|
 peaking
at the Citadel December 11, President George W. Bush made some excellent
points about the dangerous world the United States faces at the
dawn of the 21st century. But he also overstated the impact that
the war of terrorism will have on future conflicts, and hence on
the force levels and weapons programs needed to meet new challenges.
President Bush
purged the strategic malaise of the 1990s when he said, "When
the Cold War ended, some predicted that the era of direct threats
to our nation was over. Some thought our military would be used
overseas — not to win wars, but mainly to police and pacify,
to control crowds and contain ethnic conflict. They were wrong."
He reiterated the stand he took immediately after September 11,
"For states that support terror," he vowed, "it's
not enough that the consequences be costly — they must be devastating."
The problem
arises when President Bush appears to rely too much on the "lessons"
of the current military campaign in Afghanistan as providing the
template for meeting future threats. Bush noted that the combination
of "real-time intelligence, local allied forces, Special Forces
and precision air power" shattered the Taliban regime. Fair
enough. He was too hasty, however, in saying that "The conflict
in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future of our military
than a decade of blue-ribbon panels and think tank symposiums."
America is
fortunate that Osama bin Laden chose to locate in Afghanistan, a
country without ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) — or for that matter, even a conventional army of any
size. Taliban and al-Qaeda forces numbered about 50,000; one-tenth
the size of the Iraqi forces engaged in Desert Storm. U.S. forces
could attack Afghanistan with impunity.
This is not
to diminish in any way the valor of those Americans who fought (and
died) in the campaign, because war is never easy at the individual
level. But in terms of national effort, the war was as one-sided
as anything in the annals of Queen Victoria's "little wars"
of the 19th century.
The British
Empire was defended mainly by native troops, with a hard core of
veteran British professionals armed with more advanced weapons.
But armed forces designed for colonial warfare were inadequate —
both in numbers and in doctrine, to meet the army of Imperial Germany
in a contest for European supremacy.
The British
Expeditionary Force sent to France in 1914 was well trained and
equipped. On a man-for-man basis it was arguably the best fighting
force in Europe, but at only six divisions it was smaller than the
army of Belgium. Though it gave a good account of itself, it was
chewed up in high-intensity combat. The hastily mobilized mass army
that followed in 1915 suffered heavy losses due to inadequate training
and lack of support from a defense industry that had found mobilization
even more difficult than had the military.
World War I
also found the United States unprepared for large-scale war. General
John J. "Blackjack" Pershing was given command of the
American Expeditionary Force. Pershing had just led a punitive expedition
into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa, whose raiders had been terrorizing
U.S. border towns. Pershing pioneered the use of his era's high
tech systems: biplanes, radios and trucks. When his command reached
11,000 soldiers, it became the largest body of troops any then active
American officer had ever led. The U.S. Army did not have a single
active unit of division size when President Woodrow Wilson asked
Congress for a declaration of war.
American troops
went into European combat armed with French machine guns, tanks
and fighter planes because U.S. industry could not supply such weapons.
And they suffered heavy casualties because they lacked adequate
training for large scale, high intensity operations.
Despite the
reduction of the Army from 18 divisions at the time of the Gulf
War to 10 divisions today, there has been a steady pressure from
"reformers" — mainly with the motive of restraining
defense spending, to cut at least another two divisions. The argument
during the Clinton administration was that smaller, lighter units
were better tailored for peacekeeping operations. The argument will
now shift to antiterrorism operations. But the real lesson to be
learned is how difficult it is to rapidly upgrade forces designed
for the low end of the conflict spectrum to handle larger wars.
And it is usually the larger wars that have the higher stakes.
The United
States cannot always rely on local troops to prevail in combat,
even when supported by American airpower. In Korea, Vietnam and
Kuwait, American intervention — numbering in each case of around
500,000 men, was needed precisely because local allies could not
halt aggression from more powerful neighbors on their own.
The Bush administration
is now contemplating deposing regimes that support terrorism or
are developing WMD. At the top of the list of rogue states is Iraq.
It should be remembered that the first Bush administration expected
local forces (Kurdish and Shiite rebels or a military coup) would
finish off Saddam Hussein after his defeat in Kuwait. U.S. ground
troops did not advance on Baghdad to remove the Iraqi regime, but
relied on others to finish the job. They failed.
Even in Afghanistan,
reliance of local forces has had its disappointments. Almost all
the top Taliban leaders remain at large, in most cases through battlefield
deals that exchanged the peaceful surrender of territory for the
safety of defeated commanders. Such deals were often necessary because
the Northern Alliance and anti-Taliban Pashtun tribes were too weak
to win a decisive battle. This was particularly true at Kandahar.
The anti-Taliban forces lacked the numbers, weapons and training
to either take or besiege a stoutly defended city. Islamic militants
were allowed to withdraw, perhaps to fight another day.
Last year,
the Quadrennial Defense Review Working Group at the National Defense
University in Washington prepared a report on the use of allied
forces in major theater wars. It concluded that "Very few allies
possess substantial combat capability (ground maneuver brigades,
combat aircraft) that would allow for a reduction of U.S. combat
forces." The U.S. has the best trained, best armed and most
capable military on the planet. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz has said of adversaries, "They have learned from
the Gulf War that challenging American forces head-on doesn't work
— so they have turned increasingly to developing asymmetric
capabilities" like terrorism.
It would be
foolish to dismantle those elements of national strength that have
pushed adversaries into the margins. Indeed, the strategy of "decisive
warfare" articulated earlier this year by Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, as well as by Wolfowitz, plays to America's conventional
strength. It is the basis for the strategy of taking the war to
the enemy, rather than trying to defend every U.S. asset from every
form of asymmetrical attack.
Victories are
precious things, paid for in blood and treasure. They must not be
thrown away. When the enemy is beaten or in retreat, they cannot
be allowed to survive and regroup. Enemies with determined leaders
and an indomitable agenda must be destroyed when the opportunity
presents itself, because such opportunities are fleeting —
and expensive to recreate. When vital interests are at stake, America
should be ready and willing to take matters into its own hands.
Only then can the U.S. be sure that the outcome of the struggle
is a victory that fulfills American objectives.
|
