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NATO representatives who met in Munich for their 38th annual conference
to explore matters of military resources and responsibility were oddly
depressed. The reason for it wasn't the insufficiency of their combined
might. It was the critical predominance of American might. We learn of
the pertinence of national pride, and with it the collateral diminution
of influence. The looming question seemed to be: What if NATO, or one
of its component nations, committed itself to an enterprise and the United
States didn't get into the act? Could the NATO powers go it alone?
NATO secretary-general Lord Robertson said it flatly. The European NATO
allies are "militarily undersized." The spending by NATO on
military defense is $140 billion. That isn't enough to give NATO much
bang, were it to undertake a serious initiative without the back-up power
of the United States.
The contrast was illustrated in a piece for the Financial Times
by Yale historian Paul Kennedy, and he began it with a snapshot of our
carrier force built around the USS Enterprise.
The ship is, of course, an aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered. On September
11 it was cruising about in the Indian Ocean and was forthwith directed
toward the Near East and traveled 30 miles per hour in the direction of
the war zone.
Now that carrier has a crew of 3,200. They simply run the ship. The air-force
component has 2,400 pilots and air crew who maintain 70 state-of-the-art
aircraft, ready to go on a moment's notice.
Although it is called a dreadnought, in fact aircraft carriers do have
things to dread, for which reason they do not go about the world unescorted.
The Enterprise is accompanied by an Aegis-type cruiser. This is
a large surface ship, charged with intercepting incoming missiles. We
have then a "bevy" of frigates and destroyers, out there searching
for enemy submarine activity. Then, lurking about, are hunter-killer submarines,
at least one, perhaps two. In the rear are the supply vessels. Marine
troops and their helicopters are on board.
We now have twelve of these floating garrisons, and when the USS Ronald
Reagan is launched, we'll have a thirteenth. When time came for action
against Afghanistan, our B-1 bombers flew in from the continental United
States and B-52s came up from Diego Garcia. The war was won with fewer
casualties than New York loses in one week to murderers.
Now this colossus, in the language of Prof. Kennedy, has been "stupefying
to the Russian and Chinese military, worrying to the Indians, and disturbing
to proponents of a common European defense policy." Because, in military
terms, we are the only player. We spend more than the next nine largest
national-defense budgets combined. And this rise in military power is
the result of providential developments.
Twenty years ago
the Soviet Union was struggling for nuclear supremacy, and Japan was assumed
to be the economic behemoth of the ensuing decade. Exit Russia as a potential
aggressor they have left only nuclear bombs, and these, in modern
warfare, are all but useless. And exit Japan, which is left behind, engrossed
in learning simple economic arithmetic.
Then we've had in America the explosion of technological prowess. At the
meeting of the cyber people in San Francisco on Monday, we learned that
Moore's Law has been anachronized. That law was the hubristic fancy of
the scientist Gordon Moore, who toyed with the idea back in 1965 that
every 18 months, the power of a computer chip would double. What discredited
Moore's fantasy is, we learn, that chips will increase in power a lot
faster than that. Add to it all the increase in United States economic
power, and lo, the creature that sprung from the loins of America the
Beautiful dominates the air, land, and sea.
"It is as if, among the various inhabitants of the apes and monkeys
cage at the London Zoo, one creature had grown bigger and bigger
and bigger until it became a 500 lb. gorilla. It couldn't help
becoming that big, and in a certain way America today cannot help being
what it is either," writes Kennedy.
The implications of it all are enormous, causing us concern less for the
old maxim that we ought not to get involved in the affairs of other nations,
than concern over the implications of failing to get involved when a sophisticated
political and strategic polity tell us how much American power is needed.
Not to colonize, but to help ensure stability and keep the muscles of
our allies in shape, so that they can render critical service in predictable
crisis-points, this being an age when a half dozen rowdy nations have
realistic prospects of putting their hands on the ultimate weapons, biological
and chemical, and of course nuclear.
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