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 emocratic
victories in the New Jersey and Virginia gubernatorial elections
on Tuesday are, predictably, being characterized as proof that the
era of big government is back. Political pundits are also suggesting
that the tax-cutting message of the GOP, which was pay dirt for
Republicans in the 1990s, is no longer appealing to the median 21st-century
voter. Only people who paid zero attention to what was said in these
two races could make that claim.
Surely the
defeats of Bret Schundler in New Jersey and Mark Earley of Virginia
are blows to conservatives. Both ran as strong anti-tax candidates.
Both attacked the victorious Democrats (Mark Warner in Virginia
and Jim McGreevey in New Jersey) for their secret plans to raise
taxes. And both lost. But not because New Jersey and Virginia voters
opted for a return to Democratic tax-and-spend policies.
Just the opposite.
One of the most remarkable features of these two races was that
Warner and McGreevey both veered as far to the right on fiscal issues
as Democrats are permitted to without entirely alienating the left-wing
base of their party. They ran successful campaigns as Bill Clinton
new Democrat fiscal conservatives eschewing the era of big government.
They both pledged in their debates that they would not raise taxes
to balance the state budget. In fact, as any Northern Virginian
knows full well, Warner spent millions of dollars on omnipresent
TV ads to tell voters exactly that. Warner described himself as
a pro-George W. Bush "fiscal conservative" and touted
his "plan for action" indicating how budget deficits could
be avoided without raising taxes. He pledged allegiance to the car-tax
elimination, which had been a polar star for Republican Jim Gilmore
back in 1997. Warner sounded, in short, like a 1990s taxaphobic
Republican.
McGreevey's 11th-hour conversion to the no-new-taxes camp was even
more dramatic. At the start of the campaign McGreevey refused to
pledge not to raise taxes, trotting out the traditional Democratic
mantra that such a promise would be fiscally irresponsible. But
as Schundler showed signs of resurrecting his dormant campaign and
gaining ground on McGreevey, the Democrat's message became intensely
anti-tax. In the last debate, McGreevey was again asked if he would
raise taxes. Point blank, he responded that there was no need to
raise taxes and that through streamlining government and agency
consolidation, expenditure cutbacks could keep the budget out of
red ink. McGreevey even criticized the New Jersey Republicans (with
much accuracy) for fiscal mismanagement and overspending and excessive
reliance on debt during the Christie Whitman years. At the Cato
Institute, one of us (Moore) had been attacking Whitman and the
New Jersey legislature for exactly this fiscal profligacy.
What was most
excruciating for New Jersey liberals was when McGreevey was asked
about his vote in 1991 for the giant Jim Florio tax hike. For years
this vote was a badge of honor for leftists, who still maintain
that Florio did the right thing. New Jersey voters sure don't. So
McGreevey pulled a stunning mea culpa, saying that if he knew then
what he knows now, "no, I clearly wouldn't have voted for that
tax hike." You could just see James Carville, the political
architect of that soak the rich tax hike, cringing in embarrassment.
Now, we've
both been around politics long enough to be deeply skeptical of
the Warner and McGreevey oaths not to raise taxes. Our hope is that
Warner keeps his promises and turns out to be another Doug Wilder,
the Old Dominion's most fiscally tightfisted governor in 20 years,
despite being a Democrat. But fiscally stressful times are ahead
for the states, and new taxes are going to be mighty tempting option
for these Democrats. But in both states, any such tax flip-flop
will prove mighty costly politically. Our advice to McGreevey and
Warner: Don't go there.
If Warner or
McGreevey doubt the political penalty they might face for flip-flopping
on taxes, they might put in a call to former New Jersey Gov. James
Florio. Twelve years ago, Florio won a record Democratic landslide
against GOP Congressman Jim Courter by, among other things, ruling
out an increase in state taxes. By January l990, Florio's first
month in office, he had "discovered" a fiscal shortfall
that necessitated one of the steepest, most punishing tax increases
in the history of New Jersey or any other state. And, of course,
the rest is history: Christine Todd Whitman rode the income-tax-cutting
agenda to a stunning victory, presaging the landslide for Republicans
in 1994.
One other factor
played a big role in both these GOP defeats: party disunity. In
New Jersey, Bret Schundler is still waiting for an endorsement from
Gov. Donald DiFrancesco, the liberal acting Republican governor
who was forced out of this race in the spring because of financial
scandals. Christie Whitman's endorsement was tepid at best. She
played into McGreevey's hand by remarking that Schundler had some
positions "outside the mainstream" of New Jersey. To all
too many liberal Republicans, particularly in the northeast, the
"big tent" of party unity is a concept apparently meant
to be binding on conservative primary losers, but not on liberal
primary losers like DiFrancesco.
There's no
sugarcoating it: November 7th was a bad day for Republicans. Democrats
are sure to tax a page out of the McGreevey and Warner playbooks
and run carbon-copy campaigns as they attempt to take the House
in the critical 2002 midterm elections. This is all the more reason
that congressional Republicans cement themselves to a strong pro-tax-cut
position so that Democrats can't move to the right of them on fiscal
issues this year and next.
The New Jersey
and Virginia elections were a vindication, not a repudiation, of
the power of fiscal-conservative values in America. When Democrats
have to run as anti-tax advocates of fiscal restraint to win office,
and when they have to distance themselves from the party's tax and
spend liberal roots, the battle for pro-growth economic policies
is being won.
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