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May
14, 2003, 10:00 a.m.
The War Is Over and We Have Lost
Middle East
studies fails.
By Jonathan
Calt Harris
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here
has been a lot of attention in the last month to the reporters, columnists,
and TV generals who
miss-predicted the outcome of the Iraq war all that talk of
"quagmire" and an army "bogged down" against "stiff
resistance." Media heavies have either admitted their mistakes (Chris
Matthews), defended their record (William Raspberry), or done a bit of
both (Nicholas Kristof).
In contrast,
academic specialists on the Middle East remain unrepentant, even defiant
about their wildly faulty predictions, and no one seems to call them on
the matter. Here a few choice prognostications:
Edward Said, professor of English literature, Columbia University:
"The idea that Iraq's population would have welcomed American forces
entering the country after a terrifying aerial bombardment was always
utterly implausible."
Fawaz
Gerges, professor of Middle East studies, Sarah Lawrence College and
ABC News consultant: "There is a high risk that Iraq will become
a symbol of Muslim resistance against American military presence similar
to Afghanistan for the Soviets."
Joel Beinin, professor of Middle East History, Stanford, and past
president of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA): The fighting
in Iraq would "justify Israel's use of pre-emptive force against
Palestinians," permitting Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon "to
push Palestinians into Jordan."
Jere
L. Bacharach, professor of Middle East history, University of Washington:
"the war is over and we have lost," he announced on March 28,
while predicting that American tank forces will be "surrounded and
forced to surrender." Perhaps worse than this misreading, Bacharach
excused the Iraqi regime's practice of using its own civilians as military
cover. "We may denounce these Iraqi tactics as immoral and inhumane,
but the goal of the Iraqi military is to win, not play by international
rules," he said.
An extensive search
to find a public admission of error by these prophets turned up nothing
whatsoever. I therefore contacted each of them and asked if they "stood
by or repudiated" their views.
Despite repeated
attempts, both written and by telephone, I reached only two of the professors.
Joel Beinin replied with a curt "no comment." Jere Bacharach
acknowledged his error ("We should all be pleased I was wrong")
and indicated he would further address the topic in print.
This problem of terrible
predictions, then pretending they never happened and shuffling on to the
next topic, is nothing new for Middle East studies. Here are some other
examples, some from the very same individuals who got the Three-Week War
so wrong:
Edward Said for years told all who would listen about the rise
of a moderate and democratic Palestinian leadership. Here's what he said
in 1979, by way of example: "Fateh tacitly encourages a real democracy
in political ideal and style." He actually called Yassir Arafat a
mere "symbol of authority" who never appeared to be "despotic
or capricious."
Fawaz
Gerges often minimalized the importance of militant Islam in general,
and Osama bin Laden in particular. In late 2000, about the time the 9/11
attacks were in planning, he pronounced Osama bin Laden "exceptionally
isolated" and "preoccupied mainly with survival, not attacking
American targets."
Rashid
Khalidi, professor of Middle East history at University of Chicago
and past president of MESA: writing in January 1991, he said this about
the Iraqi soldiers who soon after went on to surrender to unarmed journalists:
"They're in concrete bunkers. And it won't be easy to force them
out without resorting to bloody hand-to-hand combat. It's my guess that
they'll fight and fight hard, even if you bomb them with B-52s."
John
Esposito, professor of Islamic Studies at Georgetown University and
another past president of MESA: the rise of militant Islam presents no
particular problem. In 1994, for example, Esposito informed readers of
The Middle East Quarterly that militant Islamic movements "are
not necessarily anti-Western, anti-American, or anti-democratic."
None of these analyses
proved correct, just as none of their dire predictions occurred in the
current Iraq conflict; and none of them so far as my research can
find were acknowledged or lessons learned.
Can one ask for a
more succinct proof of Middle East studies' failure?
Jonathan Calt Harris is the managing editor of Campus
Watch.
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