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that the Taliban is in headlong retreat, pundits are predicting
a speedy end to the threat posed by al Qaeda. Whether Osama bin
Laden is captured in a cave in southern Afghanistan, or successfully
escapes the region in disguise using one of the legitimate passports
at his disposal (rumor has it that bin Laden was able to travel
to the Balkans in 1999 to scope out locations for new base camps),
his global network of operatives and facilities — dispersed
in places where governments are weak or nonexistent (Somalia, Kosovo,
and Chechnya come to mind) — will prove difficult to eliminate.
The problem
is that bin Laden has survived and prospered because, in the past,
he made himself too useful to be eliminated. The United States found
in bin Laden an ally of convenience in helping to organize the struggle
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It turned a blind eye to
his activities in organizing, arming, and funding mujahedeen
units in Bosnia and Kosovo because Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia was
Enemy Number One. Pakistan and especially its intelligence service
utilized bin Laden's network as a means to encourage a "plausibly
deniable" rebellion in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf emirates saw al Qaeda as a safety valve, a way to "export"
homegrown Islamic radicals to other parts of the world.
By subsidizing
such operations, many leading Middle Eastern politicians and business
figures were able to burnish their own Islamic credentials and to
remove potentially disruptive figures from the domestic arena. Both
Sudan and the Taliban in Afghanistan welcomed bin Laden and gave
him sanctuary because he offered financial, technical and logistical
support to their regimes. Moreover, his cadres of fighters have
proven — as recent experience in Afghanistan has shown —
a willingness to fight to the death, if need be, to hold their positions.
There is a
very real possibility that remnants of the al Qaeda network, even
with or without bin Laden, could find refuge — in sympathetic
areas of northwest Pakistan, where the writ of the central government
in Islamabad is haphazard at best, among Somali warlords, in remote
regions of Kosovo where KFOR (the NATO Kosovo Force) fears to tread,
or in the highlands of Central Asia surrounding the Fergana valley,
where the control of the post-Soviet successor states is weak. Al
Qaeda operatives could find new homes in the Pakistani or Iraqi
intelligence services, or migrate into the unstable vortex of the
Caucasus — the conflicts in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and
Abkhazia — and from that vantage point, attempt to destabilize
the entire Caspian basin.
This is why
the United States and its allies must aggressively track down and
eliminate all the branches of al Qaeda. This means that the U. S.
must be prepared to become more deeply involved in a number of troubled
areas in the world, and even be prepared to invest blood and treasure,
to ensure the long-term security of the United States. Bin Laden
must not be allowed to reconstitute his terror network. This means
that the habit of indefinitely postponing final solutions for festering
problems like Somalia or Kosovo (especially if CNN cameras are no
longer broadcasting heartrending scenes 24 hours per day) must be
changed. Al Qaeda has proven to be particularly adept at exploiting
"gaps" in the international system; it is not accidental
that, just this fall, a group of Chechen rebels, some allegedly
tied to bin Laden, tried to set up a base camp in the Kodori gorge,
a remote area lying in the no man's land between the breakaway republic
of Abkhazia and Georgia.
Kosovo, for
example, has proven to be a godsend both for terrorists and for
international criminal organizations. There is no clear source for
law and order; although still formally a part of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav
police and judges have no jurisdiction, while international peacekeepers
are reluctant to engage in law enforcement activities that may complicate
their mission (and endanger their personal safety). Reportedly,
al Qaeda has a number of facilities in the province, including a
training camp near Prizren, and bin Laden operatives have allegedly
played a key role in helping to organize the insurgencies which
have destabilized democratic governments in both Serbia and Macedonia.
Kosovo's ambiguous status as an "international protectorate"
must be ended, and the province either returned to Yugoslav jurisdiction
or formally separated. In either eventuality, the U.S. must be prepared
to play a far larger role in the Balkans than domestic opinion is
prepared to accept.
Deployment
of ground forces, however, is not the only option in the American
arsenal.
The United
States should not be squeamish in using its financial largess to
achieve results. During the 1980's, when Middle East terrorism was
directed against U. S. personnel and facilities, the Saudi government,
acting as an intermediary for Washington, brokered a deal with Lebanese
Shiite factions. In return for cash payments, food, medical supplies,
and other forms of assistance, these groups agreed to act as an
"early-warning system" to help deter terrorist attacks.
Paltry investments in Afghanistan, Somalia, and other troubled areas
today could be priceless in terms of ensuring American security.
Al Qaeda has
been stunned by the rapid collapse of its Taliban host. Creative
use of America's financial, diplomatic, and military power will
ensure its final destruction.
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