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Powell was the Europeans' favorite from the beginning. Among the
Bush foreign-policy team he was the multilateral one, consensual
and cautious, and from Bosnia to the first Gulf War, admirably in
their view, always squeamish about the use of force. That the U.S.
did not immediately lash out after the attacks of September 11 is,
in the European view, largely thanks to the secretary of state's
restraint. "The multilateralists [in Washington] have prevailed,"
proclaimed one German official recently. And now, suddenly and privately,
some Europeans are beginning to worry: "What happens if we
get what we wished for?"
Just as the
events of September 11 transformed the national-security debate
in the United States, they also have profoundly affected European
attitudes toward America. No, anti-Americanism has not disappeared.
A prominent German television anchor has alleged that George W.
Bush and Osama bin Laden share "the same patterns of thought."
A leading fashion designer blames America for the fact that Muslim
men of the Arab world treat Muslim women so poorly. (So offensive
have our policies been to their sense of male dignity apparently,
that we've left them no other choice but to vent by brutalizing
the other sex.) Composer Karlheinz Stockhausen thinks the suicide
attacks on the World Trade Center should be celebrated as a work
of art.
Anti-Americanism
will not disappear. But now hatred of America is becoming isolated,
marginalized, and discredited across Europe perhaps like never before.
The reasons
are twofold. First, there has been the outpouring of solidarity
across Europe. The Queen Mother has the yanks' national anthem played;
the French fly American flags; tens of thousands of Germans flock
to the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, as politicians declare, "Ich
bin ein Amerikaner." An American navy ship meets a German warship
at sea and discovers: the Germans are flying the American flag,
standing at attention in dress-blue uniforms, while shipmates unfurl
a large hand painted banner, which reads "We stand by you."
Europeans are caught up in a remarkable wave of pro-American sentiment.
Second, and
more important, Europeans are back to an idea that had begun to
dissipate the moment the Berlin Wall fell 12 years ago: namely that
their security link to America is not merely desirable, but indispensable.
Today, Europeans understand (again) that they have nothing to gain
from an America that is weak. On the contrary. If the United States
proves unable to defend itself against the terrorism threat, how
safe are the Eiffel Tower, the Reichstag in Berlin, or London's
theater or financial districts?
Two months
ago, the European Union was a bastion of Euro-nationalism. Today
foreign-policy spokesman Javier Solana says the EU wants "the
U.S. to say what would be useful [and] we will respond." When
the little Belgians tried recently to create some distance between
Europe and America — Belgium currently holds the rotating EU
presidency — Brussels was simply squished by the others. Imagine,
Germany's Green foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, supports the
Bush administration, attacks those in his party who support a bombing
pause, and wants German troops to stand by the Americans in Afghanistan.
They may appear
in sync with Colin Powell's State Department. But the allies wonder,
After Afghanistan what's next? They know that Saddam Hussein, for
example, was likely involved in the first attack on the World Trade
Center, when six were killed and more than 1,000 injured. Ramzi
Yousef, who now serves two life sentences in Colorado for the 1993
attack, is believed to be an Iraqi agent. Abdul Rahman Yasin, another
central figure, an indicted fugitive, finds safe haven in Iraq today.
One of the perpetrators in last month's attacks had met with Iraqi
agents on more than one occasion. Whether conclusive evidence of
Saddam's culpability emerges, Europeans also know that the Iraqi
dictator is a threat; that he kicked U.N. arms inspectors out of
Iraq three years ago and continues to develops weapons of mass destruction;
and that he has motive to harm the U.S. and its allies.
Yes, of course,
some will squirm, they will complain, they will feel Weltschmerz
with furrowed brow. But if America makes the case, they will come
along, just as in the Cold War, because they understand that it
is in their interest to do so. The Arabs will join up, as they did
in the first Gulf War. When the Europeans say yes, Russia will not
wish to be isolated. And that's a coalition. Which means when Afghanistan
is finished, is America ready to lead? Or will misguided ideas of
"leadership by consensus" squander the biggest foreign-policy
opportunity the U.S. has had in a decade?
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