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Sept. 11 supposedly changed the imperative of America policy. Threats to the United States would no longer be appeased or contained; they would be confronted and removed. Popular discontent with tyrants in rogue states, an attitude fueled by the deprivations caused by sanctions, could be exploited to generate political change. People whose living standards had been reduced by their isolation from the international community would be told that their only path to a better life for themselves and their children would be through the removal of the failed regimes that have crippled their societies. Yet, even as workers continue to sift through the wreckage of the World Trade Center for bodies and American troops search the mountains in Afghanistan for terrorists, the State Department has returned to its ante bellum program of weakening sanctions against Iraq. The United States has introduced a draft resolution in the U.N. Security Council calling for the reform of U.N. sanctions against Iraq and giving Baghdad authority to export oil for an additional six months. These so-called "smart sanctions" are designed to ease restrictions on "legitimate" Iraqi trade while supposedly tightening sanctions on goods of value to the Iraqi military or to Saddam's weapons research. This is the policy Secretary of State Colin Powell came into office espousing. He explained the new policy at the Arab American Institute Foundation, May 5, 2001. "The Iraqi regime has attempted to blame the U.N. sanctions regime for the difficulties of daily life faced by the people of Iraq. But it is the regime that is at fault. Nevertheless, we are going to work with the United Nations and our Arab friends to revise the sanctions policy, so that it is directed exclusively at preventing Iraq from a military buildup and developing weapons of mass destruction, and to do it in a way that does not hurt the people of Iraq, but just the regime in Baghdad." The language hasn't changed despite the earth-shaking events of the last year. When the assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, John Wolf, signed an agreement in Moscow March 29, he said it was "designed to make clear that the international community is interposing no barrier on goods going to Iraq's civilian economy but it is determined to keep rigorous control over things that Iraq could use to resuscitate its military capabilities." The problem with this approach, as critics quickly pointed out, was that Saddam would continue to pursue his WMD program in the same wily fashion. In the absence of a robust inspection effort inside Iraq, there was not much more the U.S. could do to blockade military supplies than it was already doing. The only real change would be that Saddam could take credit for the improved economic situation as a triumph of his will over the forces of American imperialism. Domestic discontent would ease in Baghdad, while the increased presence of foreign capitalists would add legitimacy to his regime (as well as money to his treasury). Powell's audience was not just human-rights groups concerned about Iraqi children. He was also addressing other nations wanting to trade with Iraq, so as to keep them in the containment coalition. Syria, Egypt, and Turkey were selling goods to Baghdad. Economic ties had deepened between Iraq and European countries such as France and Russia that were waiting to rebuild Iraq's oil industry once all sanctions are lifted. Yet, the "rigorous control" of goods flowing to Iraq has been far from effective even without dropping barriers further. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told the Sunday Times of London March 21, "The fact remains that the sanctions [leak] and that things are getting in under dual-use, under the guise of dual-use that are being immediately turned to military advantage. The question people in the world have to ask is how do you feel about that, to be providing that type, under the guise of oil and food?" Some people feel quite fine about it. American companies have seen "smart sanctions" as part of the more general push for "sanctions reform" that would remove economic pressure as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. The Chamber of Commerce and USA*Engage, the latter a coalition of transnational corporations, agriculture groups, and trade associations created specifically to lobby against sanctions, felt that Secretary Powell was a convert to their cause. The White House and Defense Department continue to plan ways to overthrow Saddam. Attention has focused on military action, especially how to deploy and support enough ground troops to take Baghdad. But there must also be a political plan to replace Saddam with a new government than can gain the support of the Iraqi people, thus making the American war effort a campaign of liberation. Morale is said to be low in the Iraqi army, whose conscripts reflect the general mood of despair throughout society. It thus seems like an odd time to be taking steps to improve the conditions of the Iraqi people while Saddam is still in power. The answer to this apparent contradiction is that "smart sanctions" are another manifestation of the split within the Bush administration over the proper policy towards Iraq and other rogue states. Powell's reforms are designed for a long-term containment of Saddam in an environment of slipping diplomatic support for more direct American action. More comprehensive sanctions would be part of a full-court press meant to bring down Saddam in the near term by undermining the stability of both the regime and society prior to a military strike. The contrasting models have applications elsewhere. In neighboring Iran, discontent is already driving a mass movement. There is broad popular support for liberalization. This movement has provided parliamentary majorities at the polls in support of reformist President Mohammad Khatami, who was reelected with 77 percent of the vote. Young people in particular reject the Islamic theocracy that wants to keep Iran locked in a medieval cage. Though many question whether Khatami is a true reformer, or just looks moderate next to malevolent Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the Iranian people show a markedly pro-American attitude. They clearly understand that they cannot progress as long as their government is waging a Cold War with the United States. This leaves those business groups who embraced a policy of "engagement" with dictators in a precarious position. The last hurrah of the "sanctions reform" movement in Washington was the campaign against the extension of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act last year. USA*Engage led this losing battle. In a letter to President George W. Bush last August, USA*Engage chairman Don Deline argued that maintaining sanctions would "deny U.S. industry the ability to play its proper role in relations with Iran and Libya." The proper role, as seen from the boardroom, is to make deals with whoever is in power, since they are the only ones with money in an otherwise depressed economy. But firms that do so will have very dirty hands in the eyes of any post-liberation government. Certainly there are many such tainted firms in Europe, where business has been freer to follow their short-term lust for profits in concert with overseas despots. Some of the European objections to actions against Iraq and Iran undoubtedly stem from the fear that the "instability" of regime changes will lead to the purge of collaborationist firms, whose best contacts may end up in a war crimes court. Commerce always creates vested interests in the status quo. Ironically, those American firms who have chafed under restrictions and not been allowed to plunge into relations with doomed tyrants may find their "clean hands" give them an edge when its time to rebuild liberated countries. Perhaps American business leaders will even learn that it is better to work in tandem with the superpower's foreign policy, rather than try to subvert it. States, not corporations, are still the dominant actors in the world arena. Washington should be devising ways to turn selfish ends into dead ends, while paving the way for true progress. That's what would really be smart. — William R. Hawkins is senior fellow in national-security studies for the U.S. Business and Industrial Council Education Foundation. |
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of the political casualties of the September 11 attacks should have been
the "sanctions reform" movement. And for a while it looked like
the idea of appealing to rogue states and terrorist regimes on the basis
of commerce and investment had been discredited. 
