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Taliban has been overthrown, the al Qaeda network has been disrupted,
and Osama bin Laden is dead or has escaped. There's not much more
work to do in Afghanistan, so long as the Bush administration does
not take on the thankless task of attempting to build a Western-style
democracy in Afghanistan.
With al Qaeda
operatives known to have been active in an estimated 40 countries,
a lot of other potential targets beckon. The Philippines seems to
be next on the administration's list, with upward of 700 military
advisers headed its way. Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R., Kan.) argues that
"this is the next priority because there are Americans at risk."
However, the
increasing focus on the Philippines demonstrates the risk of Washington
wasting efforts on bandits rather than terrorists, and getting sucked
into conflicts which affect America only tangentially. The archipelagic
nation, for instance, has long faced an insurgency among its minority
Muslim population. The conflict waxes and wanes, seemingly insoluble
but never threatening the stability of the Filipino state, let alone
American security.
Commanding
most attention recently is the Abu Sayyaf, which currently holds
two American missionaries as hostages. In November Lt. Commander
Jeff Davis, spokesman for the Pentagon's Pacific Command, claimed
that Abu Sayyaf was "an international terrorist group that
poses as much of a threat to the U.S. as to the Philippines."
The U.S. has
since announced $92 million in military aid, rushed in military
advisers, and offered combat troops. Although Manila rejected the
latter — the Philippine constitution prohibits operations by
foreign troops — it has eagerly accepted the cash and advice.
Moreover, America's advisers are armed and authorized to fight in
self-defense. And Rep. Tiahrt, who represents the district from
which hostages Martin and Gracia Burnham hail, flew to Manila to
urge President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to accept the intervention
of U.S. troops.
But there is
no national-security justification for American involvement. The
group's ties to al Qaeda are tangential at best. Its now-deceased
leader fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets; bin Laden's brother-in-law,
Mohammad Jamal Khalifa seems to have channeled some money to Abu
Sayyaf.
However, the
group operates more like criminals than terrorists. Although they
routinely demand the release of Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the
1993 World Trade Center attack, they are usually satisfied by collecting
ransom — about $20 million in 2000.
Abu Sayyaf
has shown no interest in conducting a serious campaign against the
U.S. Rather, its American victims have simply been targets of opportunity,
visiting the wrong resort at the wrong time. It's awful when it
happens, but it's not unusual in a world full of criminals and insurgents.
Nor is there
any reason the Philippines should be unable to bring the bandits
to justice. As many as 7,000 soldiers are searching for a band thought
to have dwindled to the dozens. Unfortunately, Manila's problem
is its own inefficiency. In fact, Abu Sayyaf has taunted the U.S.
over its planned arms shipments, since Filipino weapons regularly
end up in its hands. Bribes are thought to bring the insurgents
intelligence on government efforts and have allowed surrounded guerrillas
to escape capture.
American training,
advice, and equipment might help. But the Philippines suffers from
economic and political problems that run deep. Until Manila successfully
addresses these issues, it is unlikely to develop the kind of honest
and loyal institutions necessary to protect its own citizens, who
suffer much more at the hands of Abu Sayyaf, as well as Americans.
Since reforms
come slowly in the Philippines, the Burnhams could languish in captivity
forever. So Victorino Matus of The Weekly Standard argues:
"it is — or should be — absolutely imperative for
the United States to do whatever it takes to free its own people."
Rep. Tiahrt sounds the same trumpet, telling Matus: "if it
were me, and I'm sure if it were for you, as an American, you'd
hope America would come to your rescue."
But the resolution
of most hostage crises should be left to local governments. U.S.
involvement automatically raises the stakes: "One American
equals ten Europeans," says Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sabaya.
And military
intervention sucks Washington into what are usually broader conflicts
ill-suited to easy resolution. Indeed, a policy of rescue provides
a trigger by which antagonists can consciously draw in the U.S.
But there's
an even more important point. Americans, whether busy making money,
vacationing, proselytizing their faith, or doing good works, should
not do so with the expectation that there will always be a Marine
Expeditionary Force to back them up.
For instance,
the Burnhams, missionaries since 1986, are admirable folks. But
traveling and living abroad carries risks, risks that should be
borne by those undertaking them.
Of course,
if you're the victim in a particular case, this seems a bit hard-hearted.
And it's something about which I've thought, having visited Kosovo
in 1998 and eastern Burma in 2000, both suffering from guerrilla
war, and Ambon, Indonesia in 2001, in which a still dangerous cold
war had succeeded two years of Muslim-Christian violence. (As I
write this I'm preparing to visit Pakistan.) I took what I considered
to be reasonable risks. Had I miscalculated, however, the U.S. would
have had no cause to intervene.
So far, the
war on terrorism has been a dramatic success. But there's more to
be done, and Washington needs to keep its focus on eradicating whatever
remains of al Qaeda or any other group that threatens the U.S. It
remains the job of other nations to deal with their own conflicts.
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