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‘Die, Die, Foreigners!’
We have everything in Afghanistan except strategic purpose.

By Mark Steyn


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Afghans shout anti-U.S. slogans in Ghani Khail, east of Kabul, February 2012.


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Say what you like about Afghans, but they’re admirably straightforward. The mobs outside the bases enflamed over the latest Western affront to their exquisitely refined cultural sensitivities couldn’t put it any plainer:

“Die, die, foreigners!”

And foreigners do die. USAF Lieutenant Colonel John Loftis, 44, and Army Major Robert Marchanti II, 48, lost their lives not on some mission out on the far horizon in wild tribal lands in the dead of night but in the offices of the Afghan Interior Ministry. In a “secure room” that required a numerical code to access. Gunned down by an Afghan “intelligence officer.” Who then departed the scene of the crime unimpeded by any of his colleagues.

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Some news outlets reported the event as a “security breach.” But what exactly was breached? The murderer was by all accounts an employee of the Afghan government, with legitimate rights of access to the building and its secure room, and “liaising” with his U.S. advisers and “mentors” was part of the job. In Afghanistan, foreigners are dying at the hands of the locals who know them best. The Afghans trained by Westerners, paid by Westerners, and befriended by Westerners are the ones who have the easiest opportunity to kill them. It is sufficiently non-unusual that the Pentagon, as is the wont with bureaucracies, already has a term for it: “green-on-blue incidents,” in which a uniformed Afghan turns his gun on his Western “allies.”

So we have a convenient label for what’s happening; what we don’t have is a strategy to stop it — other than more money, more “hearts and minds” for people who seem notably lacking in both, and more bulk orders of the bestselling book Three Cups of Tea, an Oprahfied heap of drivel extensively exposed as an utter fraud but which a delusional Washington insists on sticking in the kit bag of its Afghan-bound officer class.

Don’t fancy the tea? A U.S. base in southern Afghanistan was recently stricken by food poisoning due to mysteriously high amounts of chlorine in the coffee. As Navy Captain John Kirby explained, “We don’t know if it was deliberate or something in the cleaning process.”

Oh, dear. You could chisel that on the tombstones of any number of expeditionary forces over the centuries: “Afghanistan. It’s something in the cleaning process.”

In the last couple of months, two prominent politicians of different nations visiting their troops on the ground have used the same image to me for Western military bases: crusader forts. Behind the fortifications, a mini-West has been built in a cheerless land: There are Coke machines and Krispy Kreme doughnuts. Safely back within the gates, a man can climb out of the full RoboCop and stop pretending he enjoys three cups of tea with the duplicitous warlords, drug barons, and pederasts who pass for Afghanistan’s ruling class. The visiting Western dignitary is cautiously shuttled through outer and inner perimeters, and reminded that even here there are areas he would be ill-advised to venture unaccompanied, and tries to banish memories of his first tour all those years ago when aides still twittered optimistically about the possibility of a photo op at a girls’ schoolroom in Jalalabad or an Internet start-up in Kabul.

The last crusader fort I visited was Kerak Castle in Jordan a few years ago. It was built in the 1140s, and still impresses today. I doubt there will be any remains of our latter-day fortresses a millennium hence. Six weeks after the last NATO soldier leaves Afghanistan, it will be as if we were never there. Before the election in 2010, the New York Post carried a picture of women registering to vote in Herat, all in identical top-to-toe bright blue burkas, just as they would have looked on September 10, 2001. We came, we saw, we left no trace. America’s longest war will leave nothing behind.

They can breach our security, but we cannot breach theirs — the vast impregnable psychological fortress in which what passes for the Pashtun mind resides. Someone accidentally burned a Koran your pals had already defaced with covert messages? Die, die, foreigners! The president of the United States issues a groveling and characteristically clueless apology for it? Die, die, foreigners! The American friend who has trained you and hired you and paid you has arrived for a meeting? Die, die, foreigners! And those are the Afghans who know us best. To the upcountry village headmen, the fellows descending from the skies in full body armor are as alien as the space invaders were to Americans in the film Independence Day.

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COMMENTS   114

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   03/03/12 05:40

"They can breach our security, but we cannot breach theirs — the vast impregnable psychological fortress in which what passes for the Pashtun mind resides."

Mark, this is not simply a Pashtun problem. The man accused of murdering our officers at MoI was a Tajik from the Salang region, a Northern Alliance bastion. I don't know what the ethnicities were of the other Afghan soldiers and police who have killed dozens of our personnel, but I would be willing to bet some of them were Tajiks as well. I would also point out that most of the worst riots that occurred in the wake of the Koran burnings occurred in areas where the population is ethnically mixed, but NOT in the major Pashtun population centers in the south, such as Kandahar and Helmand. I'll remind you as well that the slaughter of UN personnel last year occurred in the Tajik stronghold of Mazar-e-Sharif.

This is no small quibble. How have we come to be in this position? How is it that those who hated and fought the Taliban, and who helped us topple them, are now turning on us? I don't have the answers, but I think it's clear that things have become so disfunctional over there, we have no chance of fixing the mess. Time to bail.

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schubert8
   03/03/12 05:53

For the USA and the West to have any success in Afghanistan it must have some sort of aim. What would it consider success? (I no longer use the word victory)

The USA seems aimless about its operations in Afghanistan. There is no purpose, no goal. Without a purpose they risk being simply stuck doing a strange mixture of defensive social work while taking casualties.

Leaving might be embarassing, all sorts of people will crow about American weakness but ultimately, staying and staying, achieving nothing but taking painful losses is going to be a lot more than embarassing.

Either clearly decide what success is and make a determined effort to achieve it or else leave.

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schubert8
   03/03/12 05:54

For the USA and the West to have any success in Afghanistan it must have some sort of aim. What would it consider success? (I no longer use the word victory)

The USA seems aimless about its operations in Afghanistan. There is no purpose, no goal. Without a purpose they risk being simply stuck doing a strange mixture of defensive social work while taking casualties.

Leaving might be embarassing, all sorts of people will crow about American weakness but ultimately, staying and staying, achieving nothing but taking painful losses is going to be a lot more than embarassing.

Either clearly decide what success is and make a determined effort to achieve it or else leave.

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   03/03/12 06:00

As one of many Reaganauts who helped the Afghans show the Soviets the way home, may I ask Mark where we would be had OBL chosen some completely different base of operations, Manchester or Madagascar, say ?

Farangs like us were scarcely less unwelcome in the trans-Karakorum funny hat belt before al Qaeda appeared there, the Talibs having made their debut a century earlier.

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Micha Elyi
   03/03/12 14:36

"[W]here we would be had OBL chosen some completely different base of operations, Manchester... say?"

The Brits would have acknowledged OBL's criminality, for starters.

Try again.

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 MAFV
   03/03/12 07:32
Micha Elyi
   03/03/12 14:39

Ann Coulter's advice of Sept. 12, 2001 which sent the goodie-goodies of National Review into fits and spasms becomes more and more intelligent with each passing month.

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Michael McCanles
   03/05/12 18:42

Steyn as usual illustrates for us the utter unresistable power of precisely argued common sense. Only the 18th-century satirists do as well. Is it possible to pick up Afghanistan, flip it over on its head, and the drop it the on ground--hard? We don't need it. It thinks it doesn't need us. Game, set, match.

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Tenn Slim
   03/03/12 07:39

ALL
Afghanistan war was essentially over in 2001/2 when the Spec Ops folks drove the Taliban over into Pakistan.
Now. We have Predators. We have LOOOOONG range capabilities.
Lets leave the ugly place, monitor for training camps, take essential only action, then let the rest of the world worry about logistics trails, Hindu Kush Population, and let the Afghans go back into thier history. These folks have been on stage long enough.
Semper Fi

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   03/03/12 07:43

"... we have the most advanced technology known to man; we have everything except strategic purpose."

Add to that a lack of cajones and you have the perfect description of the modern Western male. Perhaps that's the root of our problem.

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hmastercylinder
   03/03/12 08:00

Oh, nicely played!
"Cojones", "male", and "root"
Very cute.
Peter O'Toole would be ecstatic!

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   03/03/12 12:39

We've even managed to persuade ourselves that it makes sense for a civilized state to put its female population in combat.

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   03/03/12 15:56

Add to that a lack of cajones

Someone's been stealing our bureau drawers?

Oh. You mean cojones. Use the ojo as a mnemonic (wink wink nudge nudge).

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iamhandy
   03/03/12 08:20

No strategic purpose? Maybe the really sad problem is that we really and truly think we do have one.

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   03/03/12 08:22

Right on target Mr. Steyn. No wonder Ron Paul's policy proscriptions are increasingly popular.

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   03/03/12 08:33

It was Bush's fault...and this time I'm serious. Half-reared war will get you nowhere. Nation building is folly if you don't totally defeat the enemy, and by that I mean crush the will of the whole country and start over. Hand-holding and BFF will not work. Obama is worse of course, but it all started with George.

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   03/03/12 08:50

No, this is the fault of the Vietnam-era war protestors. This country hasn't had the cojones to fight a war and win since then. We are too cowardly to fight war as it should be done -- ruthlessly. We are too concerned with the PR image, and wind up staying longer, killing more, and ultimately not achieving the goal.

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Rodger Potocki
   03/03/12 09:30

It's the opposite. Bush knew enough not to commit large numbers of troops. The Taliban was dispatched from power with minimum American force involvement. It became the "good war" for Democrats particularly Obama and Hillary as they campaigned. They escalated our involvement without any actual purpose or need. There is nothing of value in Afghanistan unless you're a drug lord. My goodness, Obama even made the error of a "surge" which made no sense at all.

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Rodger Potocki
   03/03/12 09:36

It's the opposite. Bush was correct not to commit a lot of troops top a place that has nothing except poppy fields. The Taliban were dispatched from power with minimum American ground troop commitment. Obama and Clinton elevated their "good war" complete with a surge. I'm not even sure they know why. Now, they've committed us in for at least two more years for, as Styne points out, with no actual purpose.

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   03/03/12 09:47

I hear what you are saying and I sympathize, but what is your goal? Why would "starting over" get us somewhere different? Tabula rasa has a bad, progressive tradition. If that's what you want then--and maybe you're right--then you have to fill in the blanks.

Let's double, triple, quadruple our military commitment to Afghanistan. If we do this, it will result in __________. Then we can start over and by virtue of __________ the same thing won't happen again.

Derbyshire was the biggest hawk at NRO for getting into Iraq (I agreed with him). Turn their cities to rubble, he said. Then almost as quickly he was the biggest dove at NRO. Then he said we invaded the wrong country and that we should have invaded Iran. What goal? What strategy?

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