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Tunisia’s Uncertain Impact
Watching the coup d’état with fear and hope


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Daniel Pipes

The sudden and yet-unexplained exit of Tunisia’s strongman, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, 74, after 23 years in power has potential implications for the Middle East and for Muslims worldwide. As an Egyptian commentator noted, “Every Arab leader is watching Tunisia in fear. Every Arab citizen is watching Tunisia in hope and solidarity.” I watch with both sets of emotions.

During the first era of independence, until about 1970, governments in Arabic-speaking countries were frequently overthrown as troops under the control of a discontented colonel streamed into the capital, seized the presidential quarters and the radio station, and then announced a new regime. Syrians endured three coups d’état in 1949 alone.

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Over time, regimes learned to protect themselves through overlapping intelligence services, reliance on family and tribal members, repression, and other mechanisms. Four decades of sclerotic, sterile stability followed. With only rare exceptions (Iraq in 2003, Gaza in 2007) did regimes get ousted; even more rarely (Sudan in 1985) did civilian dissent have a significant role.

Enter first Al-Jazeera, which focuses Arab-wide attention on topics of its choosing, and then the Internet. Beyond its inexpensive, detailed, and timely information, the Internet also provides unprecedented secrets (e.g., the recent WikiLeaks dump of U.S. diplomatic cables) even as it connects the likeminded (via Facebook and Twitter). These new forces converged in Tunisia in December to create an intifada and quickly ousted an entrenched tyrant.

If one exalts in the power of the disenfranchised to overthrow their dull, cruel, and greedy master, one also looks ahead with trepidation to the Islamist implications of this upheaval.

The first worry concerns Tunisia itself. For all his faults, Ben Ali stood stalwart as a foe of Islamism, battling not only the terrorists but also (somewhat as in pre-2002 Turkey) the soft jihadists in school rooms and in television studios. As a former interior minister, however, he underestimated Islamists, seeing them more as criminals than as committed ideologues. His not allowing alternate Islamic outlooks to develop could now prove a great mistake.

Tunisian Islamists had a minimal role in overthrowing Ben Ali but they will surely scramble to exploit the opportunity that has opened to them. Indeed, the leader of Tunisia’s main Islamist organization, Ennahda, has announced his first return to the country since 1989. Does interim president Fouad Mebazaa, 77, have the savvy or political credibility to maintain power? Will the military keep the old guard in power? Do moderate forces have the cohesion and vision to deflect an Islamist surge?

The second worry concerns nearby Europe, already deeply incompetent at dealing with its own Islamist challenge. Were Ennahda to take power and then expand networks, provide funds, and perhaps smuggle arms to allies in nearby Europe, it could greatly exacerbate existing problems there.

The third and greatest worry concerns the possible domino effect on other Arabic-speaking countries. This fast, seemingly easy, and relatively bloodless coup d’état could inspire Islamists across the globe to sweep away their own tyrants. All four North African littoral states — Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt — fit this description, as do Syria, Jordan, and Yemen to the east. That Ben Ali took refuge in Saudi Arabia implicates that country too. Pakistan could also fit the template. In contrast to the Iranian revolution of 1978–79, which required a charismatic leader, millions on the street, and a full year’s worth of effort, events in Tunisia unfolded quickly and in a more generic, reproducible way.

What Franklin D. Roosevelt allegedly said of a Latin America dictator, “He’s a bastard but he’s our bastard,” applies to Ben Ali and many other Arab strongmen, leaving U.S. policy in seeming disarray. Barack Obama’s ambiguous after-the-fact declaration that he “applaud[s] the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people” can conveniently be read either as a warning to assorted other bastards or as a better-late-than-never recognition of awkward facts on the ground.

As Washington sorts out options, I urge the administration to adopt two policies. First, renew the push for democratization initiated by George W. Bush in 2003, but this time with due caution, intelligence, and modesty, recognizing that his flawed implementation inadvertently facilitated the Islamists’ acquisition of greater power. Second, focus on Islamism as the civilized world’s greatest enemy, and stand with our allies, including those in Tunisia, to fight this blight.

Daniel Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. © 2011 by Daniel Pipes. All rights reserved.



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