Making History
The Washington-Crawford Summit.

By Ariel Cohen, research fellow at the Heritage Foundation and author of Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis.
November 14, 2001 11:20 a.m.

 

he Washington-Crawford summit is more important than any U.S.-Russian summit since the historic conferences between President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which led to the end of the Cold War.

Bush and Putin have a unique chance to unite in the alliance against Islamist terrorism. They should go beyond a wartime alliance, which may be short-lived, and emphasize strategic cooperation and the post-war integration of Russia into the West.

The meeting should also open the way for the U.S. to develop a national missile defense, providing President George W. Bush with an opportunity to implement Ronald Reagan's dream.

The model for the new relationship should not be the short-lived World War II alliance between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, and the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin. Then, the USSR's Communist ideology and Stalin's geopolitical ambitions terminated the alliance with war's end. Instead, a more appropriate model should be the Russian-British cooperation in the war against Napoleon in 1812-1814, which resulted in the creation of the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe, a five-power coalition of Great Britain, Russia, France, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary. That alliance prevented a world war for a century and resulted in unprecedented prosperity and economic growth in Europe.

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 have changed the face of the U.S.-Russian relations. Russia's position in support of America's war effort demonstrates that the security differences between our countries are smaller than many think. U.S.-Russian ties have survived the ups and downs of the 1990s, and have transcended the Cold War, leaving adversity in the past.

There are three reasons why Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to unequivocally support the U.S. in the war on terrorism. First, he believes that radical Islamist forces, including the Taliban and al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden's terrorist network, present a clear and present danger to Russia itself through their support of Chechen separatists and other radical Islamist movements. Radical Muslim groups, such as the Islamic Front of Uzbekistan (IMU), on the U.S. Department of State terrorism list, threatened Russia's allies in Central Asia.

As Putin confided in his speech at the Russian Embassy Tuesday, just prior to the September 11th attack on the U.S., the Kremlin received the grim news of the murder of Ahmed Shah Masoud, then-military leader of the Northern Alliance. He was killed by bin Laden's assassins on September 9th. "Something bad is coming," he thought, "but we did not know where or when." He was right.

Secondly, the Kremlin saw an opportunity to focus the world's attention on its campaign against the Chechen separatists. Moscow has repeatedly stated that the radical Islamic wing of the Chechen movement, headed by Shamil Basayev and Hattab, is connected to Bin Laden's al Qaeda organization. Indeed, radical Islamic networks in the U.S., Great Britain, and the Middle East have cynically used Chechnya as a fundraising tool, collecting millions of dollars for the jihad in Chechnya. The Taliban was the only regime to recognize Chechnya's independence, and Afghanistan had become a chief supply source for the heroin distribution networks that partially financed the war in the Northern Caucasus.

In joining the antiterrorist coalition, Russia clearly expected Europe and the U.S. to change their tone on Chechnya and stop criticizing Russia for human-rights violations there. Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder promised Putin exactly that during his trip to Germany. Tony Blair followed suit. And the tone of international media started to change.

Thirdly, Putin seized an unprecedented opportunity to affect a breakthrough in Russia's relationship with the West. He believes that eventually the West will emerge victorious and is anxious for Russia to be on the winning side. When Putin weighed the resources of the U.S., Europe, and Russia arrayed against the terrorists and their supporters — and counts on at least the tacit support of China, he concluded-correctly — that in the long run, bin Laden and his allies are doomed. This wartime alliance will provide Russia with an opportunity to emerge as a US partner in several flashpoints around the world such as the future arrangement in Afghanistan and the management of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Russia may return to the forefront of the world scene, Putin believes, but this time not as a U.S. opponent.

Putin's cultural orientation was an important factor in his decision to turn West. Personal acquaintances believe that, hailing from St. Petersburg, the Westernized Russian second capital, and being a self-confessed Germanophile, Putin prefers a West European orientation for Russia.

His aides and political allies interviewed in Moscow a month ago, all agreed that in the long run, Putin wants Russia to be the West's friend and ally. According to Russia's national-security doctrine, which was developed under Putin's supervision from 1999-2001, the main challenge to the country lies in the highly unstable south. And beyond that, China, with its dynamic economy and growing population of 1.2 billion, is becoming a source of strategic concern despite the two treaties signed between Moscow and Beijing earlier this year.

Finally, Putin understands that only the West has the capacity to become Russia's principal investor and trading partner, especially as a market for Russia's energy resources. He stated that Russia will become a reliable energy partner for the West regardless of what may happen to Middle Eastern oil supplies.

A new era of cooperation in the fight against radical Islamist terrorism, which threatens both countries, has begun. The summit in Washington and Crawford should focus on solidifying the new relationship with Russia and building towards a future alliance. Disagreements over NATO enlargement and missile defense must be managed and resolved.

In particular, Russian ill-conceived military cooperation with the unstable regime in Tehran must also be addressed. It is all about money for the Russian powerful Minatom nuclear ministry and the rusting military-industrial complex. But their sustenance cannot hurt the security of the US and its allies. If Russia wants to be a part of an anti-terror coalition, it cannot succor and arm the terrorist-harboring mullahs in Iran with weapons of mass destruction.

Russia's strategic realignment with the West may be a long and difficult process, but if successful, it may distance Russia from China, Iran, and -importantly, it may also disengage Russia from its radical Soviet-era Middle Eastern clients such as Iraq, Syria and Libya.

The world will be watching to see if the U.S. and Russia will agree to make it safer for the years and decades to come. At stake is a fundamental change in the geopolitical map of the 21st century, which may put Russia firmly in the Western camp.

 
 

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