The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, thinks that Iran is a “rational actor.” He is indisputably correct.
Iran has, quite rationally, concluded that if it spins thousands of centrifuges to enrich enough uranium, it will soon have the bomb. Just as rationally, it believes it can string the West along. Then there is its airtight chain of cause and effect in the alleged plot against the Saudi ambassador to the United States: If it hired a Mexican drug gang, and that gang blew up a Washington, D.C., restaurant, and the Saudi ambassador was dining there at the time, the ambassador would die. Q.E.D.
General Dempsey said too little and too much about the Iranian regime. Tehran couldn’t have made itself into the world’s foremost exporter of terror and extended its tentacles throughout the Middle East without resorting to rational calculation. That’s obvious. What Dempsey is implying, though, is that a regime capable of such calculation can necessarily be deterred if it gets a nuclear weapon. That’s an unsupportable leap.
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If there’s one thing we should have established beyond doubt during the past decade, it is that involvement in terror attacks on American soil is extremely costly to the perpetrators. Nonetheless, according to the U.S. government, the Iranians hatched a plot against the Saudi ambassador where the risk bore no relation whatsoever to the possible reward — from our perspective.
More fundamentally from our perspective, there is no point in establishing a theocracy, killing innocents abroad, pursuing sectarian war, crushing protesters, denying the Holocaust, and threatening Israel with annihilation, either. From the point of view of the Western liberal tradition, the Islamic Republic itself makes no sense. Yet there it is, withstanding punishing economic sanctions to pursue the weapon that the regime wouldn’t want in the first place if it accepted international norms.
If the Soviets, the famous “evil empire” bristling with thousands of nuclear weapons, could be deterred, why not Iran? The Soviet leadership became more pragmatic over time. After Nikita Khrushchev renounced Josef Stalin, it didn’t believe that war with its enemies was imminent and inevitable. Iran’s religio-ideological fire, in contrast, is still burning hot.
A highly ideological leadership with a sense of desperate urgency is the enemy of deterrence. In 1941, Dean Acheson rightly said: “No rational Japanese could believe an attack on us could result anything but disaster.” Except the Japanese — driven by a sense of honor alien to us — believed that they only had two choices: getting squeezed out of China by the U.S., or launching a risky war.
Even in the Cold War, deterrence almost failed. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the airstrike and invasion pushed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff might well have unwittingly prompted a nuclear exchange. The defense secretary at the time, the late Bob McNamara, maintained that “we lucked out.” Ah, yes, that crucial backstop to deterrence — luck.
The Israelis can be forgiven for not feeling very lucky. Do we think Israeli prime minister Bibi Netanyahu and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will establish a “red telephone” to smooth out misunderstandings after Iran goes nuclear? The Iranian regime is factionalized, and it is sure to be the most fanatical elements that control the nukes. It is also prone to bouts of popular unrest threatening its existence. If the regime ever believes it is going down, national martyrdom might look gloriously alluring.
In March 1945, Adolf Hitler gave his infamous Nero Decree, essentially calling for the destruction of Germany. After the first U.S. atomic attack on Hiroshima, the Japanese war minister mused about how wonderful it would be if his nation were destroyed “like a beautiful flower.” It is in this tradition that former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — a relative pragmatist — said that “even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.”
On his own perverse terms, Rafsanjani’s reasoning is unassailable. He’s just another “rational actor.”
All Islamic jihadists are acting rationally. The huge mistake we in the West make is assuming that they are crazy fanatics. The jihadists have over 1000 years of theological scholarship and jurisprudence backing up what they are doing. They are following their religion to the T. The "peaceful, moderate" Muslims are actually the radicals who aren't following their religion - and more power to 'em....
"The jihadists have over 1000 years of theological scholarship and jurisprudence backing up what they are doing."
Well, no, that's not the case; if it were, one would expect the jihadist phenomenon to be 1000 years old. Most of the jihadi philosophy was developed, not by theological scholars, but by secular political activists. Maududi was a journalist; Qutb was an educator; Farag was an electrical engineer and college administrator. Qutb, for example, mixed some Quranic reading with Lenin's idea of the Vanguard of the Proletariat to come up with the prescription he advocated in Milestones.
So, no, if you confuse the political Islamists with theologians, you're making a fundamental error (pun intended).
Hiernonymous,
Really?
How much study did it require for you to get this so studiously wrong?
"if it were, one would expect the jihadist phenomenon to be 1000 years old."
And so it is, well except that it's more like over 1400 years old.
Qutb and Maududi are not necessary for Jihad.
What you say above is full of facts, yet completely misleading.
The concept of jihad is over a thousand years old; the current phenomenon of jihadists conducting terrorist-type attacks under the aegis of political Islam is not. The whole underlying structure - for example, of extending the concept of jahiliya from a historical to an existential state - is relatively recent.
Of course there have been radical offshoots of Islam before - the Kharijites come to mind - and they did not represent mainstream Islamic thought at the time, either. To portray the jihadist phenomenon as some sort of 1000-year continuum representing the norm of Muslim doctrine is - shall we say, full of facts, yet completely misleading?
"… aegis of political Islam…” is a phrase with little relevance to Islam but it’s exactly the kind of erudite sounding language Westerners in denial use as they carefully count, catalogue, and study fascinating grains of the sand into which they’ve stuck their heads.
Considering jahilia to be a state of being rather than a historical period is not a load bearing beam of this “whole underlying structure” to which you allude; it’s little more than a decorative finial, as are the works of Qutb and Maududi.
“Of course there have been radical offshoots of Islam before - the Kharijites come to mind - and they did not represent mainstream Islamic thought at the time, either.”
Then let us leave the Kharijites out. Why drag them in from the kharij if they “did not represent mainstream Islamic thought?” It is as if we have asserted that bears are omnivorous and you dispute this by pointing out “of course there have been omnivorous bears – the ones that raided the dumpster behind that supermarket in Karbala come to mind – and their dietary preferences did not represent the ursine mainstream.” OK. So you know some specific facts about a certain group of nonmainstream bears. With such illogic, one can pretend that sound facts support unsound assertions. Perhaps the uninformed will say “wow, this Heironymous sure knows his Islam.” But the informed ask “Huh? Is Heironymous throwing out selective facts to deliberately obfuscate that which he wishes weren’t so? Or is he full of facts but devoid of understanding?”
"Political Islam" may have little to do with Islam, but it has everything to do with the jihadist movement under discussion. The movement initiated by the likes of Maududi and Qutb, which you dismiss as 'decorative finial,' is in fact a political movement dressed in religious clothing. Groups such as the Islamic Group, Islamic Jihad, al Qai'da, etc, are rooted firmly in the thought of Qutb and similar 20th century figures.
The extension of the concept of jahiliya is also central to this modern 'jihadist' movement. One of the central characteristics of the traditional concept of jihad was that one did not carry out jihad against members of the umma: one did not kill fellow Muslims. (Obviously, Muslims have killed fellow Muslims before, hence my allusion to the Kharijites, who had rejected Ali's acceptance of arbitration of the Caliphate and had to be violently suppressed by the Umayyads.) The key element here is that Muslims have argued and disagreed about the exact extent and meaning of jihad, but the mainstream view since doctrine was settled has been that of the greater/lesser jihad formulation; and there was near-universal acceptance of the idea that jihad did not encompass fellow believers.
Qutb changed all of that by reasoning that jahiliya, rather than referring to the historical period of ignorance that obtained before the coming of the prophet, referred to a mental state of ignorance, a failure to accept True Islam. This is not decorative - it is core to the conduct of the modern extremist agenda. Most of the modern Islamist thinkers (by which I mean the thinkers of extreme political Islam, as opposed to genuine religious thinkers, who would be referred to as "Islamic"), notably Farag in The Neglected Duty, articulated some variation of the concept of the "near enemy" and the "far enemy." The 'near enemy' was the corrupt regime in the country of the organization in question; the 'far enemy' was variously Israel, the U.S., and the West in general. Qutb's formulation, which formed the early basis for Islamist action, involved invoking a variation on Lenin's Vanguard of the Proletariat - call it the Vanguard of the Faithful. He envisioned a group of true believers who segregated themselves from the corrupting influence of the existing state, formed a self-sustaining community, and would engage in a classic campaign of terrorism aimed at destabilizing and delegitimizing the state, and eventually making the classic transition to guerrilla and eventually open warfare. Only when the 'near enemy' had been brought down would attention then be directed at the 'far enemy.'
The formulation of jahiliya is absolutely central to this conception, becuase it justifies the idea of carrying out a campaign of violence against fellow Muslims by calling into question their status as Muslims. Those who support the state, actively or passively, are by definition in a state of jahiliya and thus valid targets of violence.
Events since then have caused different groups to adapt and change emphasis; some groups, in the face of very brutal and very effective counterterrorism efforts by the various regional states, argued that the 'near enemy' should be bypassed for the 'far enemy.' Regardless of the various strategies and goals articulated, though, the jihadists have embraced attacks on fellow Muslims, and the intellectual foundation of these attacks is rooted firmly in the 20th century writers.
It is possible to find previous examples of Muslims killing, or trying to justify the killing, of fellow Muslims; the Hashashiin come to mind. But the Hashashiin were Ismaili radicals, an offshoot of an offshoot, whose actions never represented mainstream Islamic thought. You seem to object to me bringing up the names of such groups, but since nobody who is asserting that today's jihadists represent a millenium of mainstream Islamic convention have brought up specific examples of what they're talking about, we're operating in a vacuum. If you're not referring to the Kharijites, or the Hashashiin, well, then, who?
Don't get me wrong. The concept of jihad is as old as Islam, and has been invoked countless times. Generally, it has been invoked in a manner perfectly consistent with mainstream Islamic doctrine - when Nur al Din called for a jihad to expel the Crusaders, he was invoking jihad in its purest and intended sense. There have been many rulers who have attempted to invoke jihad to rally support for wars that were not really religious - IIRC, the Ottomans invoked jihad in WWI. None of those are similar to the current wave of political Islam's ideologues, using the writings of the past century or so to justify widespread terrorism against Muslim and foreigner alike. (Another aspect of today's 'jihadists' that is relatively new is the salafist emphasis, whose roots are about 300 years old. Other 'purge the impure' movements have sprung up before in Islam - and in every religion that I can think of - but show no obvious connection to today's phenomenon.)
Indeed. Crytal clear illustration and exposition of my earlier point.
Especially rich is this:
"Another aspect of today's 'jihadists' that is relatively new is the salafist emphasis, whose roots are about 300 years old."
Uh-huh. A movement very self consciously rooted in Islam as practiced by the original Muslims... and we trace its roots back 300 years vice the 1400 years which it traces its roots?
Your argument is not with me; it's with Islam.
You seem to be confused. The salafist movement is not the jihadist movement, but most of the jihadists turn to the salafist movement for the form of the religion they wish to implement once they have accomplished their jihadist goals. A salafist is not a terrorist, and you do not get to cherry-pick the reference to salafism if you are trying to discuss this in an intellectually honest manner.
So if your earlier point was that today's jihadist movement, far from representing continuity with 1000+ years of mainstream Islam, is a recent phenomenon, with intellectual foundations about a century old, and turning for religious inspiration to a religious movement only 3 centuries old, then yes, my post was a clear illustration and exposition of your earlier point. Otherwise, you have misread.
I'm confused? Or you are deliberately slippery in manufacturing this "confusion" through purposeful misreading? The comment on salafism addresses your assertion that its roots go back 300 years. I commented on this because it's a fine example telling only the part of the story that suits the needs of the agenda. Ask the Salafists about the roots of Salafism.
I think you're confused, on a couple of accounts. First, the jihadists under discussion and salafists are not the same group of people. By way of analogy, the Viet Minh turned to communism for their political doctrine, but the roots of the Viet Minh were in the nationalist struggle against the colonial French occupation, not in industrial labor conditions in 19th century Europe. The modern jihadists are not a continuation of some sort of millenium-long expression of mainstream Islam; they are a response to the impotence of much of the Muslim world in the face of colonial European dominance, and then of the autocratic and corrupt regimes that in large part replaced it.
As for what the salafists would say about the roots of salafism, they would tell you that they reject 1400 years of Islamic tradition as being unacceptable innovation, embellishment, and corruption of the root teachings of the Qur'an. In short, they reject the millenium of mainstream Muslim tradition to which you appear to attribute the jihadist philosophy, and want to return to the conditions that they imagine (but did not, in reality) obtain during the rule of the Rashiduun. So even if you insist on equating 'salafist' with 'jihadist,' you can see that the proposed return to the beginning represents a new development that rejects essentially the entire history of Islam.
I made no such insistence and you obfuscate in detail.
Since "mainstream Islam" apparently means whatever Islam supports your argument, your argument is tautologically certain to be sound. But the Salafists, aside from calling themselves by another handle, would not tell us "they reject 1400 years of Islamic tradition as being unacceptable innovation, embellishment, and corruption of the root teachings of the Qur'an" They would tell us that they reject all non-Islamic innovations, embellishments and the like that have corrupted Islam over the the last 1400 years and erroneously been adopted as Islamic tradition. They would tell us that they are a reform movement. They would tell us that much of what you might call "mainstream Islam" is actually mainstream perversion of Islam.
Yes, indeed, they would say that what I - and the non-salafist Muslims - call 'mainstream Islam' is actually mainstream perversion of Islam. That's rather the point.
But we appear to be getting sidetracked. This discussion is an examination of the contention that the jihadists, rather than being a new phenomenon outside of mainstream Islam, represents a continuation of traditional Islam. My response is that the 'jihadism' in question is a modern political movement, rooted in specific, identifiable, and recent political Islamist thinkers and writers, and incidentally subscribing to a reform movement in Islam that also happens to be a relatively new phenomenon. "Salafist" and "jihadist" are not equivalent terms, and while most jihadists may be salafists, most salafists are not jihadists, and, indeed, salafist have pointed out that there is no precedent for terrorism in the actions of the Prophet or his companions. (Note that it would not matter, for purposes of this discussion, if salafism were in fact an ancient and traditional expression of Islam, as the jihadist movement is not rooted in salafism. Salafism is a new religious reform movement of the past 3 centuries, but, as I said, that is incidental.)
Perhaps you could make your argument better by establishing in positive fashion how you see the modern jihadists as representative of mainstream or traditional Islamic thought or action; that might give us a basis for a more substantive and fruitful discussion.
Gee thanks professor. But I haven't asserted that modern jihadists are representative of mainstream or traditional Islamic thought or action. This, like the assertion that Salifism is Jihadism, are assertions that you impute to me so that you may refute them. Your writing shows graduate level potential, but that's a sophomoric debating tactic.
And you've made a freshman's mistake in logic: you confuse correlation with causation when you assert that "the 'jihadism' in question is a modern political movement, rooted in specific, identifiable, and recent political Islamist thinkers and writers, and incidentally subscribing to a reform movement in Islam that also happens to be a relatively new phenomenon." The 'jihadism' in question is rooted in Islam. The upswing you correctly correlate but incorrectly attribute to recent political Islamist thinkers and writers has more to do with the dramatic increase in literacy and the availability of books among Muslim than it does with those particular thinkers. The explosion of literacy, book availability, and leisure time to absorb books has allowed a greater portion of the Islamic population that ever before (save perhaps the earliest times, when all Muslims had heard Mohammed personally) to have direct access to the authoritative texts of Islam. Contemporary Muslims are far more able than were earlier generations to compare what they receive as "mainstream" or "tradition" to what they understand when they read Islam's primary texts. The writers on which you wish to hang your hat (the purple one, with the feather) are only influential to the extent that their writings bear comparison to authoritative Islamic sources. They address an audience more literate and more familiar with Islam's primary sources than have been previous generations. For a literate audience that takes its religion seriously, Islam is not so easily watered down with non-Islamic "traditions" and "mainstream-isms."
Nobody imputed the argument concerning jihadists and mainstream Islam to you. I noted that 'this discussion' concerned that assertion - you seem to have forgotten that you entered an exchange already in progress, and that the post that initiated the entire discussion made just that assertion, to which I have alluded several times. If you have this much difficulty following the thread of a discussion, or of keeping the context of a conversation in mind over the course of several days, may I suggest holding off on critiques of others' writing styles and 'debating tactics?' (But thank you for the evaluation of my writing - since you bring it up, the profs at my grad schools also thought my writing showed grad-level potential. Great minds and all of that...)
If we can now dispense with helpful advice and name-calling, we can consider the disavowed original contention a dead topic and turn to your substantive contribution concerning the impact of increased literacy on the population's access to authoritative texts (by which I take it you mean the Qur'an and Hadith, and even that latter is questionable in the context of rejecting all subsequent 'traditions' and 'mainstream-isms.') Let's take a look and see if this matches what we know about the jihadists and Islam.
First up, let's see if what raw facts are available support the historical timeline. The transitional figure Muhammad Abduh was writing in the late 19th century; Maududi's book on the Islamic state was published in 1941. The 'explosion' of literacy during this time frame consisted of a rough doubling of the literacy rate - to about 20% in Egypt by the late 1940s (the time frame, also, in which Qutb was residing in the United States for his studies). During this timeframe, we see the founding of the Jamaat-i-Islami (1941) and the Muslim Brothers (1928), so it appears questionable that the rise of political Islam followed mass literacy, which is largely a post-independence phenomenon.
But let's jump ahead a few years, and look at your contention in the context that the Islamists depend on their legitimacy or success on the ability of the population to read both their writings and the original 'authoritative texts,' and to judge the degree to which the former accurately reflect the latter.
My initial, and most cynical, comment is that the 'masses' are inclined to do no such thing, regardless of literacy rates. Judging by our own experience on these discussion boards, which presumably attract individuals of higher political awareness and literacy than average, few of the people offering very set opinions on matters of Islamic doctrine show any signs of ever having read the Qur'an, the Hadith, or any of the seminal Islamist works. Most opinions seem to be formed by reading editorials and accepting favored writers' assertions concerning the source material, supported by authoritative-sounding selective quotations. Simply based on our own experience, one would question the degree to which the average Egyptian, say, would have read 'The Neglected Duty,' and then have pored over the Qur'an and Hadith to evaluate his arguments.
A bit less cynically, 'mainstream' Islamic doctrine is not a matter of simply reading through the Qur'an, and someone who simply reads the Qur'an cover to cover would find it hard going to understand and build a philosophy of life out of it. The Qur'an, unlike the Bible, is not ordered in chronological order - neither in narrative terms, nor in terms of the order of its revelation. The Qur'an's 'chapters' are ordered by their length. Furthermore, there are later revelations that abrogate earlier revelations, and without some serious Qur'anic education, any given individual would have a difficult time trying to figure out which of two apparently contradictory verses governs a particular situation today. (One can see this, for example, in the verses concerning the People of the Book, which are more general and accommodating during the Meccan period of the revalation, and more specific and confrontational in the late Medina period.) The Qur'an, much like the Bible, can be selectively read and quoted to support nearly any interpretation of nearly any subject, and simple literacy is insufficient to arm the average person to critically assess doctrinal assertions based on such selective citation. Imagine, if you will, how difficult it would be for a Christian to reconcile "an eye for an eye" with "love your neighbor as yourself" if the Bible were not in some sort of chronological order, and if the distinction between Old and New Testaments were not preserved in its organization.
So literacy appears to have followed, not preceded, the first eruption of the influential Islamist writings, and,absent something I've missed, does not seem to support the idea of mass literacy serving to help validate the degree to which Islamist writings supported the authoritative texts.
However, your literacy argument does have merit in another respect. While I was slightly disparaging in referring to the 'explosion' of Arab literacy in the early 20th Century (I say 'Arab' instead of Muslim, because a) Arab literacy is what I have ready access to the literacy statistics on, and 2) since your argument rested on consulting the authoritative texts, and since the Qur'an is in Arabic and only in Arabic, one must be literate in Arabic to consult it), that number did in fact reflect an increase in education, and the Islamist movement was nurtured and spread by precisely that class of educated individuals.
But here's the key point: these individuals were NOT theologians or clerics by training - they received secular educations, and their awareness and resentment of the injustices and humiliations of their societies was coupled with exactly the phenomenon to which you allude: the ability to read the 'authoritative texts' for themselves. However, this leads exactly to my earlier argument: by reading these texts at the surface level, and by focusing on those elements of the texts that supported their revolutationary goals, they generated a doctrine that was a sharp break with, and NOT a continuation of, traditional Muslim theology and doctrine.
So, yes, rising literacy can be said to have played a significant role in the emergence of the Islamist/jihadist phenomenon, but in the sense of giving rise to selective and non-traditional "lay" interpretations of the Qur'an, not in the sense of permitting the masses to vet Islamist writings for their theological accuracy and purity.
Thank you for taking the time to make an interesting and positive argument, however. I enjoyed reading and thinking about it (and look forward to any elaboration). It's the sort of contribution that one wishes would prevail on these forums.
The only predictable part of this American idyll is that Iran can depend upon American stupidity that is only able to see others through the prism of their own arrogance which indulges in the luxury of presuming that the Islamic world is merely a mirror reflection of themselves.
If, in 1960, a mysterious nuclear explosion occurred in central Manhattan, what would the U.S. response have been? If, in 2060, a mysterious nuclear explosion occurs in central Manhattan, what will the U.S. response be? Yes, Iran is terribly rational.
Just for the record, Rick, the closest we came to nuclear war was in 1973 during the Arab-Israeli war. The Israeli Army had just cut off the Egyptian Army and the Soviets were going to send in an Airborne Corps to relieve them. Nixon said that nuclear armed jet fighters would stop them: the Soviets had the troops on the transports and Nixon had the jets loaded with AIR-2A nuclear tipped rockets.
Oh, if you wondered why the Soviet Union was so interested in saving the Egyptian Army it's because the Egyptian Army was supplied with nerve gas to shell Israeli cities. It's one thing to say "we were lucky" in the Cuban missile crisis. It's quite another thing to find out that Nixon did the right thing at the right time because Egypt was going to use nerve gas against the residents of Israel. Yes, the Islamic objective was the destrucition of Israel; a few Israeli tank divisions and Richard Nixon's iron foreign policy saved the world from a second Holocaust.
This story takes us back to a thing brought up about Iran: objective.
What is Iran's objective?
They have simply two objectives. First, it's the destruction of Israel. Second, the other objective is the destruction of the Great Satan, the government of the USA. Iran has one additional objective: martyrdom. Nuclear weapons make the first two possible and may fill the latter.
When we faced the Soviet Union it was after their terrible Civil War, a war with Poland, the internal purges, border skirmishes in China with the Japanese Army, and the loss of millions in the Great Patriotic War. The Russian people were war weary. Even in the Cold War enviorment hundreds of Russian soldiers, sailors, and airmen died in training or using defective equipment. The Cold War was almost as costly as a hot war.
So, the Soviets knew quite well about war and the objective, expansion of their empire, could only be done by use of arms. However, nuclear weapons removed that objective because any objective would have been destroyed by the sun-like burst of thermonuclear weapons.
Iran sees none of that. All they need are two nukes. One can be for Washington and the other for Jerusalem. That would accomplish all of Iran's objectives; the destruction of Israel and of the Great Satan.
It matters not that Iranian cities might be be flattened in a nuclear exchange. Indeed, this poster believes that what is left of the American government will back down, craven cowards to all but those apposed to religious institution funded family planning. Depending on the size of the nuclear weapon used, there might not be that many residents alive in Israel to do a counter strike. A 100 KT weapon will effectively exterminate Isreal.'
Fate has given us a lesson for 2012. It was the phone call of the young widow living in rural Oklahoma to the 911 operator who replied, "you do what you have to do to protect yourself and that baby". Russia and China will say they oppose any action. However, they are like the 911 operator. They are not going to say, "take off the kid gloves and take these jokers out!" They have to play both sides. It would be interesting to hear what is being said in private. China must be in abject terror because they have millions of people who could be killed by the nuclear fallout.
I give our chances of avoiding nuclear war 50-50 in 2012-2014.
destroying DC with a nuke will not destroy the US. However,a single nucdet over the US at enough altitude would cause an EMP burst that would set the US back to 19th century living conditions,that we are NOT prepared for. Many millions of US citizens would die from starvation and disease in the first year,around 90% of the population. It would mean the end of the US.
Iran has been testing SCUD launches with HIGH altitude warhead detonations,characteristics of an EMP sneak attack. Iran does not need containerships to reach Israel with it's missiles,but it does to hit the US. Also,Iran has been building a missile base in Venezuela,bringing their IRBMs within range of US cities. they could have anthrax or chemical warheads. Iran's first use of a nuke may not be on Israel,it is more likely to be over the US. With the US crippled and out of the way,Iran would be free to do as they please,and Israel would have no one to support it.
Why would some destroyed electronics kill 90% of the people in the USA? and in a year are you kidding me? ANYTHING that an EMP bomb could destroy would be replaced quickly.
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