Congress has given the Fed the dual mandate of pursuing price stability and fighting unemployment.) That pattern is evident in this debate as well. The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page is regularly running commentary critical of the Fed for debasing the dollar, and Fox News is running plenty of ads encouraging people to buy gold as a hedge against inflation.
But some analysts are playing against type. John Makin, an economist at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, is worried about deflation. Greg Mankiw, who chaired President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, has called for “significant” inflation so as to create negative real interest rates and thus spur borrowing. But Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize–winning economist who has been a favorite of the Left over the last decade, joins with supply-sider Lawrence Kudlow in thinking that the chief effect of quantitative easing will be to cause “chaos” (Stiglitz’s word) in foreign-exchange markets.
Different people make different arguments for a looser monetary policy. For some of them, fear of deflation is the primary concern. The Treasury sells five-year bonds both with and without inflation protections. Comparing their yields results in one measure of the market’s expectations of inflation over the period. Those expectations have been low and dropping for most of the year, although they have started to bounce back now that quantitative easing is under discussion.
Fear of deflation is rooted in the experience of the early years of the Great Depression, when the money supply cratered. A falling price level increases the burden of debt and discourages spending (since a dollar will buy more tomorrow than it does today). Thus it can make recovery difficult, or even impossible. Bernanke is a student of the Depression and agrees with the late Milton Friedman that the Fed’s excessive tightness caused it. He has vowed that the Fed will not make the same mistake again, even if it means printing money and tossing it out of helicopters.
In what way?
He's been completely wrong in everything he's said, all his advice has been a disaster, everyone who believed him is ruined, and he's learned nothing.
But he's still got his job, yes?
Please, sir, may I have a tough spot?
What this article proves is if you talk to 100 different economists, you'll get 50 different answers (assuming that at least 50 economists agree on with more than one answer).
Central planning didn't work for the Commies, but I guess us Americans have some secret as to how we will make it work for our money supply.
I don't know why the actions of the Bernanke Fed come as a surprise to anyone. Bernanke's academic work, presumably so superb as to partially qualify him for the job, specifically consisted of criticizing the Japanese for not similarly inflating the yen during the 90s so as to more quickly resolve their own debt problem.
Beyond that, deflation is nearly impossible for the federal gov or central bankers to stop, so who is surprised that they would err on the side of creating inflation?
Lastly too: when the fed poofs money into existence to buy bonds, that "prints" money and increases the money supply, ergo the inflation.
BUT - the fed is a central bank, not a person. That means that when those bonds are paid for the fed need not return the principle + interest to the economy through investment or spending. It can suck those dollars up, thereby counter-balancing its earlier inflationary practices.
Such is the magic of being a central bank. That side of the credit/debit sheet seems a bit lost on those in all out fear of out-of-control inflation. One is left thinking that there are millions with a strong opinion, but only a few who really understand the ramifications of what's being done.
A strong currency gone weak is an indicator of a society that's lived beyond its means - borrowed too much, and, as a whole, must now trim back its appetites to pay off the debtors.
That's not the conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom is if you talk to 10 different economists, you get 20 different answers (assuming you don't ask a one-armed economist).
One aspect of the last round of serious currency wars which I would like to see addressed by those much smarter than me:
Global currency wars of the 1930's resulted (yes/no/maybe?) in a real global war in the 1940's.
My dad spent six years in the Pacific theater in WWII (never explaining why he was so important as to be kept behind till 1947) and he had two mantra's he kept repeating to me during the 1950's:
1. Politicians are only in it for their own personal gain.
2. The best defense is a good offense.
He also said that German speaking immigrants to the US knew by 1934 that there would be a war with Germany (my family having been cast out of Germany by Bismarck) but the war with Japan caught us by surprise.
His final thoughts on this subject: When the common man begins to realize that the government can and will play games with monetary supply, the lid is coming off of normal constraints against domestic violence. (He told me this when Nixon put into place wage and price controls in the 1970's.)