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Seeing Sights That Almost Stop Your Heart



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John Roberts vs. Michael Jackson:

“The office of presidential correspondence is not yet an adjunct of Michael Jackson’s PR firm,” Roberts wrote in a memo to his boss on June 22, 1984, opposing a request by the singer’s publicist for a presidential letter praising the star’s work against drunken driving.

In opposing the wishes of Jackson, Roberts acknowledged that he was a voice in the wilderness — but being a future Supreme Court nominee, he used the Latin. “I recognize that I am something of a vox clamans in terris in this area,” he wrote, “but enough is enough.”

Can You Feel the Disappointment in the Air?



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From the Washington Post this morning: “Roberts Unlikely To Face Big Fight.”


Translation: Nothing’s Sticking!

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Roberts, Raspberry & Busing



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It’s interesting that one of William Raspberry’s complaints about Judge Roberts is that he has been an “advocate of positions,” such as limitations on mandatory busing, “seem well out of the settled mainstream” to “civil rights partisans.” Raspberry, after all, has himself often advocated positions “well out of the settled mainstream” as judged by “civil rights partisans.” Raspberry has criticized civil-rights groups for failing to support school choice and has raised doubts about the value of forced busing to improve educational opportunity for African Americans.

Enviros and Roberts



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This WSJ article on environmentalists’ views on the Roberts nomination does a good job of fairly characterizing Roberts’s record. Of note, it quotes the Sierra Club’s David Bookbinder saying, “His record on the D.C. court is even-handed . . . There is certainly no pro- or anti-environmental bias we can see. We’re glad, but these are not the sort of cases that go to the Supreme Court.” What’s particularly interesting about the article is that it makes clear that many environmentalist legal types are more concerned with the policy outcomes in environmental cases than they are with the legal questions at issue. In this environmentalists are not alone – indeed, it can be said of many activist groups – but it is worth nothing nonetheless.

Roberts’s White House Counsel Records--The Exclusionary Rule



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In January 1983, Roberts wrote a memo that highlighted a recent National Institute of Justice study on the effect of the exclusionary rule. (The exclusionary rule, the judicially crafted remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment, generally bars illegally obtained evidence from being admitted.) According to Roberts’s memo, “the study shows that the exclusionary rule resulted in the release of 29% of felony drug arrestees in Los Angeles in one year—a far cry from the highly misleading 0.4% figure usually bandied about.” Roberts concludes: “This study should be highly useful in the campaign to amend or abolish the exclusionary rule.”

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Roberts’s White House Counsel Records--Voluntary School Prayer



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In June 1985, the Supreme Court ruled in Wallace v. Jaffree that an Alabama statute that authorized a period of silence in public schools for “meditation or silent prayer” violated the Establishment Clause. On the day of the ruling, John Roberts prepared a memorandum for the White House Counsel that summarized and discussed the ruling. Roberts opined that “careful analysis shows at least a majority of the Justices would vote to uphold a simple moment-of-silence statute.” But “the decision shows we still have an uphill battle to return prayer to schools.”

In November 1985, with the benefit of 5-1/2 months’ time to reflect on Wallace v. Jaffree, Roberts commented that the conclusion in that case “that the Constitution prohibits such a moment of silent reflection—or even silent ‘prayer’—seems indefensible.” Roberts made his comment in the course of discussing a proposed constitutional amendment to permit “silent prayer or reflection in public schools,” an amendment that he expected the Reagan administration to support.

Roberts’s White House Counsel Records--Abortion



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Two items are noteworthy (in addition to Roberts’s unequivocal condemnation of bombings and other acts of violence against abortion clinics):

1. In October 1985 Roberts was asked to review a proposed telegram to be sent from President Reagan to a memorial service to be held in Los Angeles for some 16,500 aborted fetuses that had been discovered at a medical laboratory in 1982. The draft telegram, quoting Lincoln’s words at Gettysburg, stated that “just as the terrible toll of Gettysburg can be traced to a tragic decision of a divided Supreme Court, so also can the deaths we mourn.” It stated that Roe “made void all our laws protecting the lives of infants developing in their mothers’ wombs” and noted that “[o]nce again [as in Dred Scott] a whole category of human beings had been ruled outside the protection of the law by a court ruling which clashed with our deepest moral convictions.” The draft prayed that God would “speed the day when the right to life of every human being . . . is honored and protected by our laws and our public policy.”

Roberts wrote that he had “only one small objection” to the text of the draft telegram–namely, that it would be more accurate to say that Roe voided “many of our laws” rather than “all our laws.” He added that, in accord with Reagan’s position on abortion, a “memorial service would seem an entirely appropriate means of calling attention to the abortion tragedy.”

2. In June 1985 Roberts was asked to review talking points that had been drafted for President Reagan for a telephone call to an anti-abortion rally in Los Angeles. Approving the talking points, Roberts noted that they “call for reversing ‘the tragedy of Roe v. Wade,’ ” “not[e] advances in medical technology that permit increased care for the unborn, and applaud[] those who are providing compassionate alternatives to abortion.”

Roberts’s White House Counsel Records



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I’ve spent much of today reviewing several thousand pages of documents from John Roberts’s files as a White House lawyer from 1982 to 1986. These documents show that John Roberts was a forceful proponent of Reagan administration policies on abortion, school prayer, the exclusionary rule, and other hotly contested issues. Those who try to portray Judge Roberts as a squishy moderate will not find any supporting evidence in these documents.

I’ll have a series of posts on these records as soon as I am able.

Raspberry Vinaigrette



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By now this is like shooting fish in a barrel, but some fish just ask for it. As I noted this morning, William Raspberry opines in his Washington Post column today that “to civil rights partisans” (that includes him, of course), Roberts has taken positions that “seem well out of the settled mainstream.”

Like a lot of liberal pundits, Raspberry has a lazy way of assuming that such fog-words as “mainstream” have an accepted meaning that is uncontested by people of good faith. But just what is the “mainstream” in constitutional interpretation is contested all the time, and has been since John Jay became the first chief justice.

Chin-pulling about hewing to the “mainstream” has preoccupied Raspberry’s columns about Robert Bork, on July 3, September 14, and September 21, 1987; about who would be next to be nominated after Bork’s defeat, on October 16, 1987; about the first President Bush’s future nominees to the Court, on November 11, 1988; about Clarence Thomas on July 10, August 7, and September 11, 1991; and about John Ashcroft’s nomination as attorney general, on January 19, 2001.

Raspberry’s record is completely devoid of any worries about whether Democratic presidents’ nominees are in or out of the “mainstream.” He simply assumes they are in it. The mainstream is, it appears, the possession of liberal Democrats, and Raspberry mans one of the picket boats defending its pristine waters from entry by “extremists” nominated by Republican presidents.

Once upon a time, the “mainstream” in constitutional jurisprudence was the principle of “separate but equal” under the Fourteenth Amendment. One of Raspberry’s heroes, Thurgood Marshall, thought that mainstream wasn’t good enough. But it hasn’t seemed to occur to William Raspberry that “out of the mainstream” is an epithet, not an argument.

More Questions About Questions



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Robert Alt finds an opinion he attributes to me “incredible.” He ascribes to me the position that senators must ask questions about specific pending cases, or they fail to do their constitutional duty under the Article I “advise and consent” clause. But that is not my position. My position–as staked out in a couple of posts last week–is that a senator who knows nothing definite about what a nominee thinks the Constitution says about secularism, abortion, and same-sex marriage should not consent to that nominee’s appointment. How could “consent” in such a state of ignorance be squared with a senator’s duty to uphold the Constitution which, by my hypothesis, has been grossly distorted on these matters by the Court? How would “consent” in this state of ignorance be conscientious?

My post in response to an intervention by Ramesh makes especially clear that my position is not that senators must ask about specific cases, pending or otherwise. My position has to do with what a senator needs to know to do his job. Mine is a position about what information is needed to make a conscientious decision, a decision which the Constitution charges a senator to make. As I said in response to Ramesh: Consider a nominee whose views on secularism, abortion, same-sex marriage and the Constitution are crystal clear coming into hearing. Consider, I said, a nominee such as I. A conscientious senator could vote me up or down without any hearings at all.

I do think that broad questioning of a nominee less notorious than I may be needed for a senator to discharge his or her constitutional responsibility. If it is needed, the senator should ask. Robert Alt may agree with me here so long as questions about “specific cases” are avoided. Maybe Robert even agrees with me that senators may (should?) be seeking to learn from a nominee through broad, but not case-specific questioning, what I think needs to known before consenting–the Constitution and secularism, etc. If so, the remaining issues between us may be too insignificant to debate in a public forum.

Just in case, though, I should like to respond to a few points Robert makes against what he takes to be my position.

One is his claim that “grilling” nominees has a short history, going back (he says) no further than Brown v. Board of Education. I grant this point, but I do not see what difference it makes. I never argued for broad questioning on the basis of historical practice. I do not know anyone who has. Robert does not seem to suggest that the pre-Brown practice sets a constitutionally required standard for senators. (It does not.)

Maybe perfunctory hearings were not a good idea even back when senators
thought they were. A few years after Brown senators chose to ask little of two Republicans nominees to the Supreme Court sent up by Eisenhower. These two men sailed through the Senate. I wish they had not. In fact, Ike later wished that they had not; he regretted their appointment to the Court. But each had political/demographic credentials which made them attractive to Ike; in one case, the nominee’s religion was his central qualification. These men were Charles Whittaker, as undistinguished a justice as ever sat on the Court, and a man whose nervous system was broken by the work. The other man filled the “Catholic seat” on the Court. His name was William Brennan.

For that matter, Ike regretted his first high court appointment, another man whose political credentials got him the him the job. His name was Earl Warren.

Robert thinks it is “tad peculiar” for conservatives to rely upon a times-have-changed argument. I cannot imagine why he should find it so. Times do change. “Conservatives” along with everyone else have to deal with it. Robert himself recognizes that times have changed; at least, he seems to agree that the Court has become “politicized” in new and important ways. Indeed it has. I do not think anything in “conservatism” holds that appointments to a regrettably politicized institution must not be made with that (regrettable) fact in mind. Indeed, my main point is that the Court has gone well beyond and even against the Constitution on important matters, and that we want to know whether a nominee will bring back the Constitution. If that is too “political” (or something) for Robert, so much the worse for him.

Here are two of the many changes since around 1950 that warrant stricter scrutiny of a Supreme Court nominee. One is “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights in a series of cases culminating in the 1960’s criminal procedure revolution. (Miranda and all that.) “Incorporation” put the Supreme Court in charge across the country of church-state, law enforcement, trial practice, and a host of other matters theretofore reserved to the states. “Incorporation” has resulted in massive bodies of detailed regulation, all under the heading of broad constitutional phrases such as “unreasonable search and seizure”–practically, a common law of search and seizure, of confessions, of “separation” of church and state, etc. These bodies of law include lots of balancing tests and calls about reasonableness and rationality that rest, in part, upon value and policy judgments of the courts. Why not ask then what policies and values a nominee favors?

Two: The role of political parties in American history has been such that much of what senators would want to know about a nominee was conveyed summarily by his party affiliation. If a Republican president nominated a Republican stalwart to the Court in, say, the late nineteenth century, and you knew pretty much what you are getting. The practice since abandoned of nominating leading “public men” to the bench–and not nearly so many sitting judges–contributed to effective shorthand communication. Republican president nominates a sitting Republican judge to the bench in the late twentieth century, and you get . . . David Souter.

Robert says that the “real concern” should be whether a judge views the Court as another “political or legislative body.” I think he means for senators to act as if it were not, no matter what has been happening for, say, 50 years on the Court. Well, okay, I guess. But how much work is this concept going to do now?

What does it mean to say that someone is fit for the Court so long as he views it not as “a political or legislative body”? Some law professors and columnists speak approvingly (i.e., prescriptively) of the Court as a “political” or “legislative” body. They are not going to be nominated to the Court. But fewer and fewer do: We are all “originalists” and “interpetivists” now, they say. And they say this, too: Reversing Roe now would be a “political” act; the wise judicial statesman stays the course, as three Republican appointees told us in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.

On the other hand, many law professors and columnists describe the Court these last few decades as behaving in a “political” or “legislative”
way. They are right. But even these folks (and Roberts may be one of
them) are going to be very reluctant to identify at hearings any particular binding precedent as “political” or “legislative.” To do so would signal a firm intention to overrule, and this would violate some people’s idea (not
mine) of proper hearings etiquette. Besides, to identify a particular piece of settled law as “legislative” or “political” is to invite an avalanche of further questions about what, exactly, distinguishes sound interpretation from judicial legislation. Again, that is not where a nominee is going to want to go.

Chills! Where’s Barry Lynn?



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WASHINGTON - As a young government attorney, John Roberts advised the White House to support congressional efforts to allow school prayer, arguing that a Supreme Court ruling striking down the practice “seems indefensible.”

Raspberry Smoothie



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Over on The Corner, our all-seeing editrix Kathryn Lopez was ahead of me by an hour in noticing William Raspberry’s lame column today. She quotes part of his snarky conclusion about Roberts’s life of “quite extraordinary privilege,” which Raspberry, that man of the people, sees as somehow a kind of disqualification for service on the Supreme Court.

Raspberry’s description of Roberts is “son of a wealthy steel executive . . . attended private schools . . . Harvard and Harvard Law School . . . appeals court clerkship . . . clerkship with . . . Rehnquist . . . special assistant to the U.S. attorney general, and associate counsel to the president . . . one of Washington’s top law firms . . . office of the solicitor general . . . a seat on the . . . D.C. Circuit.” Oh, what a great distance from “real-life . . . problems and concerns” Roberts has enjoyed, concludes Raspberry.

But it appears from what has been published about Roberts’s life that his origins were decidedly middle-class, his dad a mid-level white-collar guy with Bethlehem Steel, at least when the younger John was a kid, and the Roberts family’s two homes in Long Beach, Indiana were fairly modest affairs. Roberts went to a boys’ Catholic boarding school–who knows how much that cost or how hard or easy it was for his father?–but then went off to Harvard as a scholarship student. From then on, Roberts’s success was owing to his own hard work and native talent.

Now compare John Roberts’s story to that of the last appointee to the Court, Stephen G. Breyer. Here’s a brief biographical sketch of Breyer, relying in part on a Washington Post profile from June 26, 1994: His father was a lawyer, for 42 years counsel to the San Francisco Board of Education. Breyer’s childhood milieu was the “large Jewish middle-class community in San Francisco, one generation removed from poverty.” He attended an “academically rigorous public [high] school,” then was off to Stanford, then won a Marshall scholarship to Oxford (he was too un-athletic to get a Rhodes–hmm, what was Clinton’s sport?). Then to Harvard Law, where he made law review. Then a year clerking for Justice Arthur Goldberg at the Supreme Court, followed by two years as special assistant to the U.S. attorney general. Then Breyer spent thirteen years on the full-time faculty of Harvard Law, interrupted only by service on the special Watergate prosecution task force in 1973. Finally, Breyer was appointed to the federal First Circuit in 1980, from which he was elevated 14 years later to the high bench.

Can you see much daylight between the two life histories? And do you remember William Raspberry’s worrying aloud about Stephen Breyer’s detachment from ordinary life when he joined the Court eleven years ago?

Give Raspberry the Raspberry



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It’s a bad day for a columnist when he publishes a piece whose central argument has been thoroughly refuted a few days earlier. That’s the plight of William Raspberry, whose Washington Post column today–arguing for “balance” on the Supreme Court–collapsed before it was constructed, thanks to Keith Whittington’s NRO article last Wednesday. But let us dwell on Raspberry’s partisanship-disguised-as-moderation for a moment.

At one point in his column, Raspberry proudly recycles a couple of paragraphs from a column he wrote “more than a dozen years ago,” making the same kind of case for “balance” on the Court. The vague allusion to the age of the earlier column made me curious. Turns out the old article was published on October 30, 1992, four days before the presidential election that year. Back then he was arguing for electing Bill Clinton, on grounds that the first President Bush had made “two conservative appointments–Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas”–and this was written about four months after Souter played a central role in one of the worst examples of liberal jurisprudence in the twentieth century, the joint opinion (with O’Connor and Kennedy) in Planned Parenthood v. Casey!

It gets worse. In today’s column, Raspberry ends his quotation from his 1992 self with this line: “Only in fairly recent times has the Supreme Court come to be viewed as part of an ideological spoils system.” Snip, end of quotation. But the next two sentences in the 1992 column–omitted in today’s self-quotation–read thus: “That is why it is tilted so far to the right today. And that is why Clinton, should he defeat Bush next Tuesday, ought to start moving it back toward the center.”

Well, Clinton sure did that, didn’t he? He gave us Ginsburg and Breyer, and not a peep was heard from Raspberry about the need for maintaining “balance” on the Court because Clinton was rebalancing it, don’t you see? So “balance” simply means this: Whatever composition of views on the Court shakes out in favor of the liberal agenda on all constitutional questions is declared to be a fine “balance.” Democratic presidents therefore have carte blanche to redress imbalances, understood as the presence of “conservatives” on the Court (like David Souter!). But whenever a Republican is elected, even or especially having run on promises to appoint certain kinds of jurists, the cry goes up from William Raspberry that the current “balance” on the Court must be maintained at all costs.

And I haven’t even gotten to his silly effort to define John Roberts as “well out of the settled mainstream.” What a tool.

Roberts’s Recusal



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Judge Roberts is recusing himself from a case before the D.C. Circuit involving the American Bar Association, even though he had already participated in oral argument in the case, according to this report. (Link may require registration.) Roberts did not give a reason, but the ABA’s pending evaluation of Roberts is the likely cause. The recusal avoids any potential accusations that the ruling could be influenced by what is expected to be a very positive evaluation.

Greens & Roberts



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The WSJ has a long story on environmentalists’ views on the Roberts nomination, but it does not appear to be available on-line. I’ll be driving most of the day (D.C. here I come), but hope to have comments on it later.

Judge Roberts, When Was the Last Time You Made Someone In Your Courtroom Cry?



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Omaha World-Herald:

A Douglas County judge has been publicly reprimanded by the Nebraska Commission on Judicial Qualifications for making impatient and rude comments from the bench. The commission says John Huber made a litigant cry, then berated her.

LATimes 4 Roberts



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I’d expect a lot more of this in the wake of the NARAL debacle. Though I wonder if it (thirst for blood) turns around again come closer to hearing date.

“John Roberts is either a mad bomber of abortion clinics or a homo-tastic friend of the sodomite.”



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The Judge Report,” from The Daily Show.

The Questions Continue



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I, too, have been AWOL, although I am happy to rejoin the fray now that I know that Ramesh supports my nomination to the Supreme Court. Now if I can just get him elected to the Senate, I can be assured of at least one vote. I don’t have adequate time to address all the arguments that have been raised, but let me offer a few observations. First, as to Andy’s piece Friday, I think that for the analogy of privileges to align properly with the ability—nay duty—of a nominee not to answer questions based upon the code of conduct, you have to compare privileges which are likewise based in a code of conduct (e.g., doctor-patient or lawyer-client). The other privileges (such as Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination) may carry negative incentives, but there is not necessarily an external obligation carrying with it the possibility of sanctions outside of the proceeding itself. That is what Roberts must be careful about: the code and the recusal statutes operate independently of his desire to be forthcoming about issues which are likely to come before the court. Andy is right in saying that the Senators may ask any inappropriate questions they like. Roberts may likewise choose to answer, but if he does so, it may come at a price.

Second, Gerry and others have spoken about the need to ask questions about specific cases—presumably specific cases which are still active issues likely to come before the court—because they believe that such questions must be asked for Senators to exercise their art. I obligations of advice and consent. This view finds little support in history. As Gleaves Whitney pointed out previously on NRO, the modern spectacle of judiciary committee grillings is just that—modern. According to Stephen Carter, the current system of questioning did not arise until after Brown v. Board of Education, and most judges didn’t even appear before the Senate prior to 1925. I suspect that my interlocutors will argue that Congress had the power even back in the day, but didn’t use it. But that is not their argument as I understand it: I understand their argument to be not that they have the ability to ask these questions, but the constitutional necessity to do so in order to fulfill their duty under art. I. This is an incredible statement. Is it more necessary now than after Plessy? More necessary than after Dred Scott? Controversial issues did not come before the Court for the first time in the 70s.


This leads to what I presume will be the next response: it is worse now because the Supreme Court has become politicized. Ah, it is always a tad peculiar to see conservatives use the “times have changed” argument. While I am sympathetic to the view that we on the Right need not carry out unilateral disarmament—lamenting the politicization of the bench but doing nothing to stop more partisans from joining its ranks—I do not see how failing to ask about specific cases forces us to accept the politicization of the Court. To the contrary, no one has yet explained to me why it is that Senators could not ask questions about judicial philosophy and methodology which would be far more useful in determining how the judge approaches the Constitution than merely asking whether he agrees with a particular case which is likely to come before the court again. For example, Roe is used by both sides of the aisle not merely for the principle of the case itself but as a proxy for how the nominee views the Constitution—that is, do they believe in a living or originalist/textualist Constitution; do they believe in enforceable, extra-textual rights, etc. However asking about agreement or disagreement with a particular case can be deceptive. You could be conservative, and still believe, for example, that the federal partial-birth abortion statute is unconstitutional. And yet, this does not tell you whether the person approves or disapproves of the privacy rights found in Roe. Accordingly, instead of using a proxy, why not ask the questions directly, as I suggested here. In this way, you can see whether the judge views the Court as another political or legislative body, which is, I would hope, the real concern.

Finally, I believe that Mark is right when he suggested that the code of conduct is based in the Constitution. That is why I began this post by suggesting that Roberts has a duty not to answer questions that violate the code—that is, questions which infringe upon the independence and insularity of the judiciary as found in art. III. Yes, this sets up a constitutional clash between art. I and art. III (albeit a non-justiciable political question). But in this clash there is a long tradition of judges not answering questions about pending cases based on their art. III insularity, while the tradition of grilling nominees with questions about specific cases has a far shorter, and, I think Judge Bork would agree, less respectable pedigree.

Thanks for the Signal, Man!



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From the WashPost Style section:

As they waited for a red light to change at First and C streets NE, a few Capitol Hill workers leaving their offices greeted the nominee. “Good luck,” said one man, shaking Roberts’s hand.

There was no traffic in sight, which made the red light seem to go on forever.

Roberts decided he had one last comment.

“Notice,” he joked, “I’m obeying the law.”

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