Obama’s Open Microphone
The president shouldn’t be offering concessions to Russia, in private or in public.

President Obama and outgoing Russian president Dmitry Medvedev meet in Seoul, South Korea, March 26, 2012.


The remarks of President Obama to Dmitry Medvedev over an open microphone, in which he promised that in a second term, he will have flexibility on the issue of global missile defense, shows that when it comes to U.S.–Russian relations, Obama is a stunningly slow learner.

The relations between a U.S. president and a Russian leader often follow a depressing pattern. The American leader charms (or thinks he charms) his Russian counterpart. The Russian leader begins to engage in criminal behavior, which gets steadily worse. Finally, something big happens — the invasion of Afghanistan, the nuclear poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in London, the invasion of Georgia — and the realization dawns that the Russian is neither a Christian nor a friend and he has to be approached with realism.

Since taking office in 2008, Obama has had ample reason to reconsider the wisdom of relying on Russian goodwill, including Russia’s fixed elections and official involvement in the murder of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. But he persists in seeing the Putin regime as a “partner” and the real threat as coming from the political opposition in the U.S.

Obama hinted in his now-public conversation with Medvedev that he is ready to meet Russian concerns. In fact, he needs to be prevented from doing so because the steps the Russians are demanding will not lead to a real improvement in relations and are inimical to the security interests of the U.S.

Russian complaints about the threat from a U.S. missile-defense system to their nuclear deterrent are a fabrication. As Russia’s own defense experts have acknowledged, U.S. missiles pose no threat to Russia’s ICBM force that is intended to strike over the North Pole. The missiles intended for deployment in Europe are designed for a completely different purpose. It should therefore be out of the question to provide Russians with classified information about U.S. missile capabilities in order to convince Russians of what they already know.

In fact, Russia is not worried about a threat to its strategic missiles but rather to its tactical missiles. The defensive missiles to be deployed by NATO, if developed into a ramified network, might negate Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, which are useful not for retaliation against a Western attack, but rather for keeping U.S. allies under threat. Their potential role was demonstrated by Russia’s warnings of possible missile strikes against Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and, recently, Western Europe for either hosting missile-defense systems or joining NATO.

In response to the deadlock over European missile defense, Russia suggested a joint missile shield with both NATO and Russia at the controls, decisions made jointly, and Russia offered a specific area of responsibility. How this would have worked is hard to imagine. In any case, in November, Medvedev himself demonstrated why there can be no shared defense when he threatened to deploy missiles in the Kaliningrad region, which borders Poland and Lithuania, and aim them at U.S. missile-defense sites if there was no agreement.

Russia has, admittedly, expanded its cooperation with the U.S. over Afghanistan. As of May 2011, 170,000 U.S. personnel had transited Russian territory on over 1,000 flights. But the defeat of the Taliban is critical to Russia’s own security. On the other hand, Russia shows a complete disregard for the danger that Iran’s nuclear program presents to the West.