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 n
his interview
on NRO on Monday, Robert P. George — a man whom I admire
greatly — listed the following as criteria for deeming a war
just:
- Self defense or defense
of others
- Likelihood of success
- Last resort
- Immunity of non-combatants
- Proportionality of
force
All of these properties
are, of course, necessary for a war to be just. They are shared
by many religious denominations, though their origins are explicitly
Catholic. However, there is one more criterion, which I believe
is both theologically required and politically consequential: being
declared by legitimate authority.
In the Summa Theologica,
St. Thomas makes this the first requirement for a war to be just.
For it is not the
business of a private individual to declare war, because he can
seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior.
Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon
together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the
care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority,
it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city,
kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for
them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal
against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according
to the words of the Apostle (Rm. 13:4): "He beareth not the
sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath
upon him that doth evil"; so too, it is their business to have
recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against
external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority
(Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of
the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive to peace
among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war
should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."
On a theological level,
this requirement takes into account the distinction drawn in Romans
between the use of force by an individual (which is forbidden) and
the use of force by a sovereign (which is permitted, indeed required).
While we, as individuals, are called upon to "turn the other
cheek," the state is required to — in the words of St.
Paul — "execute wrath on the wrongdoer." This is
immediately applicable in the case of justice within the state,
but when the state itself is under attack, it is called to use force
in this case as well.
Philosophically, too,
this is a crucial component of any just-war theory. The other concerns
enumerated by Professor George — from self-defense to last
resort to proportionality — are pragmatic concerns. And as
such, they are applications of moral principles to given situations.
This application, therefore, can be done only by the legitimate
authority. In other words, only that authority charged with calling
for the just war can determine whether the other criteria fit. And
because of that, the "legitimate authority" test is the
first one that needs to be met in just-war discussions. It is the
sine qua non of just-war theory.
And on a political level,
the "legitimate authority" test is a crucial one as well.
As the Catechism of the Catholic Church states clearly, "The
evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the
prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common
good" (2309). This does not mean that every war declared just
by a competent authority is just. It does, however, mean that a
war cannot be easily declared unjust by those without the "responsibility
for the common good." Taken in its most literal sense, this
might be interpreted to mean that the bishops of the Catholic Church
could never deem a war unjust. This interpretation is rather strict,
and one could easily imagine the bishops (appropriately) declaring
that the jihad of Osama bin Laden is unjust. (One might imagine,
for instance, the bishops declaring the war unjust simply because
bin Laden has no legitimate authority to call for a jihad
under any circumstances.)
More likely is the suggestion
of restraint in speaking about the justice of a war. Most of the
American bishops have taken this tone in the wake of the attacks
of September 11th. In a statement released upon the first attacks
in Afghanistan, Bishop Joseph Fiorenza — president of the U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops — did not comment on the justice
of the war but rather reiterated the general principles of the just
war, leaving their application to the "legitimate authority."
Of even greater significance
was Bishop Fiorenza's September 19th letter to the president. In
this letter, he did not even cite what St. Thomas considered to
be the three primary criteria for a just war — legitimate authority,
just cause, and right intention — but rather focused on the
more prudential concerns, "such as probability of success,
civilian immunity, and proportionality." It would not be unseemly
to read into this Bishop Fiorenza's belief that the criteria were
met. But as the bishops ought not comment unduly on the unjustness
of a war, so they should refrain from speaking about the justice
of one.
The condition of "legitimate
authority" is an important one to keep in mind when assessing
the just-war theory, especially as it relates to the Catholic Church.
The president enjoys the support of an all-but-unanimous Congress.
And the more general "questions" about the legitimacy
of the Bush presidency have disappeared, as they should have long
ago, in the wake of his most impressive conduct during this first
war of the 21st century — and a just war at that.
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