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the debate over McCain-Feingold campaign-finance legislation heats
up, another reform proposal continues to gain support: Requiring
candidates to disclose the identity of their contributors and the
amounts of the contributions. But a better solution is to make all
campaign donations anonymous, by pooling the donations into a blind
trust.
If the point of voting
in private in a curtained booth — anonymously — is to discourage
corruption, then donating in private should also curtail political
corruption. Politicians won't know who gave them how much money.
And contributors couldn't expect direct favors in exchange for donations.
Ballot secrecy was adopted
toward the end of the 19th century to deter political corruption
by disrupting the economics of vote buying. That made it much more
difficult for a candidate to know if, at the end of the day, the
voters he paid had actually voted for him. In much the same way,
we could use an anonymous "donation booth" to restrict
campaign-finance corruption.
We could legally require
donors to funnel campaign contributions through institutions that,
when distributing money to the donor-selected candidates, would
be prohibited from disclosing the names of the donors. Such a requirement
would make it impossible for candidates to know who "paid the
price" for access or influence. Knowledge about whether the
other side actually performs his or her promise is an important
prerequisite for trade. People — including political candidates
— are less likely to deal if they are uncertain whether the other
side performs.
Under one possible system
of mandated anonymity, all candidates, political parties and PACs
would establish blind-trust accounts at private-trust companies
with substantial, preexisting assets. All donations would, by law,
have to be directed to the recipients through the blind trusts.
Then, on a weekly or biweekly basis, the blind trusts would report
the total amount that had been donated to the candidates and political
groups who, in turn, would use the money to finance campaigns.
In such a system, candidates
could still ask potential donors for support. They could still hold
fundraisers for rich invitees. But the candidates could not close
the deal; they could do no more than distribute postage-free envelopes
addressed to the blind trust so that supporters could mail in their
contributions. The system, by itself, might be enough to free politicians
from the current fundraising marathon of constantly seeking contributions.
Of course, even with
this system of mandated anonymity, candidates would still know a
lot about some of the sources of their campaign funds. Ross Perot
would know how much he gave to himself. Bill Clinton would know
how many New Hampshire cocktail parties a particular supporter threw
on his behalf. Donating your time to fundraising might still get
you an ambassadorship. But the effect of those efforts would be
muted, because the candidate could not know for sure how much money
a particular person raised.
What is to stop a donor
from telling a candidate on the sly about a large contribution?
Absolutely nothing. But talk is cheap. Anyone can claim to have
donated to a candidate, just like anyone can claim to have voted
for a candidate. But mandated anonymity would make it impossible
for a donor to prove that he gave to a campaign. What is more, non-donors
could mimic the signals of real donors, making it difficult for
unscrupulous candidates to determine to whom they owe favors.
Mandated anonymity would
deter political corruption and give potential donors more freedom
to participate in campaigns. For instance, it would impede various
forms of implicit and explicit quid pro quo corruption because politicians
would be unable to determine to whom they owe favors. Mandated anonymity
would also deter officeholders from extorting donations with threats
of future policy decisions that would prove harmful to those being
threatened.
Under mandated anonymity,
contributors would be free to tell candidates anything (or nothing)
about their contribution. The only restriction would be that donors
could not prove that they donated. Also, mandated anonymity would
allow the removal of campaign donation limits without fear of impending
corruption. Because a candidate would not know the identities of
his donors, people who want improper access or influence would have
no incentive to use large campaign contributions as a means to their
ends. Without that incentive, there is little reason to limit the
amount of contributions. People who truly support a candidate could
thus be free to donate as much of their money as they want to the
campaign.
The secret ballot stands
against disclosure in elections. We should remind ourselves that
we chose to make voting a solitary act in order to diminish corruption.
Anyone opposing mandated donor anonymity needs to explain why we
should not also jettison mandated voting anonymity.
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