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The Bush administration is displaying a similar strategic change. Even before September 11, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz had unveiled the concept of "decisive warfare" defined as the ability to march on an enemy's capital and impose fundamental political change. At an August 16 briefing, Wolfowitz compared the doctrine to that of "unconditional surrender" in World War II. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz have focused their attention on Iraq with the same determination the great Roman Senator Cato the Elder showed Carthage 2,150 years ago. The American people support President Bush's desire to oust Saddam. A CBS poll released this August 8 found 66 percent in favor of using military force against Iraq, with 57 percent saying that the U.S. has the "right" to overthrow governments that pose a threat to America. A successful campaign will push approval ratings even higher, as Americans love nothing better than victory. Prominent Democrats
have also come on board. After chairing Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearings on Iraq, Sen. Joseph Biden (D, Del.) said that the United States
has "no choice but to eliminate" the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Sen. Joseph Lieberman
(D, Conn.) followed, saying that he supported action against the Iraqi
leader "because every day Saddam remains in power with chemical weapons,
biological weapons, and the development of nuclear weapons is a day of
danger for the United States of America." Decisive war is about politics, the governing of land and people. Precision-guided weapons make for wonderful television, but technology is not strategy and wars are about more than just blowing things up. When the smoke clears, it still takes "boots on the ground" to gain a victory that really matters. A cruise missile is not an adequate substitute for a Roman legion when it comes to changing regimes. Unfortunately, Republicans have too often shown a preference for "clean" technological approaches to military problems, such as bombing campaigns. They have also blanched at the cost of postwar reconstruction efforts required to build a better order than the one that produced the war. House Majority Leader Dick Armey's recent warning to President Bush against an "unprovoked war" was less about the libertarian congressman's concern for international law, than about the cost of a military campaign and lengthy occupation. Jack Kemp, Sen. Chuck Hagel, and others from the economic wing of the party have voiced similar concerns. It is this kind of misplaced fiscal conservatism has often hobbled GOP foreign policy. The Republicans then act on the reverse of Teddy Roosevelt's famous dictum: they talk loudly while refusing to carry a big stick. In 1953, the Eisenhower administration told the military to think in terms of "greater reliance upon our allies for the provision of indigenous forces, particularly ground forces" while the U.S. concentrated on more "bang for the buck" nuclear weapons that would deter war. In 1969, President Nixon said that in future crises, "we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense" with the U.S. only providing support with air and naval forces. Both Eisenhower and Nixon were channeling negative reactions to recent land wars that had become unpopular through mismanagement. Yet, the reason Washington had sent large armies to Korea and Vietnam — and would do so again in the Gulf, was precisely because local allies could not match the onslaught of better-armed neighbors who were nor deterred by "over the horizon" threats. Even in victory, the first Bush administration failed to march on Baghdad, rushed the troops home before disarming Iraq's WMD, and then sliced Army force levels by over a third from what had been built up under President Reagan. The current Bush administration still suffers from the GOP's traditional reluctance to deploy ground troops or engage in "nation building" to convert defeated enemies into allies. There are persistent reports that Secretary Rumsfeld still wants to make major cuts in American ground forces, perhaps eliminating one or two Army divisions and canceling weapons programs critical to land combat. Yet, real war cannot be waged, and the conditions of a stable peace established, without a strong army. Typical of the old Republican line against overseas entanglements is Brent Scowcroft, who has been talking down an Iraqi campaign in any venue he can find. Scowcroft and the elder George Bush co-authored the 1998 joint memoir A World Transformed. They argued that to have overthrown Saddam in 1991, the U.S. "would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq." They characterize this as "mission creep" with no "exit strategy." Such a view shows not just a lack of strategic foresight, but also a distaste for the hard, dirty — but necessary, tasks of world leadership. To the extent Saddam believes he can survive in power, it is because he doubts American troops will march on Baghdad. He has organized his military and secret police to handle any uprising by the unprepared Iraqi democrats, Kurdish rebels, or mutinous army units. And, unless a lucky hit kills Saddam, his regime can ride out air strikes. There is only one thing Saddam knows he cannot stand against, and that's an invasion led by U.S. armored forces, air cavalry and Marines. Liberating the people of Iraq from Saddam's brutal dictatorship will boost America's position in the Persian Gulf. Placing a friendly regime in Baghdad will give the U.S. access to new bases and oil supplies, and tilt the regional balance of power decisively in Washington's favor. Rather than recoil from an increased U.S. role, Americans should embrace it as they did in Europe and Japan after World War II. — William R. Hawkins is senior fellow for national-security studies at the U.S. Business and Industrial Council in Washington, D.C. |
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his history of the Punic Wars, Brian Caven describes the change in strategic
thought that took place in Republican Rome in the 2nd century B.C., "Moderation
had been the keynote of Rome's traditional foreign policy, and as a result
there was hardly one of her defeated enemies whom she was not obliged
to fight at least a second time. The opinion was gaining ground that Rome
had been too generous in the past." Rome then changed its strategy
from limited to total war, destroying both Carthage in North Africa and
Corinth in Greece, and placing their lands under the rule of friendly
regimes. Centuries of peace in those regions followed.
