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Punxsutawney
Protocol
By Christopher C. Horner, senior fellow, Competitive
Enterprise Institute & counsel, Cooler Heads Coalition. |
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Consider these headlines:
"Historic Global Warming Pact Reached" (Associated Press, December
11, 1997, on the original Kyoto session) and "Nations Reach Landmark
Global Warming Pact" (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 11, 1997);
or this summer's "World Agrees on Climate Pact" (Chicago Tribune,
July 24, 2001, on COP-6) and "Nations reach a climate accord"
(New York Times, July 25, 2001). This one Post lead provides more factual errors, masquerading as editorial bias, than any news story should reasonably contain in its entirety. Consider the subhead's derogation, "U.S. Was on Sidelines in Morocco Talks." This, regrettably, is not true. Though claiming it will not be bound by the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. nonetheless refuses to rescind its valid signature on the document signaling, at best, continued engagement and a plea for less oppressive terms. At worst, it indicates that ratification may remain a possibility. The U.S. sent a full
delegation to Marrakesh, participated in key discussions, and, as anyone
making even one inquiry would know, advocated longstanding negotiating
positions through allied delegations. For example (and environmentalist
groups fumed about this throughout the conference, even if it doesn't
suit the reporting tastes of the Post), Canadian delegates promoted U.S.
ideas for a "clean development mechanism" whereby covered countries
receive some credit for energy projects developed overseas. Regardless, the Post and other establishment press seem to advocate or fall for the routine charade of "groundbreaking agreement." Anyone attending these conferences knows that whatever olio can be cobbled at the eleventh hour is hailed as a groundbreaking achievement closing the deal, etc., details to be hammered out later. Year in and year out, one negotiating session follows another. One "climate agreement" is reported after another, though all that's accomplished is a slight narrowing of terms. Given the actual treaty language's persistent vagaries, any implementable, enforceable "agreement" remains far off. In truth, the Kyoto Protocol set forth broad language binding 38 countries to reduce particular "greenhouse gas" (GHG) emissions, by differing percentages each, by dates certain. It called for emission-credit-trading regimes to enable this even though, rhetoric notwithstanding, these remain undefined. It called for international economic sanctions, which are still unstated. So far, all they've agreed to for cases of noncompliance is a more restrictive emission level for the promised, and as-yet-unagreed-upon, "next compliance period." The key question "Or what?" now highlights the folly of this anti-growth measure. Negotiations in The Hague in November 2000 made clear that either our negotiating partners in bad faith sought to change the terms of the agreement in mid-course or there never was agreement. There, our European allies insisted that when, for instance, Protocol Article 3 says GHG sinks "shall be used to meet the commitments under this article" ("sinks" are forestry and land-management practices sucking greenhouse gases from the atmosphere), they meant, "but not very much." The U.S. clearly intended "to the extent we are able to reduce GHGs through that method." No EU flexibility, given that this would mitigate U.S. pain therefore, no deal. We "dropped out." And most of such questions remain unanswered. As still-scarce details take form, Kyoto is increasingly obviously designed to fail (the particular charade of such dysfunction requiring another essay entirely). Greens and their cheerleaders might find a more appropriate announcement in Chevy Chase's classic Saturday Night Live offering: "This just in, Generalissimo Francisco Franco is still valiantly holding on in his fight to remain dead." |