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The ongoing ambiguity surrounding NATO's purpose in a post-Cold War Europe makes it very difficult to develop clear and transparent criteria for admitting new members. If NATO is evolving into an association of democratic states, then political criteria should take precedence. Thus Denmark, for example, supports the accession of all "deserving" countries to the North Atlantic Treaty (in the official words of the foreign ministry: "The Alliance should be open to all European democracies willing and able to share the responsibilities that membership of NATO brings"). If, on the other hand, NATO intends to remain primarily a military alliance whose members share common security interests, then — as Thomas S. Szayna of the RAND Corporation noted — the final decision to admit a new member must be based instead on a "strategic rationale — the impact on NATO's core mission and abilities… no matter how successful that country has been in meeting NATO's guidelines." NATO itself has been delightfully vague in charting its future course — and deciding which of the candidate countries are best suited to further its aims. Lord Robertson's definitive answer is that anywhere "between one and nine" states will be invited to join NATO at the Prague summit, though most observers conclude that only seven countries — the three Baltic states, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria — are viable candidates at this time. The Romanian newspaper Evenimentul Zilei complains that, unlike the European Union, NATO issues no periodic "progress reports" on the candidate countries. This is true, but quite understandable. After all, what criteria would be used? The "seven sisters" are all classified as "free" countries, according to the latest Freedom House report for 2001-02, although Romania and Bulgaria rank behind the other candidates. The Baltic states and Slovenia are more developed, wealthier, and better integrated into the European economy than are the Balkan nations; but from a strategic point of view, Romania and Bulgaria are prime real estate for projecting power to protect Western interests in the Caucasus and the Caspian region. The Scandinavian countries are strongly behind admitting Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, in order to consolidate a common defense and economic community of nations ringing the Baltic Sea; Greece and Turkey are especially interested in strengthening the alliance's "southern flank." All seven of the aspirant countries have constituencies of support within the U.S. Senate. To help the process along, the candidate countries have been very keen to respond to the signals emanating from Washington. While most current NATO members in Europe rebuffed Secretary Rumsfeld's invitation to increase their defense spending (to a level between 2 and 2.5 percent of GDP), Estonian Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland pledged that Estonia's expenditures on defense will not drop below a minimum threshold of 2 percent of GDP. Bulgarian Finance Minister Milen Velchev has promised that Bulgaria will maintain defense spending at a level of 2.7 percent of GDP for the coming three years. As it seems all but assured that NATO will expand this November, there is a strong case to be made for incorporating the seven all at once, rather than dragging the process out. Each of the candidate countries has particular deficiencies that might argue against admission, but such problems can be better addressed once the states are enmeshed into the framework of the alliance. Moreover — and following much the same principle as do mothers who urge their children to remove a bandage in one quick motion — the inevitable problems that come in the wake of expansion (dislocation in the relationship with Russia, a rebalancing of power and influence among existing NATO members) are better dealt with all at once, rather than prolonged over a number of years. A good deal of pre-summit attention continues to be wasted on speculation as to which states will be invited into the alliance. That time would be better spent on contemplating the future of NATO and the structural changes the alliance needs to undergo in order to remain relevant as a pillar of European security. President Bush's request that the position of Supreme Allied Commander-Atlantic be left unfilled, pending a review of the overall command structure of NATO, highlights the need for serious dialogue on these issues. The other major question that needs to be addressed is Russia's continuing integration. Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, writing in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, speaks for many in Europe when he notes that, if allowed to function as envisioned, the new NATO-Russia council will establish "a role for Russia in the key institutions of the Atlantic community" which, de facto, means that "Russia is now a member of the alliance, whether with or without veto power." The "beauty contest" atmosphere that now surrounds the Prague summit is counterproductive. The top priority isn't admitting new members; it's rejuvenating the alliance. Let's not lose sight of that goal. — Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a senior fellow for strategic studies at the Nixon Center and is executive editor of The National Interest. He previously wrote about NATO for NRO on June 12. |
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the countdown to the November NATO summit in Prague begins, concerns over
the future of the alliance remain acute. Polish senate speaker Longin
Pastusiak worries that NATO has "fallen into an identity crisis,"
while the editors of El Pais, in Madrid, speculate over whether
the transatlantic alliance is poised to "enter into an existential
crisis."
