On Tuesday, June 28, outside the holy city of Qom, the rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran test-fired 14 ballistic missiles, including long- and medium-range Shahab missiles and short-range Zelzal missiles. Also near Qom, new and improved centrifuges are turning out more enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.
In addition, departing defense secretary Robert Gates noted last month that North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile development “now constitute[] a direct threat to the United States. . . . They are developing a road-mobile [intercontinental ballistic missile]. . . . It’s a huge problem.”
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For national-security experts, these developments raise a list of troubling questions. For the rest of us, they should raise just two: Do Iran and North Korea represent threats we should take seriously? The answer, clearly, is yes. Are we building the missile-defense system we need to protect America against these threats? The answer, just as clearly, is no.
To understand how this situation has come about, recall a little history. During the Cold War, the United States adopted a strategic doctrine called MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction. The logic behind it was both perverse and compelling: So long as we were vulnerable to missile attack by the Soviets, and so long as the Soviets were vulnerable to missile attack by us, neither side would benefit by attacking first — on the contrary, a devastating retaliation would be assured. Assuming that both we and the Soviets were rational, the result would be a standoff, stability, and peaceful coexistence.
Veterans of the Cold War, still influential in the foreign-policy establishment and the Obama administration, believe that if this kind of deterrence worked then, it can work now.
The current occupants of the Kremlin go farther. They claim it is destabilizing and provocative for Americans and Europeans to attempt to protect themselves from the possibility of an Iranian or North Korean missile attack by building a missile-defense system that may one day be robust enough also to thwart a Russian missile attack. “If NATO wants to reduce tension with Russia,” Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s ambassador to the Atlantic alliance recently said, “it should cancel the missile-defense project. We have always criticized these plans as deeply anti-Russian.”
Missile-defense advocates — I list myself among them — counter that MAD is an idea whose time has come and gone. The regime that rules Iran appears to view nuclear weapons and missile development as its highest priority, worth the pain being inflicted by a growing catalogue of international sanctions. It proclaims that “a world without America . . . is attainable.” More than a few of Iran’s rulers hold the theological conviction that the return of the Mahdi, the savior, can be brought about only by an apocalypse. As scholar Bernard Lewis has aptly phrased it, for those who share the views of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, “Mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent. It is an inducement.”
As for the authoritarian regime that rules Russia, it is not America’s enemy, but neither is it likely to become an ally anytime soon — no matter how hard the Obama administration tries to “reset” relations. What’s more, the Kremlin has been actively assisting Iran.
Two years ago, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the U.S. should create a missile-defense “umbrella” that would protect not only American citizens at home and American forces abroad but also America’s allies. But such a project is not in development. And some say, given the state of the economy, we can’t afford it now.
Three reasons I disagree: (1) If just one American city should be hit by just one missile, the cost — not merely in dollars — will be far greater than that of any missile-defense system being contemplated. And it would require only a single enemy missile to stage an Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, which could cripple the United States for years. (2) Deploying a comprehensive missile-defense system would dramatically alter the strategic environment. The rationale for building nuclear-armed ballistic missiles for offensive purposes disappears if it is clear the U.S. has both the will and a way to prevent those weapons from reaching their targets. At the moment, the incentives are reversed: Moammar Qaddafi gives up his nuclear weapons, and NATO tries to kill him. The North Koreans refuse to give up their nuclear weapons, and we leave them alone no matter what they do. (3) The cost need not be exorbitant. Our missile-defense architecture is made up of various systems — some can be cut.
Unfortunately, what you are saying is true but we have a history in this country of sticking our head in the ground and hoping that all turns out well. Usually it doesn't. One only needs to look fairly recently in history to see the validation of that position---Pearl Harbour. Our refusal to see the obvious signs not only resulted in the loss of the Pacific Fleet but eventually the loss of our military in the Pacific. We sacrificed soldiers, sailors and marines because we just didn't want to get involved.
When the first missile hits and we lose a city, or maybe many cities, people will then get it. It will, of course, be too late. We just don't learn and history has proven that many times over.
While an antimissile defense system is desirable, there are important criteria it must meet:
1. It must not pose a physical hazard in and of itself.
2. It must justify itself in terms of the protection afforded.
3. It must not afford the enemies of the United States any opportunities they don't already have.
4. It must be technologically sound.
5. It must be affordable.
6. It must be capable of gaining the assent of the requisite number of legislators and (of course) the president.
These are not easy conditions to meet simultaneously, especially given the continuous advance of technology. For example, the "brilliant pebbles" approach to ICBMs -- missiles that travel space during their post-boost phase -- is workable, at least in theory. However, an Iranian missile assault on Israel would not be hindered by that approach; a measure that would kill the missile in its boost phase, or shoot it down in-atmosphere, would be required. So at minimum two systems are required, with the attendant costs of development, deployment, and maintenance.
Also, it would be a mistake to think we could build a system that would guarantee absolute protection against ballistic attack, even in the short run. Given a large enough barrage, some weapons will survive to reach their targets. So the system's cost, complexity, and associated difficulties and hazards must be balanced against the protection it affords.
Finally comes the problem of political endurance. There has never been (and probably never will be) a weapons system with no cost of maintenance. Usually, the cost of maintenance mounts as time passes. Such a defensive system, if never used in the actual defense of the United States, is a lure for budget-cutters: "Why continue to fund this when there are human needs unmet / when children are starving / when the budget is so far out of balance?" Such legislators and their backers tend to be insensitive to just-in-case arguments. So the system wouldn't just have to meet all the criteria above; it would have to be defended over a significant period of time against some of the strongest political incentives in existence.
Quite a three-pipe problem, Watson. Perhaps we should outsource it to the private sector. Oh, wait: then begins the ranting about eeeevil defense contractors looking to bleed the Treasury with three-martini lunches and corporate jets. Make that a four-pipe problem...and have the "seven-percent solution" ready for later!
First,any IRBM fired from Iran at Israel WILL travel through space and be vulnerable to a Pebble or other space-based defense.
Second,ballistic missile defense does NOT have to be a "perfect" defense. It just has to have a reasonable probability of kill.(PK),then it makes an attack FAR less likely to succeed,particularly if a nation has few nuclear warheads. You set an impossible,unachievable standard.
Third,the cost of BMD must consider the cost if a nuclear warhead reaches it's target and detonates.We cannot afford to lose an entire city full of US citizens to a nuke. Nor can we afford a successful EMP attack on the US,that would reduce us to 19th century conditions and kill 90% of the US population from starvation and disease.Read One Second After by William Forstchen about the aftermath of an EMP attack on the US.
Let's not forget to consider the death of MAD along with the nuclear deterrent mission.
The US has reduced its strategic arsenal from a Cold War high of 12,000 deployed warheads to, eventually, 1550 under New Start. This was supposed to stop other countries from building nukes because of "US leadership" and willingness to disarm. How has that worked out? Not one single country that aspires to have nuclear weapons has changed their behavior one iota.
Robust defense is a requirement of the new strategic age we live in but so does a robust offensive strike force consisting of a fully modernized nuclear weapons enterprise and Triad, including a Minuteman III replacement.
The countries that have aspired to nuclear weapons are still hopelessly out gunned. How does North Korea's handful of nuclear weapons compare to the US' 1550, or China, India, Pakistan's few hundred?
It doesn't make a difference to these countries that the US has reduced from 12,000 to 1550. It is still an overwhelmingly superior force.
How would modernising the Minuteman missile change the situation at all? all the nuclear weapon states are defenceless to the current series of missiles.
Clearly the US already has an enormous advantage in offensive capabilities, and even still this has not deterred nations from becoming nuclear (quite the opposite).
In terms of defence however the US is completely vulnerable, perhaps it's time to try a new strategy.
Would a missile shield be any different from the MAD doctrine anyway? It means if one nation launches nuclear weapons, that the other probably won't be destroyed and will retaliate with its entire force.
Here's my problem with this line of argument about MAD, popular on the missile-defense supporting Right: it always assumes that Russia's arguments are *true*.
Meaning, Cliff May's arguments start from Russia's argument that missile defense threatens MAD. Rather than refute that argument, May and others simply say, "Well then, MAD was always madness, so let's just forget about MAD... full speed ahead on missile defense!"
This is both wrong in fact, and wrong in wisdom.
MAD works-- with Russia. It works with China. It works with nation states that are sane enough to do counterforce and surety calculations (which any college student can do on the back of an envolope using basic math).
Where MAD breaks down is obvious: smaller nation-states, with (relatively) minor nuclear arsenals, led by potentially unstable leaders (nay, madmen) are less likely to be deterred by the U.S. nuclear arsenal, regardless of whether we have ten nuclear weapons or ten thousand.
Thus, in those cases, it makes perfect sense to have a missile defense system. A *limited* missile defense system-- one global in size, but not as large as one dedicated to preclude a Russian or even Chinese attack.
Such a system-- like the one we have now, or expect to soon have-- can be technically capable and militarily robust to defeat any likely small-state missile attack, whether from Iran, North Korea or any other minor threat. Shooting down 10 missiles, even with decoys, is far less of a challenge than designing and deploying a system capable of shooting down 100, let alone 1000.
Yet, such a system, capable of defending against that limited, "rogue state" attack, does nothing to affect Russian or Chinese deterrence calculations-- they've got enough hardened missiles and submerged warheads to survive any theoretical American first, disarming strike and *still* constitute a force large enough to overwhelm limited American missile defenses.
The bottom line is, pie-in-the-sky dreams aside, missile defense will never be robust or capable enough to defend against arsenals the size and complexity of Russia's and China's, at least not at a price the U.S. is willing to afford.
But a *limited* capability is in our grasp, and that limited capability is what's needed most today.
And contrary to Russian posturing, such a limited defense does *absolutely nothing* to reduce the efficacy of MAD between the U.S. and Russia.
But that's not why Putin fought it, now is it? The Russians aren't afraid of U.S. missile defense-- they're afraid that *their clients* will be afraid of U.S. missile defense.
Maybe someone can explain to me how 'New Start' makes sense when it DOES NOT include China? Maybe it is assumed that they pose no threat? Does anyone really believe that?
The same reason why New START doesn't include Britain's and France's weapons: China's ICBM arsenal is both smaller and less accurate than the U.S. and Russia's, by a large margin. Even today, they only have few missiles that can reach beyond the West Coast to hold all of America at risk.
Somewhere along the way, the Chinese decided to focus their nuclear deterrent on countervalue targets, i.e. cities instead of silos. It's still MAD, but MAD-lite.
Nuke a suburb of the Holy City of Qom and see how well mutually assured destruction actually works. We'd have regime change in Iran *way* quicker than Japan in 1945.
With North Korea it's a bit of a different story. The mad dictator there is really just a puppet of his suppliers, the Communist Chinese. They don't care so much if you make South Korea an island as long as you continue to pretend they didn't pull the trigger (and load the gun.)
For an EMP attack to be effective, the detonation must be several hundred miles up. Higher than the space station and higher than the shuttle can achieve. Effectively it means that you have to have the capability to put something in orbit, especially if you want your detonation to be well inland.
So it's not something that's going to be done from a freighter off the coast of Norfolk. Which leaves out Ernst Blofeld or George Soros as perpetrators, and leaves you with a short list of countries with access to both a launch site and possessing nukes small enough to be put that high.
I would like a Russian to explain how a missile interceptor in Poland is a threat to Russian ICBMs that would be fired over the north pole.
I'm just sayin'.
Or would the Polish interceptors prevent the Russians from targeting Western Europe, with its shrinking, aging population and laughable military budgets? You know, all those people dependent on Russian gas for heat and cooking?
Isn't that a bit like Spain fearing the military might of Portugal?
I suspect this Russian posturing comes from a desire to remain somebody "dangerous". A player. And chagrin that once the Warsaw Pact collapsed, everyone abandoned their sphere of influence with embarrassing haste.
Anyone who dismisses the threat from China is being very foolish. We dismissed the threat from Japan in 1941 and we all know what happened there. I would challenge the assertion that Chinese missles are not accurate. The Clinton administration saw to it that American technology was transferred to the Chinese to close that gap.
I hope neither occurs, but I do wonder: If America is to be destroyed, what will the catalyst be? The economic policies of the progressive left or an attack (e.g., an EMP attack) by a 'rogue' state? Actually, they really go hand-in-hand: an economic collapse (which is already occurring) will severely reduce our military capabilities, which in turn will embolden our enemies.
1. Other than the 'some regimes are potentially insane' argument, you offer no explanation of the circumstances in which simple deterrence would break down and a state might contemplate a first strike. In reality the only circumstances in which a first strike would be contemplated would be those in which the US presented an existential threat to the existence of a state, just as the first use of nuclear weapons was only truly contemplated by either side during the Cold War in such circumstances. Missile defence is therefore generally viewed by weaker states as an effort to circumvent deterrent structures in order to enable US freedom of action. That perception is rather more sane than the contention that some states are sufficiently insane to risk first use unprovoked.
2. Even with missile defence systems in place, a threatened state would be likely to employ available capability in the event of an existential threat materialising. If that missile defence were not wholly effective and an attck found its target, this would necessitate a proportionate - and potentially disproportionate - reaction in order to deter or prevent further attack.
3. In recent history, the use of ballistic missiles has generally been seen as means of a relatively weak power delivering strategic effect in the absence of advanced air power capable of pentrating a superior opponent's air defences. This provides a very sound argument for the development and deployment of theatre missile defence capabilities optimised for countering such threats. However, once the offensive capability becomes nuclear, the game changes completely.
4. Over the longer term, more limited strategic missile defences have always been proposed to counter a limited threat because of the technical impossibility of defending against a more substantial threat. In the 1960s missile defence evolved from attempting to counter the Soviet threat to dealing with a more limited Chinese threat and ulitmately to simply preserving a retaliatory capability - before it was axed.
