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Tuesday, the German city of Bonn welcomes officials from Afghanistan's
major political factions for a conference designed to help the leaders
of the war-torn country set up a stable, viable government.
Some of the
factions now being asked to sit at the same table once fought one
another on the battlefield, and is not yet clear that the participants
will be able to achieve the conference's stated aims. Even as it
begins, however, the Bonn meeting has already achieved a tangible
result: Confirming Germany's return to the forefront of international
politics as a major player.
The German
military, until seven years ago, had a constitutional mandate to
act only for defensive purposes and within NATO countries. Sour
memories of the country's 20th-century militarism meant "out-of-area"
combat operations, for example in Africa or Asia, were not permitted.
Now, however, Germany has committed itself not merely to hosting
the Afghan talks, but to helping make whatever agreement the parties
reach stick, if necessary by force of arms. On November 16, the
country's center-left government, led by Social Democrat Gerhard
Schroeder and his environmentalist "Green" foreign minister
Joschka Fischer, persuaded the lower house of parliament to offer
the U.S.-led antiterrorist coalition up to 3,900 German troops for
deployment in Afghanistan. The traditionally pacifist Greens Party
endorsed the lower house's decision at its party conference eight
days later.
If they do indeed go to South Asia, the soldiers would not merely
assume medical duties, as they did in Somalia in 1993 and 1994.
This time, German forces would use advanced equipment to help detect
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, to the extent that any
are indeed strewn across the country's already mine-laden landscape.
Schroeder, however, has also offered to put special forces at the
coalition's disposal. Given the recent history of Afghanistan and
the coalition's plans to flush out Osama bin Laden and the remnants
of the Taliban, it is quite possible these German troops would see
real combat duty.
The lawmakers'
acceptance of an eventual German troop deployment reflects the opinion
of a large majority of Berlin's foreign-policy establishment that
the country must look more assertively after its own interests.
The center-right and large parts of Schroeder's Social Democratic
Party believe standing up for the country's interest is perfectly
constructive, since Germany's commitment to the European Union and
NATO make a recurrence of past nationalist and militaristic policies
impossible.
Moreover, Schroeder,
born in 1944, is the first German chancellor not to have been grown
up under the Third Reich. He is, by all accounts, irritated by constant
reminders of his country's Nazi past and believes German military
missions are perfectly acceptable, especially if sanctioned by NATO
or the United Nations.
The November
16 parliamentary vote is also the culmination of a process that
began on July 12th, 1994. On that day, the Constitutional Court
ruled in favor of then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl's contention that
Germany, now a unified and rock-solid democracy, should do away
with its taboo after the end of the Cold War and in light of warfare
in the Balkans. "Out-of-area" missions, the justices said,
would now be permitted with parliamentary approval and under a United
Nations mandate.
The high court,
in 1994, granted the petition of a conservative-led government.
Yet, remarkably, it took a center-left coalition with Greens as
junior partners to actually send German soldiers on combat missions
for the first time since World War II. In March 1999, Schroeder
sent 14 Tornado jet fighters bearing the Federal Republic's black,
red, and gold emblem into the bombing campaign against rump Yugoslavia.
Later that year, Berlin sent peacekeepers to Western-controlled
Kosovo, where these soldiers are still serving.
Helmut Kohl,
the conservative who oversaw Germany's reunification in 1990, would
have surprised no one by sending soldiers to Kosovo and Afghanistan,
had Gerhard Schroeder not quashed his bid for a fifth term in 1998.
The danger for Schroeder's coalition, however, came from the Greens'
pacifist rank-and-file. Had they successfully lobbied their members
of parliament for voting against sending soldiers, the center-left
cabinet would have collapsed.
It fell to
Joschka Fischer, the foreign minister, to convince his fellow party
members that military assignments were not only necessary, but also
in tune with the Greens' traditional commitment to human rights.
Fischer, a high-school dropout and radical leftist street fighter
in the 1970s, had moved to the center and developed into one of
Germany's most popular figures by the time he became foreign minister
and vice-chancellor in 1998. Endowed with an impressive media presence
and high personal skills, Fischer combined an original life story
with middle-of-the-road positions hardly different from those of
a Tony Blair. He spoke for the Greens Party's moderates, against
leftists who believe Western intervention in the Third World, in
whatever form, will likely do more harm than good.
In the end,
Fischer, a top-notch politician, won four times, with relative ease.
In 1999, he convinced Green Party lawmakers and the rank-and-file
to accept the Kosovo combat missions. He managed those feats again
this year, in parliament on November 16th, and at his party's national
convention on November 24th.
Fischer was
only the latest German statesman to argue for Germany taking risks
in order to play a larger role in world affairs. He also understood
that when push came to shove, his party would choose to remain in
power.
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