The results of the data exchange on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons required under the New START treaty were released by the State Department on June 1. They demonstrate conclusively the truth of what treaty skeptics had said for months: The treaty brought the United States nothing in terms of lowered Russian force numbers.
In promoting the treaty to the Senate and the American people, the Obama administration claimed that New START provided the great benefit of reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by 30 percent — from 2,200 warheads each to 1,550 warheads each. It also placed a ceiling on the number of deployed American and Russian strategic launchers (missiles and bombers) at 700 each. Both sides are required under the treaty to be at or below these ceilings by 2018. The catch here, and the undoubted source of considerable amusement in Moscow, is the now-indisputable fact that only the United States must make actual reductions under New START.
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As of February 5, the day the treaty came into force, Russia already was below the ceilings mandated by the treaty both for deployed strategic nuclear launchers and for warheads. On the first day of the treaty, the number of Russian launchers stood at 521, well below New START’s ceiling of 700, and the number of accountable warheads stood at 1,537, below the new ceiling of 1,550. Rather than reducing its forces, Moscow would have to build them up to reach the new limits. In fact, according to the Russian defense minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, Russia will strive until the year 2028 to build up to New START’s limit on strategic launchers. In contrast, the United States must make reductions, including a 25 percent cut in deployed strategic launchers.
Senior members of the Obama administration denied this inconvenient truth for many months leading up to the Senate’s ratification of New START in December 2010. To acknowledge that Russian force levels already were below New START ceilings would have been to admit that the U.S. was the only side required to make reductions and would have raised questions about the treaty’s value. It would have contradicted the popular claim that New START would require 30 percent reductions from both parties.
In fact, not much work was needed to conclude that the Russians would be giving up nothing. Numerous Russian officials and commentators said openly before the treaty was ratified that Russia already was below New START’s ceilings and would go lower still as it continued to withdraw its aged Cold War strategic nuclear systems. Russia has for some time been in the process of swapping out its old systems for newer models, and its replacement rate cannot keep up with the deactivation of its outdated systems — so Russia’s force numbers would have dropped with or without New START. Thus, Russian officials happily noted that only the U.S. would have to make reductions.
Secretary of State Clinton denied this now-obvious fact before the Senate Armed Services Committee and charged that American treaty skeptics making such observations “just don’t believe in arms-control treaties at all and from my perspective are very unfortunately slanting a lot of what they say.” Similarly, when the since-retired senator Kit Bond (R., Mo.), then vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, observed that only the United States would have to make force reductions under New START, the State Department contradicted him publicly, stating, “The Treaty does not force the United States to reduce unilaterally.”
Negotiations are all about compromise — you have to give something to get something, right? Apparently not when it came to the reductions required by New START. As Russian defense expert Vladimir Dvorkin acknowledges openly, “Russia does not need to reduce anything. Only the U.S.A. will have to reduce its arsenals.” Earlier he and a senior Russian official, Alexei Arbatov observed, “The United States did not seek to eliminate, reduce, or limit any of the other side’s weapons or programs in particular (such as, for example, Soviet or Russian heavy ICBMs or mobile missiles, which were the focus of talks in previous times).” No, indeed. There is a lesson here that should not be lost when expansive claims are next made about the administration’s arms-control achievements and skeptics are chastised. As Ronald Reagan said, “Trust but verify.”
— Keith B. Payne is department head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (Washington, D.C., campus).
So, what's the problem? Russia has a lower amount of deployed ICBMs precisely because it has already made the necessary reductions. At its peak in 1980s, the Soviet Union had more deployed strategic rockets, than the U.S.
You forget about:
1) Russian railway-based RT-23, which were unilaterally decommissioned.
2) Russian R-36 "Satan" rockets, each capable of carrying 10 MIRVed warheads and multiple decoys, many of which were decommissioned under a START II, although that was one of the newest weapons of the time.
3) Russian RT-2PM "Topol" mobile rocket systems. Due to their quality of mobility, they should have been likened to the U.S. submarines, rather than silo-based rockets.
The problem, Evgeny, is the mendacity of the Obama Administration in disguising essentially unilateral arms reduction as a bilateral treaty. Put another way, this is simply a gimmick to make the US weaker while attempting to avoid the political heat for it.
And the article points out quite clearly that the reason Russia has made the cuts is NOT due to treaty compliance and renders the need for such a treaty moot.
What the U.S. gets from the treaty is quite simple: that warm, fuzzy feeling that comes from having signed a treaty. Okay, maybe we don't actually get an strategic benefit, but what does that matter in the face of feeling good and morally superior to the Bush administration?
Even more importantly, not only are we disarming for no reason we are letting our nuclear enterprise and delivery system industrial base "wither on the vine."
The Russians not only have a robust nuclear weapons R&D program but active prodution lines. In addition, they are deploying an advanced Sineva and Bulava SLBM, RS-24 and SS-18 replacement ICBM's. There is also hints that these missiles will be topped with advanced "anti-missile defense" MaRVs.
The US has just started an ICBM "study" to replace the 30 + year old Minuteman III, has no active warhead production lines and research on new advanced warheads is currently banned. We are keeping the Trident D5 until 2047 and have just started work on a new bomber. Of note, all of these programs might never see the light of day due to budgetary constraints.
In the 60's - when the US was way ahead of the Soviets and could have buried them by deploying thousands of ICBMs (the Air Force wanted 3000 Minuteman ICBMs) - then Defense Secretary McNamara basically said, "we will allow the Societs to catch up with us so they feel better about themselves and less threatened by us". US warhead and delivery systems peaked during this time. The Soviets they kept on building until they surpassed us in warheads and most importanly missile throwweights (carry many, many more warheads/misile)
This treaty is a long leftist continuation of "making the Russian feel good about himself", nothing more. It was a totally unnecessary treaty completely out of touch with 21st Century strategic reality.
Indeed, Russia has made its previous reductions under previous bilateral treaties with the USA.
I'm afraid that doesn't answer your concern. But if you care about numbers so much, would you feel better if Russia is forced to quickly build up its rocket forces up to whatever is sufficient to satisfy your ego? Is THAT your goal?
You cite Maknamara as a sign of his failure, while essentially he was spot on correct -- even if he could not have envisioned Gorbachev and Perestroika.
And yes, we do have a severe attitude problem. If Russia and the U.S. trust each other more, then may be we won't need expensive military programs.
"If Russia and the U.S. trust each other more, ..."
Russian and American mendacity is legendary and consistent over decades.
I appreciate your supposition about trust but how? Even assuming that we can trust each other today that does not mean that someone untrustworthy may assume power later.
I would prefer to have friendly relations and a big arsenal. Call me old fashioned but no schoolyard bully ever picks a fight with the biggest kid on campus.
P.S. To the NRO staff: Requiring people type in a company's motto as a requirement to post is Orwellian conditioning of the worst kind and highly uncharacteristic of a site such as this. Leave the Orwellian conditioning to Daily Kos. BTW, I hit refresh until I am presented with a screen not requiring such behavior. I am not going to play your game.
What the US needs is a "Nuclear Deterrence Agency" along the lines of the Missile Defense Agency to insure that the mission is given the prominence it deserves as a cornerstone of national security.
The agency would be in charge of all things nuclear from solid rockets, to SSBNs, to reentry vehicles, to the smallest warhead component. Members of the agency would all be proponents of the deterrent mission which is key in these tough budgetary times.
"If Russia and the U.S. trust each other more, ..."
I've had reason to become somewhat acquainted with both the earlier START treaty and the New START treaty. One thing that is very noticeable is the huge reduction in the detailed information provided in New START. I get the impression that the lack of trust when the earlier treaty was signed caused the negotiators to insist on many more levels of verification than what they felt was necessary in the new treaty.
Speaking of verification, I think that is really the point of the New START treaty for the U.S.. Even though the treaty isn't causing Russia to reduce it's arms, it is providing us benefit by making Russia tell us where their weapons are, what types of weapons they have, when and where the weapons are moved or eliminated, etc..
We have had other treaties that help us keep track of Russian non-nuclear forces but unfortunately not all of them remain in effect.
I'm not sure signing the treaty was good. Perhaps we could have gotten a better deal. Perhaps no deal would have been better than what we got. But you can't simply look at the arms reductions as Mr. Payne has done. You also have to look at the information we're getting if you want to have an informed opinion.
"I appreciate your supposition about trust but how?"
A possible answer is the global governance. Google for "The Resurgent Idea of World Government", it would provide you with a good introduction. It's a pure theory, OK, but may be it is important enough to get accustomed with.
I must offer a polite but absolutely firm hell NO!
I have seen enough of the UN to be absolutely sure that the last thing the American people need is an extra-national government not under their control. We can barely control the government we have. We would have no control over a world government.
Furthermore, I fail to see how this would change anything. People would still form alliances against each other and the situation would still pit people against each other. Surely you have seen this in the UN?
Frankly, I am astonished that, given my previous post, you would even suggest such a thing to me.
The Global Government is just an idea. Various different forms of global governance are possible as well.
Like, it may be harmful to control globally every aspect of domestic policies. Instead, it could be useful to control globally nuclear weapons. Such a configuration could help to eliminate a threat of self-extermination of the human race, while effectively preventing wars between major countries.
Of course, a solution suitable for everyone can't be easy. So far, the best hope is to suggest some outlines of it.
I thought you asked for my suggestions? Best, from Russia.
