‘My name is Khalid Islambouli,” the assassin thundered. “I have slain Pharaoh, and I do not fear death!” This was at an annual state parade in Cairo on October 6, 1981. Islambouli, swelling with a delirious pride, had just strafed the reviewing stand with bullets, killing Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and hurtling his nation into chaos.
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That was the plan. Islambouli, like several of his coconspirators, was a Muslim Brotherhood veteran who’d drunk deep the incitements of the Ikhwan’s martyred leader, Sayyid Qutb, but lost patience with the organization’s Fabian approach to revolution. He’d joined Islamic Jihad, one of several splinter groups that would later be folded into al-Qaeda by another Brotherhood alum, Ayman Zawahiri.
They’d hoped to trigger an Islamic upheaval by “cutting off the head of the snake” and seizing power in the ensuing chaos. But apart from murdering the president, the plot failed. Power passed seamlessly to Sadat’s vice president, Hosni Mubarak, who cracked down brutally on the terrorists.
The story is worth remembering as chaos grips Egypt yet again. In the drama three decades ago, one tie beyond citizenship united all the major players — the villain, the victim, the heroes who put down the uprising, and the bureaucrat who emerged from obscurity to grab the autocratic reins he has yet to relinquish: They were all members of the Egyptian military.
With events on the ground shifting even faster than the Obama administration’s positions on them — though not quite as quickly as the sudden proliferation of Egypt experts — received wisdom holds that the one anchor of stability in the unfolding crisis is the military. It is said to be the only solid ground in Cairo’s cataclysm. Otherwise, the scene at Tahrir Square, depending on who is doing the describing and who is projecting which hopes and fears, is alternatively a tea party, a human-rights riot, or an explosion of Islamist rage.
It’s true enough that Egypt’s highly professional armed forces constitute the most revered institution in the country. Their professionalism has been purchased at a cost of nearly $40 billion from U.S. taxpayers since 1978, when Sadat made the peace with Israel that drove the jihadists to kill him. Thus, when analysts herald the stability of Egypt’s military — fortified by a generation of training and cooperative relations with U.S. warriors — the implication is that this will be to our benefit. Their patriotism will prevent Mubarak’s worst excesses and usher him out the door, and their pro-Western bent will guard against that worst of all worlds: the very sharia state Khalid Islambouli and his fellow jihadists sought to impose 30 years ago.
Even if everything we’d like to believe about the Egyptian military were true, the dream of secular stability would be very difficult to realize. Thanks to the West’s conflating of democratic processes with democratic culture, the crisis is careering toward a premature “settlement” by popular elections, to be held no later than September. Unfortunately, that is years before civil society — stunted by the powerful influence of fundamentalist Islam, the constant threat of terrorism, and Mubarak’s iron-fisted rule — can evolve sufficiently for real self-government.
A transitional military coup would be best for all concerned, but it is very unlikely to happen. The democracy fetish of transnational progressives won’t allow it. That opens the field for the most organized, best disciplined faction, the Muslim Brotherhood. With the administration having finally decided to shove Mubarak under the bus, the Brotherhood and its beard, Mohammed ElBaradei, are hovering.
Let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that Egypt’s armed forces are capable of thwarting the Islamist rise. The question is: Will they?
Khalid Islambouli was a first lieutenant in the army. This station enabled him to be assigned to the parade held that fateful day — an annual event at which the nation celebrates its great “victory” in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. (Yes, the same war the home team lost to Israel; this is Egypt we’re talking about.) How, you may wonder, does a jihadist terrorist become a military officer and get close enough to kill the Egyptian president, widely known at the time to be a marked man?
Too bad Andy's right. The Eygptian Army is professional by regional standards -- no other Arab army would have so many armored vehicles operational, able to leave the motor pool, and drive to the center of the city. But by any objective standard, they're, well, Egyptians, and it is hard to see how this is going to work out well. We hear, "The Egyptian Army is popular with the people," but that is only when it is doing something -- crossing the Suez Canal, rounding up terrorists, throwing out foreigners. The only way the Army succeeds, I think, is to wait a few more days until food shortages really hit Cairo, and then crack down hard, "to restore order."
Just imagine if the US was self sufficient in energy, including oil, as it was in 1967 at the time of the Six Day War. There was an attempt at an oil embargo by the Arabs but it failed. We now have the opportunity to be self sufficient again as oil climbs above $100. It is insanity to prevent exploitation of the gulf, the Montana oil sands and nuclear power. The only state that is not affected by the recession is North Dakota. Anyone asked why ? If we had followed such a policy the past ten years, Egypt would be an interesting story that did not seriously affect us.
While you can argue that Egypt didn’t win the ‘73 war, Sadat achieved most of his goals for the war. As a result, I’d say he’s the closest thing to a winner in that war.
You left out natural gas , but otherwise you are very much correct . The only thing standing in the way of this rational approach is Obama and his fellow travellers in the Senate and EPA . 2012 is not too long too wait (but 2016 is) . Hopefully the loyal opposition will be able to frame $5 gas in a way the independent voter can understand
I agree with Michael Kennedy that the U.S. should be exploiting our deposits of oil in the Gulf of Mexico, off the Californian coast, in the northwestern Great Plains, and in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. However, that will merely provide stability to the price of oil, but will not prevent the Middle East from continuing to be the most important source of oil in setting the world price of oil.
Our allies all need to import Middle Eastern oil and we cannot divorce ourselves from them. The western Europeans have almost no oil outside of Scotland and Norway and the Japanese and Koreans have no domestic oil at all. The world price of oil is set by all of the world's purchasers and sellers and we cannot help but be affected by events in the Middle East as long as our allies continue to import oil from that region.
I think we need to embark upon a crash program of developing modern nuclear power plants for our electrical needs. As for automobiles, I see no good answer for their fuel other than petroleum. At least by eliminating petroleum as a source of electricity, we will reduce our dependence on the Middle East for fuel.
An incremental transition presided over by a gradually, steadily withdrawing Egyptian Army is the best path here. There is a precedent, as outlined by an expert on democratic transitions, Thomas Carothers, writing in The New Republic (which btw has probably the best, widest-ranging, most intelligent commentary to be found on the web re. this crisis and its implications). External Link
Excerpts:
“Egypt’s historical path, societal makeup, economic conditions, and national character differ in many ways from Indonesia’s. Nevertheless, enough of its socio-political experiences and structures bear resemblance to Indonesia’s ten years ago—- from its newly assertive mix of idealistic young protestors, civic groups, and political opposition parties to its longstanding effort to balance secular and Islamist values—that Indonesia’s democratization offers some hope for Egypt. Accordingly, it is worth noting some of the keys to Indonesia’s successful transition.
“First, the post-Suharto political renovation was inclusive despite the powerful mass rejection of the prior dictatorial order. The interim president moved quickly to allow freedom of expression and open the political space. Apparatchiks around the dictator managed to find a new political role for themselves through a transformed former ruling party that emphasized its technocratic capabilities. The army, which had played a key role in facilitating Suharto’s stepping down by refusing to violently repress the protesters, saw its political role greatly reduced but only bit by bit, through constant negotiations and compromises. Political parties of all sorts were allowed to flourish, despite the messiness of the initial elections and governments.
“Second, once Suharto’s abrupt ouster was achieved, the transition became intensely legalistic and iterative. Indonesia put itself through seemingly endless phases of constitutional, electoral, and other legal reforms, carried out in a spirit of compromise. The vague but emotive reformist ideal was gradually translated into concrete institutions, rules, and procedures.
“The serious pursuit of this detailed reform agenda helped Indonesians tolerate a transition period marked early on by a dubious post-dictator leader, disturbing outbursts of violence, economic woes, and the breaking off of East Timor.
“Third, the United States and Europe overcame their suspicions of a political transition they had long dreaded and offered valuable assistance in support of elections, political party development, civil society strengthening, and legal reform….”
Mr. McCarthy, thanks for the work, but what worries you more...the "hope" of the Egytian army or our fearless leader and his "administration" negotiating with the Muslim Brotherhood? For as sure as this writing, this is what BHO is doing!!! Aside from the BHO apologists who visits NRO, does anyone doubt this?
Here is a news flash...Mexico, Central, and South America are next!!!
Have a little faith in the democratic process. This is not an Islamic revolution, but one that includes parts of the population outside of this narrow slice that does support the muslim brotherhood, which is at best 30 percent of the population. Just because one crazed assassin happened to come from the military doesn't mean the Egyptian military and other sectors of Egyptian society will allow an Islamic state to be formed similar to the Iranian state. Even if an Islamic party wins a popular election, it doesnt mean that we will have to deal with an Islamic state in Egypt. Just look at Turkey: an Islamic party has been in power there for nearly 3 years now, and you certainly cant call that an islamic state. On the contrary, the Turks are continuing to try and make the transition towards joining the European Union.
The Egyptian army, as Mr. McCarthy observes, is a conscript army. It is not a thing apart from all of Egypt, it is a thing of Egypt and is thoroughly Egyptian - for better and for worse.
This crisis has been barreling down the tracks toward us for many years and should come as no surprise. The punditariat has been quick to develop boilerplate around it, padding their comments with references to dominoes falling from Tunisia to the Arabian peninsula.
None of them were talking during the past 10 years about the coming crisis of a post-Mubarak Egypt
None of them are talking now about the obvious, and not dissimilar crisis to come, the vastly more ominous case of Pakistan. I hope Mr. McCarthy and other sound analysts soon turn their attention to that ticking time (atomic) bomb.
Nobody knows what's next for Egypt but I have hope for real, substantial, concrete progress.
What strikes me about the Middle East is something Reagan said; it's "not so much a place as a state of mind." They live under autocracies but their minds are seized by a particularly virulent and zealous totalitarian ideology.
In many ways their culture is worse than their governments. The people are the problem.
So why would I have hope for the future? Because in this age when anyone can communicate with anyone, it's easier to change ideas than it is to change regimes. North Korea is governed by a regime that will not lose its grip; the Arab and Persian mind is ensnared in ideas and beliefs that are insane. Expose them, and they'll become objects of ridicule.
In the Cold War we fought against the threats posed by the KGB, and the Red Army, assassinations, and guns and money and ammo. In this war, we're contending against a population that thinks a harem of virgins is the reward for murder.
It's amazing how insular these societies are ... children taught that Jews will suck their blood, that America is "The Great Satan." C'mon.
I sense that the protesters believe there's something else out there, something they've never tasted before, and that they don't know what it is but they want a door to be opened. Their protests are incoherent because they're rebelling against something without knowing anything more than what they don't want.
Their culture is brutal, barbaric, violent, and deeply, deeply ignorant. And it's fraying in the age of the internet. Can the bases for their ideology survive ... reality?
There's danger here, and the Muslim Brotherhood won't disappear without a fight, and they're as violent as Andrew says they are. But I think their beliefs are about to be questioned, and I don't think they'll have an answer that will satisfy a lot of the people of Egypt.
There is a paragraph in the article, which talks about the distinction between a democratic process and a democratic society. It is astute and clear-headed, if pessimistic. It infers that democracy is an unalloyed goal, but that it is more complex than just having elections. Fair enough.
Then, just a few lines later, democracy is dismissed as a "fetish." It isn't elections which are the fetish, but democracy itself. The distinction which the author JUST MADE is already discarded.
So which of these positions really represent the writers true feelings? Is democracy (both in society and process) a human right which is to be pursued aggressively? Or is it a trivial "fetish" which should be discarded when autocracy is more convenient?
