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 ou wouldn't think
this would be a particularly happy time for old-fashioned liberal
Democrats, much less their brethren
to
the far left. Republicans control Congress, the White House, and
a big majority of governorships. Centrist New Democrats are by far
the largest organized group in both Houses of Congress, with 70
members in the House and 19 in the Senate. Reapportionment is about
to strengthen the political clout of the sunbelt states and the
suburbs at the expense of industrial states and the cities. Clintonian
scandals continue to bedevil Democrats, with no end in sight. And
the Left's most durable leader, the Rev. Jesse Jackson, is mired
in disgrace.
Despite this, the Left is feeling its oats these days. Having spent
much of the 1990s in cranky resistance to virtually every important
social, economic, and political trend affecting the country, leftists
are increasingly loud, proud, and confident. Their journals are
brimming with manifestos and agendas. Their activists are making
demands of Democratic politicians, not simply whining about being
taken for granted. And above all, the Left is animated by the growing
belief that it can not only control the Democratic party in the
near future, but can also win the national majorities it's failed
to obtain since 1964.
So, what is the elixir that has revived the Left? Ironically, it's
the 2000 elections, which simultaneously provided ammunition for
the Left's longstanding theories on how to build a majority, while
liberating liberals from the responsibility of participating in
a governing coalition.
Most of the Left (and much of the news media) accept as gospel the
post-election analysis released last December by Gore pollster Stan
Greenberg for the labor-oriented Campaign for America's Future.
It holds that Gore won a popular-vote plurality by a successful
message of economic populism and carefully targeted new federal
benefits (especially prescription drugs); this potent combination
helped labor and civil-rights groups energize the Democratic base,
and would have handed the White House decisively to Al Gore were
it not for the "drag" of festering anger among working-class men
toward Clinton and his scandals.
Other liberal analysts less involved in the Gore campaign, like
the Century Foundation's Ruy Texiera (who with Joel Rogers penned
a highly influential pre-election book on non-college-educated white
middle-class men as the true "swing" vote), have felt free to add
to the Greenberg analysis the observation that Gore's own personal
shortcomings as a candidate handicapped him nearly as much as the
Clinton
| “No
longer must the Left express grudging appreciation for
the management of the national economy; already, liberal
politicians are returning to the themes of economic insecurity
and income inequality that were so popular just a few
years ago.” |
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factor.
The clear implication for future Democratic campaigns is that a
better candidate, tacking even farther to the Left (and thus maintaining
maximum "issue differentiation" from pseudo-centrist Republicans
like George W. Bush), and without the one-time phenomenon of the
Clinton "drag," can win very big. The cherry on top of this analytical
confection is the "Nader factor": A more clearly left-of-center
candidate can easily pick up the 2.6% of the vote that went Green
and cost Gore the presidency.
But the empirical buttressing of the Left's longstanding "hidden
majority" claims is less important to the revival of liberal esprit
than its liberation from actual political power. No longer, for
example, must the Left express grudging appreciation for the management
of the national economy; already, liberal politicians are returning
to the themes of economic insecurity and income inequality that
were so popular just a few years ago. (An actual recession would
help promote class-warfare populism even more). More importantly,
with no Democratic president commanding the bully pulpit and the
affections of the rank and file, the labor movement and other liberal
interest groups enjoy vastly enhanced power within the party. New
DNC Chairman Terry McAuliffe's extravagant efforts to identify himself
with the "angry base" of the party in his inaugural speech reflected
this new configuration.
A final tonic for the troops has been the recently receding tide
of the New Economy, whose robustness during the late 1990s threatened
the Left on many fronts. Aside from the political consequences of
a rapidly growing upper-middle class and booming suburbs, the New
Economy challenges the industrial-age workplace arrangements and
stable labor contracts that lie at the heart of the Left's social-democratic
vision of the ideal society. Indeed, the labor movement has had
little or nothing to say to "wired workers" other than "organize
a collective-bargaining unit." After several years of grousing about
overblown estimates of the size and distinctiveness of the wired
world, labor-oriented liberals are now gleefully joining many of
their class enemies on Wall Street in proclaiming that the whole
New Economy concept is a chimera. One leading indicator of the New
Economy backlash on the Left was a recent New Republiccover
story by Jonathan Cohn about Amazon.com, which argued that traditional
industrial-age labor arrangements and protections are just as relevant
in the tech world as elsewhere.
Still, for all the renewed spirits of the Left, some serious obstacles
jeopardize a complete revival of the old-time religion of liberalism.
One immediate problem is the question of cultural issues. While
just about everybody on the Left believes a heavy stress on economic
populism is necessary to distract all those blue-collar men from
their guns and their conservative social views, many labor-left
analysts like Greenberg and Texiera go further, arguing that Democrats
should moderate their social liberalism and downplay "identity politics"
so that Republicans cannot play race or gender cards to separate
white working men from their natural allies.
This, in fact, is an argument on the Left that goes right back to
the 1960s, crystallized in Richard Scammons and Ben Wattenberg's
1970 book, The Real Majority, which warned liberals that
their flirtation with the counterculture was undermining the Democratic
economic message at its working-class core. But it's a bit hard
to believe that today's practitioners of cultural-identity politics,
who are a lot stronger now than they were back in 1970, will meekly
agree to moderate their demands, much less keep their mouths shut,
in future Democratic campaigns to avoid (to use the old Marxist
saw) "alienating the workers."
Then there's the question of political leadership. Who, if anyone,
will carry the Left's torch in future presidential campaigns? Al
Gore? Maybe, but the Left does not believe he's with them deep within
his wonky heart. Dick Gephardt? Probably won't run, and doesn't
exactly set hearts pounding in front of television screens. Bill
Bradley? No, he's stubbornly for free trade. Paul Wellstone? Tom
Harkin? C'mon, get serious. Meanwhile, the Left's New Democrat rivals
are loaded with presidential timber: Lieberman, Bayh, Kerry and
Kerrey, Edwards, maybe a Governor or two, maybe even a reconstructed
Al Gore.
Finally, there's the very real possibility that the Left's political
analysis and dismissal of economic change is, well, wrong. The Greenberg/Texiera
numbers crunching looks convincing enough--until you ask which of
the 11 states carried by Bill Clinton in 1996 and lost by Al Gore
in 2000 are likely to be won back by a turn to the Left. It's hard
to identify even one. And maybe, just maybe, Gore nearly won because
of the centrist record of Bill Clinton, even though he tried hard
not to talk about it (or him). If that is the case, a Democrat in
2004 would need to tack hard center to come close to Gore's numbers
in 2000. And as for the Left's sunny assumption that economic globalization
and technological change are "so 1999" — much of the evidence
suggests that today's dismissal of the New Economy is even more
irrational than yesterday's uncritical acceptance.
But for now, the Left is ready to keep hope alive, and full of its
old messianic zeal.
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