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Bush administration is thinking through the next stage of the war
on terrorism. While the proclaimed goals of the engagement are currently
limited to al Qaeda and the Taliban, others who support terrorism
may soon be in the crosshairs of the U.S. military. And as in the
case of the Taliban, the atrocities of Saddam Hussein, and the abuses
against their own people of the Iranian mullahs, demonstrate that
popular support in these two countries is paper-thin.
The quick and
violent death of the Taliban regime in Kabul teaches U.S. policymakers
about how to put totalitarians out of their misery. But who should
top this America's Most Wanted list? Just Saddam, or maybe Castro
and Pyongyang's Kim? The answer is, those who threaten America's
security should be our top priority.
And their people
want them gone: Totalitarians bring hatred upon themselves through
abuse of power, cruelty, and corruption. The longer they remain
in charge, the more they are hated.
Taliban's public
executions and mutilations, their banning music and covering women
head-to-toe are reminiscent of the worst abuses of the Pol Pot regime
in Cambodia. The collapse of the Taliban bore a resemblance to the
Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu's regime downfall, or the way
the East German state came crashing down together with the Berlin
Wall, in 1989. The only difference was ferocity of retribution.
No velvet revolution there. The celebrations in Kabul, with music
blasting and beards shaved, demonstrates that the Taliban had little
popular support or legitimacy.
Even the longest-surviving
regime of them all, Soviet Russia, never enjoyed majority support
— hence the cruelty and terror that started immediately after
Vladimir Lenin seized power in November 1917.
If the West
had seriously supported the anti-Communist forces in Russia, the
Bolshevik dictatorship would likely have tumbled in the 1920s. Even
Hitler's invading armies were greeted with flowers and the traditional
gifts of bread and salt in Ukraine, Russia, and the Baltic states,
expressing hope for liberation from Stalin's Communism. That is,
until the locals found out that the Nazis were just as brutal as
the Reds. Then, they took to the woods.
The end of
the Taliban, as the end of Communism, demonstrates what the ingredients
are for toppling anti-American totalitarians. First, you need free
communication. People must have access to information about the
regime's atrocities and the world's denunciations of them. The words
on the wall of the CIA building, quoting John the Evangelist, read:
"and you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you
free."
During the
Cold War, Radio Liberty-Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, the
BBC, and other Western broadcasters disseminated the truth. After
Stalin's death, the Samizdat movement of underground publishing
was spawned spontaneously. It provided critical analysis and opinion,
albeit in the underground. Free ideas, which countered the doublespeak
of the regime, eventually undermined Soviet totalitarianism.
No doubt, today
Radio Liberty's Radio Free Iraq and its Farsi service are doing
a great job, and VOA's Arabic service is reaching some elites in
the Middle East. However, we are just beginning to create a credible
media alternative to the anti-Western al Jazeera, and government-sponsored
propaganda TV and radio channels in the Middle East. Much more needs
to be done.
A credible
opposition that constitutes an alternative to the regime is also
necessary. If it exists, it needs to be well-armed and supplied.
If it does not exist, it must be created. Some serious military
training wouldn't hurt. It was the U.S.'s luck that the Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan were as battle-hardened as the Taliban.
In addition, U.S. Special Forces on the ground, working in tandem
with the opposition, could do wonders.
Weak authoritarian
regimes can go down even under nonviolent scenarios. This was true
in the case of Mikhail Gorbachev, who ruled out the use of force
in Eastern Europe. However, totalitarian regimes often have the
will to survive to the very end — even at the price of thousands
of lives. And the brutal rulers in the Middle East, Cuba, and North
Korea are no exception.
A geographic
access for U.S. forces and an adequate supply effort would be great
in any engagement. In Afghanistan, these were difficult (and involved
a lot of frequent-flier miles for the U.S. Air Force), but possible
nevertheless. The air bases in Central Asia, and air corridors through
Russia and the former Soviet Union, did help.
Finally, achievement
of air superiority — followed by a massive air bombardment,
as occurred in Desert Storm in 1991, over Kosovo, and now over Afghanistan
— is extremely important. It breaks the will of the enemy and
destroys its stationary and movable targets.
Once the opponent's
military loses its command-and-control and its hardware, and after
its personnel is smashed, there are few assets left with which they
can fight. To wit, the Taliban is taking to the hills. Earlier,
Milosevic and the Iraqi military laid down their arms after decisive
air blows and ground operations.
As in Kosovo
and Iraq, the war lasted for a shorter time than expected, and the
destruction was quick and complete. Fewer U.S. troops got killed
than the doomsayers predicted.
It is difficult
to forecast the expected speed of the collapse of the Iranian and
Iraqi regimes if the U.S. decides to "help them out."
Reliable public-opinion polling does not exist in either place,
nor it is encouraged by the rulers.
One can only
assume that the 75-80 percent support for President Khatami, and
the anti-clerical demonstrations in Iranian cities, indicate that
at least the urban, educated upper- and middle classes have no love
for the ayatollahs, and might rise if led by credible Iranian forces.
And uprisings
against Saddam in Kurdistan and the Shiite South, in the aftermath
of the Gulf War, together with his unparalleled record of cruelty
and despotism, suggest that few tears will be shed when he and his
sons are gone.
Thus, there
is a formula for regime change in both countries. What is missing
is massive U.S. support for the opposition movement in Iraq, and
at least some organizational backing for the pro-reform forces in
Iran. The free flow of information to both countries must be dramatically
increased. If opposition is adequately supported, the U.S. military
action may bring results just as quick and dramatic as those seen
in Afghanistan.
There must
be an overriding principle as to when the U.S. should commit to
toppling totalitarian regimes. If a country threatens our vital
national interests, or those of our allies — if it finances
terrorist organizations, or provides them with intelligence, diplomatic,
or mass media support — then it should be considered a legitimate
target as a terrorist-sponsoring state. Such a regime should be
doomed. All the might of the U.S. military and the intelligence
community, as well as information resources, should be deployed
against it.
However, if
a country is not currently hostile to the United States, it may
be put in abeyance, left on a watch list, but not immediately engaged.
Thus, in its
war on terrorism, the U.S. national interest should dictate the
timetable. Totalitarian regimes that harbor, aid, and abet terrorists
should rightly top the America's Most Wanted list.
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