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Bush’s first presidential visit to Europe this month has caused
wide kvetching among the chattering class, which is accusing the
Bush administration of causing a serious deterioration in relations
between the United States and Europe.
“There is
a clearly noticeable increase in the strain since George W. Bush
took over in Washington,” wrote Flora Lewis in the International
Herald Tribune. “A combination of some new Washington measures
— rejecting rules against global warming and attempted joint
monitoring of money laundering for example — along with a perceived
new harshness in Washington, has magnified resentment [in Europe].”
The New
York Times ran a similar critique on its front page: “Across
Europe, there is little love of America's new president and a growing
perception that the United States, under his leadership, is looking
out only for itself these days — polluting the skies, breaking
treaties and flirting with new arms races.”
Despite worries
that the relationship is fracturing, economic and cultural links
between Americans and Europeans are, in reality, as close as ever.
What has changed is the political mix within the alliance. For the
most part, anti-Bush carping represents partisan rhetoric, not a
fundamental separation of interests.
Over the past
decade, a new trans-Atlantic politics has emerged, with key players
crossing borders to help ideological soulmates. From Britain’s Tony
Blair to Germany’s Gerhard Schroeder, center-left politicians employ
Clintonian marketing strategies to win elections. They even hire
Clinton advisers to devise the messages--pollster Stan Greenberg
works for both Blair and Schroeder, and strategists James Carville
and Robert Shrum have also advised Blair.
Once in office,
the politicos actively promote ties with like-minded brethren, pursuing
partisan objectives at the expense of traditional sovereign responsibilities.
Impressed by the success of Bill Clinton’s “permanent campaign”
governing style, European officials are emulating it — not
just in their own countries, but in the crafting and execution of
their governments’ foreign policies.
Last year,
when a conservative government in Austria invited Joerg Haider’s
controversial Freedom Party to join the ruling coalition, center-left
politicians elsewhere in Europe punished Vienna with economic sanctions.
That political success has since emboldened a number of European
officials to oppose and attack conservatives regardless of nationality.
During the
recent elections in Italy, right-wing candidate Silvio Berlusconi
endured partisan rancor not just from his Italian opponents, but
also by elected officials throughout Europe. Belgium’s foreign minister,
Louis Michel, exemplified the tone by calling Berlusconi “a threat
to democracy.” Citing Austria as precedent, he argued for sanctions
to be applied in the event of a conservative victory.
In May, German
chancellor Schroeder made his first trip to Austria since the sanctions
episode. He spent barely an hour with the elected conservatives
who run the government, then devoted the rest of the official state
visit to strategy sessions with out-of-power opposition members.
Meanwhile,
France’s Socialist prime minister, Lionel Jospin, gave a major policy
speech outlining his vision for the European Union. He consulted
beforehand about its contents with German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer. A year earlier, Fischer had prepared a similar address
after “close cooperation with Paris,” according to the Wall Street
Journal.
(It was also
widely alleged that Jospin took into consideration the impact his
remarks might have on the British elections. Direct consultation
was officially denied by the Blair camp, however, which was mindful
of Euroskeptics in the British electorate.)
European leaders
have meddled in each other’s affairs for centuries, of course. As
the EU develops as a political institution, the rise of pan-European
political parties may be inevitable, even necessary. But it is a
different matter to define the trans-Atlantic relationship in terms
of ideology rather than national interest.
The fact is
that if fissure marks are emerging, they spring from philosophical
differences between conservative and liberal politicians. Ignoring
this obvious point, some instead blame the White House for independent
policymaking.
The U.S. decision
to scrap the Kyoto accord on global warming was described as a “Taliban-style
act of wanton destruction,” by Britain’s Guardian. “Instead
of leading the community of nations, Bush's America seems increasingly
intent on confronting it,” the paper editorialized, claiming that
the administration’s attitude is: “We do what we want for ourselves,
regardless of the consequences for you.”
On many policy
questions, the Bush administration simply takes a different view
than the center-left in Europe. Thus, a certain level of independence
is proper, and to be expected. After all, it is not the purpose
of U.S. foreign policy to be a good soldier in global coalitions.
Alliances are constructed to serve the national interest, not the
other way around.
It’s also
important to remember that Europe hardly speaks with one voice.
In Italy, Berlusconi has already said that he agrees with the U.S.
on Kyoto and a number of other issues. In Spain, the conservative
Aznar government’s successful tax and regulatory thinking is more
in line with Bush than Jospin.
Moreover,
electoral politics could soon ease trans-Atlantic tensions. The
Socialists in France face a difficult re-election next year, and
the Schroeder coalition is in power but hardly beloved in Germany.
If Europe changes leaders, contentiousness will dissipate. Whether
or not that happens, the Bush administration should ignore trans-Atlantic
partisanship and let policy, not politics, guide its course.
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