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 ndian
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Washington in November
came at a critical juncture in the Bush administration's war on
terrorism. The Taliban, in retreat, is crumbling as a cohesive fighting
force. The al Qaeda terrorist network is attempting to escape to
the recently friendly confines of Pakistan, bent on continuing their
terrorist campaign as roving guerillas. And Arab countries, which
never strongly supported air strikes on the terrorist camps in Afghanistan,
are calling for an end to the war on terror and a significant role
in forming the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan.
In the present
environment, the value of a visit to Washington by the leader of
India — the world's largest democracy and second-largest Muslim
community — is considerable. It highlights the growing importance
of India as a world player and partner in the continuing war against
international terrorism.
Far from being
a reluctant partner, India is a committed U.S. ally. Within a week
of the September 11 attacks, India provided the U.S. with intelligence
on the locations of more than 120 terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.
And in a nationwide address to India's one billion citizens, Vajpayee
proclaimed that America's war was India's as well, and offered the
U.S. military immediate, unconditional use of several Indian air
bases and port facilities.
The importance
of India's support for the long-term war on terrorism cannot be
overstated. As the war widens and U.S. military planners look beyond
Afghanistan, President Bush should give a high priority to cultivating
closer ties with India — a democratic state in the very region
in which the most serious terrorist threats are based.
Washington's
interactions with the Indian government are currently limited by
selective sanctions, ridiculously burdening the world's largest
democracy with the same stigma of illegitimacy as rogue states like
Iraq and Libya. These sanctions are counterproductive, preventing
full development of positive U.S.-Indian relations. Immediately
ending the selective sanctions would be a wise course of action,
from both a geopolitical and economic perspective.
The Bush administration
appears to be aware of this fact. Secretary Rumsfeld, in response
to a request by India's defense minister that the current ban on
the sale of high-tech U.S. weapons to India be repealed, recently
hinted that a change in policy is possible, saying that "the
status" of the sanctions would soon be discussed. Ending these
sanctions would go a long way towards the important goal of forging
closer military ties with India.
The importance
of establishing close relations with India extends beyond military
matters, however. Economically, India's potential as a trading partner
is rapidly expanding. By 2025, gross domestic product is expected
to exceed that of Germany and France, meaning that India will become
the world's fourth-largest economic power. Even with limited sanctions
in place, bilateral economic cooperation between the U.S. and India
has been accelerating, with U.S. foreign direct investment topping
more than $7 billion in 1998. From the standpoint of American foreign
policy, accelerated economic liberalization would further cement
relations with a stable democracy vital to our geopolitical interests.
Beyond removing
sanctions, America could publicly acknowledge the terrorist status
of Pakistani-supported groups active in India. Over the past two
decades, terrorists have killed 50,000 Indian citizens. Fearful
of endangering U.S. air strikes against Afghanistan, American officials
have not publicly discussed the terrorist operations within India,
since doing so might be interpreted by the Pakistanis as pro-Indian.
This policy, while diplomatically shrewd in the short term, ignores
reality and risks undermining the larger war on terrorism.
No one seriously
doubts that the Pakistani government supports these groups. Only
weeks into the bombing campaign, the Pakistani Ministry for Internal
Affairs publicly criticized U.S.-led attacks. This came as U.S.
officials confirmed that Pakistan clandestinely transfers ammunition
and fuel to the Taliban militia. In fact, many of the Taliban's
leaders are alumni of religious schools in Pakistan where Osama
bin Laden is praised as a hero.
By contrast,
long before the September 11 attacks, India and the U.S. were actively
cooperating to combat terrorism. Almost one year to the day before
the attacks, President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee signed
a joint agreement to cooperate on a range of issues, including counter-terrorism.
Later that same month, the U.S.- India Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism
met in New Delhi and agreed to "share experience, exchange
information and coordinate approaches and action in joint counter-terrorist
activities."
Clearly, there
is a vast difference between the Indian and Pakistani positions
on fighting terrorism. While General Musharraf should be praised
for supporting the U.S.-led coalition thus far, by calling Pakistani
support for terrorists in Kashmir what it is — state-sponsored
terrorism — President Bush would lend credence to his claim
that the U.S. war is against terrorism at large, rather than merely
those groups that threaten U.S. interests.
India is committed
to defeating terrorism. Unlike other countries in the region that
may prove to be temporary and conditional partners, India offers
substantive and principled support to the United States. Given India's
commitment to the U.S.-led campaign against global terrorism, the
Bush administration should acknowledge India as a close ally.
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