Is it time to start talking about the inevitable demise of the Democratic party?
Since the 1990s there’s been a thriving cottage industry of doomsaying about the Republican party. The gold standard of the genre is undoubtedly 2002’s The Emerging Democratic Majority by Ruy Teixeira and John Judis, which argued that the Democrats were destined to become a majority party because demographic and cultural trends were on their side. The increasing cultural liberalism of professionals, the dramatic growth of Latinos, and the increasingly liberal attitudes of (single) women were celebrated by Teixeira and Judis as proof that time was on the Democrats’ side.
And they may have been right, had all the trends they identified or took for granted continued to move in a straight line.
McGovern lost in a massive landslide (61 percent to 38 percent).
The problem for the Democratic party is that its core philosophy and mechanisms are increasingly ill-suited to our times.
In an essay for National Affairs titled “The Politics of Loss,” Jay Cost recounts how the entire edifice of post–World War II politics is starting to crumble under the weight of debt and impending austerity. “The days when lawmakers could give to some Americans without shortchanging others are over; the politics of deciding who loses what, and when and how, is upon us,” Cost writes. He’s undoubtedly right when he adds, “Neither party yet fully understands the implications of this shift, which means both parties risk being caught unprepared when the economic slowdown forces profound changes in American politics.”
But there’s a key difference between the parties. The Democrats tend to be more traditionally coalitional: If everyone sticks together, everyone gets paid. In the age of austerity, however, zero-sum politics become more of the norm. When one constituency’s victory is another’s loss, the payoff for solidarity diminishes.
Already, across the country, there’s a growing rift between unions in the public sector and the private sector, perhaps not in official statements, but clearly in terms of rank-and-file voters and popular perceptions. Wisconsin governor Scott Walker got 37 percent of the vote from union households in his recall fight, in part because private-sector union members understood how much the private sector needed a healthy state economy.