The German Role
Confirming Germany’s return to the forefront of international politics.

n Tuesday, the German city of Bonn welcomes officials from Afghanistan's major political factions for a conference designed to help the leaders of the war-torn country set up a stable, viable government.

Some of the factions now being asked to sit at the same table once fought one another on the battlefield, and is not yet clear that the participants will be able to achieve the conference's stated aims. Even as it begins, however, the Bonn meeting has already achieved a tangible result: Confirming Germany's return to the forefront of international politics as a major player.

The German military, until seven years ago, had a constitutional mandate to act only for defensive purposes and within NATO countries. Sour memories of the country's 20th-century militarism meant "out-of-area" combat operations, for example in Africa or Asia, were not permitted. Now, however, Germany has committed itself not merely to hosting the Afghan talks, but to helping make whatever agreement the parties reach stick, if necessary by force of arms. On November 16, the country's center-left government, led by Social Democrat Gerhard Schroeder and his environmentalist "Green" foreign minister Joschka Fischer, persuaded the lower house of parliament to offer the U.S.-led antiterrorist coalition up to 3,900 German troops for deployment in Afghanistan. The traditionally pacifist Greens Party endorsed the lower house's decision at its party conference eight days later.

If they do indeed go to South Asia, the soldiers would not merely assume medical duties, as they did in Somalia in 1993 and 1994. This time, German forces would use advanced equipment to help detect chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, to the extent that any are indeed strewn across the country's already mine-laden landscape. Schroeder, however, has also offered to put special forces at the coalition's disposal. Given the recent history of Afghanistan and the coalition's plans to flush out Osama bin Laden and the remnants of the Taliban, it is quite possible these German troops would see real combat duty.

The lawmakers' acceptance of an eventual German troop deployment reflects the opinion of a large majority of Berlin's foreign-policy establishment that the country must look more assertively after its own interests. The center-right and large parts of Schroeder's Social Democratic Party believe standing up for the country's interest is perfectly constructive, since Germany's commitment to the European Union and NATO make a recurrence of past nationalist and militaristic policies impossible.

Moreover, Schroeder, born in 1944, is the first German chancellor not to have been grown up under the Third Reich. He is, by all accounts, irritated by constant reminders of his country's Nazi past and believes German military missions are perfectly acceptable, especially if sanctioned by NATO or the United Nations.

The November 16 parliamentary vote is also the culmination of a process that began on July 12th, 1994. On that day, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl's contention that Germany, now a unified and rock-solid democracy, should do away with its taboo after the end of the Cold War and in light of warfare in the Balkans. "Out-of-area" missions, the justices said, would now be permitted with parliamentary approval and under a United Nations mandate.

The high court, in 1994, granted the petition of a conservative-led government. Yet, remarkably, it took a center-left coalition with Greens as junior partners to actually send German soldiers on combat missions for the first time since World War II. In March 1999, Schroeder sent 14 Tornado jet fighters bearing the Federal Republic's black, red, and gold emblem into the bombing campaign against rump Yugoslavia. Later that year, Berlin sent peacekeepers to Western-controlled Kosovo, where these soldiers are still serving.

Helmut Kohl, the conservative who oversaw Germany's reunification in 1990, would have surprised no one by sending soldiers to Kosovo and Afghanistan, had Gerhard Schroeder not quashed his bid for a fifth term in 1998. The danger for Schroeder's coalition, however, came from the Greens' pacifist rank-and-file. Had they successfully lobbied their members of parliament for voting against sending soldiers, the center-left cabinet would have collapsed.

It fell to Joschka Fischer, the foreign minister, to convince his fellow party members that military assignments were not only necessary, but also in tune with the Greens' traditional commitment to human rights. Fischer, a high-school dropout and radical leftist street fighter in the 1970s, had moved to the center and developed into one of Germany's most popular figures by the time he became foreign minister and vice-chancellor in 1998. Endowed with an impressive media presence and high personal skills, Fischer combined an original life story with middle-of-the-road positions hardly different from those of a Tony Blair. He spoke for the Greens Party's moderates, against leftists who believe Western intervention in the Third World, in whatever form, will likely do more harm than good.

In the end, Fischer, a top-notch politician, won four times, with relative ease. In 1999, he convinced Green Party lawmakers and the rank-and-file to accept the Kosovo combat missions. He managed those feats again this year, in parliament on November 16th, and at his party's national convention on November 24th.

Fischer was only the latest German statesman to argue for Germany taking risks in order to play a larger role in world affairs. He also understood that when push came to shove, his party would choose to remain in power.