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Unless an honest and frank transatlantic dialogue is initiated, the tensions lurking beneath the surface of the alliance will only be exacerbated, especially as NATO considers redefining its core missions and admitting new members at its November summit in Prague. Hungary's ambassador to NATO Janos Herman has bluntly summed up the task: "In Prague, and repeatedly recurring after Prague, we must provide a convincing answer to the question of whether the Alliance has a place in the new world, and if so, what that is." The recent Afghan campaign, however, convincingly demonstrated the degree to which NATO has become irrelevant as a traditional military alliance. The United States did not need to turn to other NATO members to provide technologies or capabilities that it lacked in order to successfully carry out its operations. At the same time, neither Kyrgyzstan nor Uzbekistan needed to be admitted into NATO in order for the U.S. to obtain bases. Indeed, America's bilateral ties — especially with Turkey and Great Britain — are much more critical to U.S. security interests than the multilateral alliance. NATO continues to be bedeviled by its post-Cold War lack of focus. Its original raison d'être — to deter an attack on Western Europe launched by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies — evaporated with the collapse of both institutions. To argue that Russia continues to pose an offensive threat to Europe when it has more than halved its armed forces deployed on its western frontiers stretches credibility. While some Central Europeans continue to privately argue that NATO must continue to defend against the possibility of a resurgent Russia (which might once again seek to impose its dominion over its former satellites), countering phantom threats is insufficient to justify the alliance's continued existence. No one, however, wants to dismantle NATO — for the simple fact that the alliance is the institutional guarantee of continued American involvement in European affairs — and the continuation of the security umbrella under which Europe continues to rest. Without NATO, the transatlantic relationship would rapidly become unglued, to the detriment of interests on both sides of the ocean. Yet, the whole process of enlargement seems to be on autopilot. Czech President Vaclav Havel urges the continuing transformation of the alliance into a political organization, a community of Western democracies (and, implicitly, to serve as a poor man's European Union for those former Soviet bloc states who will not be able to meet the EU's entry criteria at any point in the near future). Greece's defense minister Yiannos Papantoniou supports the entry into NATO of all states in the Balkans and in Central and Eastern Europe, in order to "create a single defense area without dividing lines and gaps" — in other words, turning NATO into the organization that the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) failed to become. Does NATO enlargement, however, enhance American security? One can certainly make the case for the political benefits of expansion, but NATO's survival as a viable security organization rests on its continuing ability to counter threats to the well being of its member-states. Hence, the Rumsfeld proposals. Even though the French have serious disagreements with Washington over the nature of the international system (and the role that the U.S. should play in global affairs), they too recognize that, in order for NATO to function as a credible collective-security agency, its member states need robust militaries. Paris has articulated a vision of a European "rapid reaction force" capable of deploying 60,000 men anywhere in the world within a 60-day timeframe. Unfortunately, apart from Britain and France, no other European country seems prepared to radically increase its defense spending and restructure its military establishment to be in a position to complement American forces. This does not mean, however, that Washington should simply accept a widening gap between American and European contributions to the common defense. The alliance still has an important role to play in serving as a strategic reserve for the United States, to provide resources, capabilities, and manpower to augment U.S. efforts. The stabilization of Afghanistan as well as the ongoing missions in the Balkans, represent an important test for the future of burden sharing within NATO. The Prague summit offers the opportunity for the United States to put forward serious proposals for NATO reform. For the last 50years, NATO has functioned like the Mafia — once in, never out. There is no mechanism to allow states that are either unwilling or unable to shoulder their fair share of the costs of alliance membership to exit. This needs to change. NATO also needs to regain its focus upon its core mission: security. Concerns about democratic transitions, human rights, and free and fair elections are best left to other multilateral organizations (such as the Council of Europe). Moreover, NATO expansion should not be allowed to jeopardize the important progress made in furthering Russo-American security cooperation. An enlarged NATO capable of more effectively dealing with terrorist threats and instability emanating from the Near East and Western Asia is very much in Moscow's interests — but the U. S. must prevent any of the new NATO members from succumbing to the temptation to use their membership in the alliance as a way to "twist the Bear's tail" or to gain leverage in border or business disputes. The champagne will flow in Prague as the alliance is expanded and the triumph of democracy in Europe toasted. Let's hope that all member states are willing — and able — to pay the tab. — Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a senior fellow for strategic studies at the Nixon Center and the executive editor of The National Interest. |
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ehind the
façade of unity presented at photo opportunities in Brussels, it
is clear that there are serious disagreements over the future of NATO.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's proposal that European states increase
their military budgets (to a level between 2 and 2.5 percent of GDP) in
order to more equitably distribute the burden of collective security among
the alliance's member states (the United States spends approximately 3.3
percent of its gross domestic product on defense while the European average
is 1.8 percent of GDP) was not endorsed by the majority of the European
members. Le Monde quoted an unnamed official who said, "Since
we do not have the same calling as the United States to restore order
around the world, we do not need a comparable military effort."
