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 onald Bailey
originally proposed to demonstrate on the basis of science
that human embryos are not human beings. In
response to our
critique, however, he has implicitly conceded the key scientific
points establishing that human embryos are in fact nothing less
than individual human beings in the earliest stages of their lives.
Bailey now shifts ground to try to show by philosophical
arguments that human individuals in the embryonic stage have no
worth, dignity, or rights. But Bailey's philosophical arguments
have no more cogency than do the putatively scientific ones by which
he originally proposed to establish the moral validity of dissecting
human embryos for others' benefit.
Against Bailey's attempt, as a scientific matter, to analogize embryonic
human beings to somatic cells that may be used to clone a new human
being, we pointed out decisive differences that he had simply ignored:
Human embryos are (just as more mature human beings are) whole human
organisms, and, as such, living (albeit immature) members of the
species homo sapiens; somatic cells are not. Human embryos have
the epigenetic primordia for internally directed maturation as distinct,
complete, self-integrating human individuals; somatic cells do not.
Thus, the "potential" of somatic cells is nothing remotely like
the potential of the embryo. Like sperm and ova, somatic cells,
though they themselves are not distinct, self-integrating human
organisms (but are rather parts of other, larger human organisms),
can contribute constituents to a process that brings into being
a new, distinct, self-integrating human organism — a human
embryo. By contrast, an embryo — whether brought into being
by sexual union or cloning — is already a human being. That
human being, given nothing more than an hospitable environment,
will actively develop itself from the embryonic through the fetal,
infant, and adolescent stages of his or her life and into adulthood
with his or her unity and identity fully intact. That is why it
is true to say that you or I was once an embryo, just as we were
once adolescents, infants, etc. A fully mature human being who came
into existence by cloning, however, was never a somatic cell, just
as adult human beings who were brought into existence by sexual
reproduction were never sperm cells or ova.
Bailey concedes the following points: 1) You and I are essentially
physical organisms; 2) we came to be when the physical organisms
we are came to be; and 3) the physical organisms you and I are came
to be at conception. Moreover, he concedes what is implied by these
points, namely, 4) that you and I once were human embryos (for he
says: "But the question is were we people when we were embryos?")
In view of these concession it is clear that Bailey's defense of
destructive embryo research rests on philosophical claims, not on
scientific facts. He now makes assertions about "the moral status
of life," rather than about who is or isn't a distinct human organism
or a human individual. The propositions Bailey now asserts are not
statements of physics, chemistry, or biology; they are highly contested
philosophical assertions.
Again, Bailey proposes an analogy. Just as it is morally legitimate
to extract organs from brain-dead individuals, because (he claims)
they are human organisms but not persons, so it is legitimate to
dismember human embryos. To be a "person" (he argues) one must have
a brain that can sustain memories and intentions. Since human beings
in the embryonic stage have not yet developed brains, they are (he
insists) not "people" and may legitimately be killed in order to
extract their body parts.
More than a decade ago the philosopher Michael Lockwood proposed
the same analogy in an effort to find a credible "middle position"
in the abortion debate. He proposed brain function as the criterion
of life, just as collapse of the brain is the criterion of death.
Under that criterion, abortion could be permitted by law before
the development of a fetal brain and prohibited afterwards. However,
Lockwood's argument crashed and burned on take-off for reasons that
his fellow philosophers on both sides of the abortion question immediately
pointed out. Under prevailing law and accepted medical practice,
the rationale for "brain death" is not that a brain-dead body is
a living human organism but not a "person" (as Lockwood claimed
and Bailey now claims). Rather, brain death is accepted because
the irreversible collapse of the brain destroys the capacity for
self-directed integral organic functioning of human beings who have
matured to the stage at which the brain performs the key role in
integrating the organism. What is left is no longer a unitary organism
at all. Obviously, the fact that an embryo has not yet developed
a brain (though its capacity to do so is inherent, just as the capacity
of an infant to develop its brain sufficiently so that it actually
can think is inherent) does not mean that it is incapable of self-directed
integral organic functioning. Unlike a corpse — which is merely
the remains of what was once a human organism but is now dead —
an embryo is a unified, self-integrating human organism.
Were Bailey's account of the rationale behind the acceptance of
brain death accurate, the criterion of death would be cerebral
death not whole-brain death. Indeed, the actual rationale behind
the whole brain death criterion presupposes precisely the
opposite of what Bailey takes it to illustrate, namely, that a human
person with worth, dignity, and rights exists as long as the living
human being — i.e., the unified, self-integrating human organism
— exists.
When defenders of destructive embryo research or a putative right
to abortion say that human embryos or fetuses are human individuals
but not "persons," they could mean one of two things. One thing
they could mean is that the human person is not a physical organism,
and thus did not come to be when the physical organism "associated
with" that person came to be. On this view, a "person" is not a
physical organism but rather a purely spiritual (not necessarily
in any religious sense) subject merely "inhabiting" a body, or perhaps
a sequence of experiences, somehow "associated with" a biological
organism. But Bailey rightly rejects that position, and the evidence
is overwhelmingly against it. Every living thing that performs bodily
actions is an organism, a bodily entity. But it is clear in the
case of the human individual that it is the same thing that
perceives, walks and talks (which are bodily actions), and that
understands and makes choices (what everyone, including anyone who
denies he is a bodily entity, refers to as "I"). It must be the
same thing that perceives these words on a page, for example, and
understands them. Thus, what each of us refers to as "I" is identically
the physical organism which is the subject both of bodily actions
such as perceiving, walking, and so on, and of spiritual actions,
such as understanding and choosing. The thing that I am, and the
thing that you are — what you and I refer to by the personal
pronouns "you" and "I" — is in each case a human, physical
organism (but also with spiritual capacities). Therefore, since
you and I are essentially physical organisms, we came to be at conception,
we once were embryos, then fetuses, then infants, and so on.
Alternatively, when someone says that embryos are human but not
persons he could mean what Bailey apparently means. That is, he
could mean that although you and I once were human embryos, we "became"
persons and intrinsically valuable only at a later stage in our
lives. We argued against this position in our previous article for
NRO, and Bailey makes no effort to rebut our argument. He merely
says that the way people commonly use the word "person" does not
include human beings in the embryonic stage of development. But
the common usage of the word "person" is not the issue. The history
of human atrocity makes clear enough that those who wish to license
the killing of certain human individuals or classes of human beings
will deny that those individuals are "persons," or "fully human,"
or what have you. The substantive claim that we reject is that you
or I or any other human individual came to be at one point,
but became worthy of respect and possessors of rights only later
in the course of our lives. This philosophical issue (again notice
that there is nothing scientific about it) can be discussed,
if necessary, without even using the word "person."
Human individuals, such as you or I, are valuable because of what
they are; they are not mere carriers or vehicles of what is in itself
valuable. If human individuals were mere vehicles for bringing about
what is intrinsically valuable then it would be acceptable to kill
one's young child as long at it was agreed that we would replace
him with a healthier or more intelligent one, or with two. But that
is certainly not the case. Human individuals are not valuable (only)
in that way. So, the things (substantial entities) that they are
(i.e., human beings), rather than the properties or states they
instantiate, are intrinsically valuable. But that means that, no
matter how one chooses to use the word "person," the entities that
you and I are, are valuable from the point at which they come to
be. They do not come to be at one time but become intrinsically
valuable only at some time later.
As we pointed out in our original critique of Bailey's denial of
the worth and dignity of embryonic human beings, what is intrinsically
valuable — and therefore what is rightly called a "person"
— is the thing (substantial entity) that has natural
capacities for reason and free choice. Such an entity has a rational
nature. By virtue of it, he or she possesses dignity and is the
subject of rights. Clearly, when an adult human being is asleep
or in a coma, or suffering from dementia, he still is a person,
even though he cannot immediately exercise mental functions, and
even if he will never exercise such functions again. But so too
with infants, fetuses and embryos. Because they are human beings
they have radical natural capacities to exercise mental functions.
It will take them some time to actualize those capacities, but they
are identical to the entities that (unless prevented by natural
calamity or deliberate human action) actively develop themselves
to the stage of maturity where they exercise rational faculties
and make free choices.
Note carefully that according to Bailey's argument neither a comatose
person nor a three-week-old infant would qualify as a "person,"
since neither of them now has memories or forms intentions. Unabashed
proponents of the view Bailey embraces — such as Peter Singer
and Michael Tooley — candidly acknowledge that this argument
that embryos or fetuses are not persons because they lack consciousness
unavoidably leads to condoning infanticide.
Bailey says that, "we do define 'persons' as the sort of entities
that do have brains capable of sustaining a mind…." But we
certainly do not define them that way. And historically most people
have not done so. In fact, this definition is of recent vintage,
and was custom designed by supporters of abortion, embryo experimentation,
and euthanasia to give advantage to their moral and political arguments.
There is certainly nothing scientific about it. It is true
that people generally think, and have thought, that human individuals
are "persons" because they are of a kind that typically come to
exercise mental functions. But, until recently, people have not
denied personhood to human individuals too young to perform such
functions yet, or too frail or disabled to perform them any longer.
Let us now return to Bailey's analogy between somatic cells and
human embryos. Despite his concessions, Bailey still wants to claim
that somatic cells have just as much "potential" as embryonic human
beings. He argues that egg cytoplasm is merely a "right environment"
for the development of the potentialities of a somatic cell. But
this ignores our arguments against this position in our previous
article, and it is certainly false: The ovum or cytoplasm from the
ovum is not merely the environment for the somatic cell's nucleus
(in cloning) but is a co-principle with it. The nucleus is not all
that develops; the whole entity grows by cell division. What Bailey
is actually proposing is that each of our cells is no different
in kind from a living, growing, whole human embryo; all the somatic
cell needs is the "right environment" to develop into an adult human
being. But if that were true it would mean that each of our cells
already is a distinct organism, which is absurd. (Yet remember that
Bailey himself concedes that the human embryo is a distinct organism.)
It is clear that something must be done to generate from
a sex cell or a somatic cell a new and distinct organism that is
no longer merely a part of a larger organism. The difference in
kind between a living human embryo and a somatic cell is clear:
The somatic cell's functions are subordinated to the survival and
flourishing of the larger organism of which it is a part; the human
embryo's functions are directed to its maturation.
Bailey's final recourse is to propose a fantastical thought experiment.
We are asked to imagine a future in which the factors in egg cytoplasm
which trigger the development of the DNA code found either in gametes
or a somatic cell have been discovered and such protein factors
could then be directly applied to a somatic cell. We are then asked
to imagine further a skin cell's DNA switches being flipped one
at a time to take it back to the embryonic state (where its cells
have totipotentiality). Finally, we are asked to imagine still further
that there is only one more methyl group to flip and the cell will
be able to begin embryonic development. Bailey then asks: "Does
that cell's status as a person depend on the presence or absence
of that one bit of methylation?" First, Bailey has slanted the facts
in constructing his thought-experiment. The factors in the ovum
or ovum's cytoplasm do more than just trigger the development of
the DNA molecules obtained either from gametes or a somatic cell:
they become a part of the new developing embryo. Second, neither
we nor Bailey have any idea whether this thought experiment could
come true. Still, given those reservations, the answer to his question
is: Yes. But this proves nothing. A significant — even morally
significant — personal change can always be re-described in
merely abstract chemical or mechanical terms and be made to sound
trivial or impersonal. Someone might say, for example: "Are you
asserting that the difference between having a normal, happy life
or being severely depressed for that twenty-one year old is merely
a matter of the composition of the carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and
oxygen elements in the fluids of his brain?" Or: "Are you saying
that whether we have a living being or not is just a matter of a
few potassium elements?"
The claim in Bailey's final paragraph is a textbook example of the
fallacy ignoratio elenchi. Nothing in any argument we advanced
appealed to revelation or to the authority of any church. Nevertheless,
he insinuates that we hold our view, not on the grounds we have
offered, but on some sort of religious basis. One might as well
say: "Bailey, you are obviously an apologist for the utilitarian
faith, and so you won't stick to the point and attend to the science
that shows, as even you have been forced quietly to admit, that
all of us once were embryos, because human individuals begin with
an activated ovum having a full complement of DNA, whether that
results from a natural process or by lab technology."
People of every religious persuasion, or none at all, ought to be
able to see that it is wrong to kill you or me, because the things
that we are, as opposed to just the properties or experiences we
have, are intrinsically valuable. But the things that we are, are
human physical organisms. Human physical organisms come to be at
conception, whether by a natural process or by lab technology. Therefore,
the things that are intrinsically valuable — and so can rightly
be called "persons" — come to be at conception, It is wrong
it kill and dismember them — at any stage of their existence
— in the hope of benefiting others.
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