July
15, 2003, 9:40 a.m.
Arafat Must Go
The key to Mideast
process progress.
By Ami Horowitz
he
optimists thought that Fatah, represented by Arafat and Abbas, had decided
to give the roadmap a chance to work, but instead Arafat is playing a
two-headed game. While Abbas is performing as the peacemaker, his organization
has continued the violence. Despite the "ceasefire" sniper attacks
continue to create an ominous cloud over Israelis. Fatah has taken credit
for several of these shootings. Abbas's true intentions are irrelevant,
he does not have the ability to achieve any of the goals he set out in
Aqaba. Arafat controls the military and political apparatus and is using
the former to engage in continued acts of terrorism The option of Israel
ridding themselves of Arafat is still a viable option. Arafat has proven
himself time and time again to be, not a statesman, but a cold-blooded
terrorist who once threw a crippled American out of a boat to drown in
his wheelchair and once massacred Israeli children in their kindergarten.
His Fatah organization has eclipsed Hamas in the number of terror attacks
over the past two years. Now is the time to free ourselves of this most
dangerous of menaces.
The debate raging
in Israel over what to do with Arafat is mostly focused on what the result
would be — either politically or physically — if Arafat left the
scene. One thing that's certain: The era of one man dominating every aspect
of Palestinian society and enjoying a near-total concentration of power
would be over. Though Abbas is the prime minister, it is doubtful that he
would have the ability to lead a Palestinian Authority without Arafat. When
Arafat acceded to the creation of a prime minister, he denuded the office
of any real authority, leaving Abbas without the ability to carve out a
power base. Abbas is a technocrat whose expertise has been focused more
inward, toward economic development and reform of the political process.
His support comes primarily from the Palestinian democrats, the Gulf states,
and many Western countries. While support from those quarters is not unimportant,
such backing is not nearly enough to make Abbas a true player in a post-Arafat
world. He is perceived as too moderate and a figment of the Bush administration
(as is shown clearly by his 2 percent approval rating). He would be unable
to muster the muscle and numbers needed in order to make a solid play for
the Palestinian leadership.
Without Arafat or a real prime minister, the Palestinian Authority will
most likely fall apart. Chaos and violence will reign, leading up to a new
leadership. Such a situation could have been averted if Arafat had groomed
an heir-apparent, thereby giving the anointed a measure of credibility both
within the Palestinian community and before the world generally. Unfortunately
for the Palestinian people, Arafat's hubris and megalomania have kept him
from preparing such a protégé.
Two major fault lines
will determine what shape a new Palestinian leadership will take. They
are the secular and religious rift, and the "old Tunisian" elite
and young Turks divide. In almost any scenario, I believe it would leave
Israel in no worse circumstances, and in some ways measurably better off
than they are now.
It's important to
understand that even with Arafat in place, Israel has never had a partner
to negotiate with. At times there were the niceties of diplomatic chatter
(such as the current incarnation of the peace process); at other times
there was a veneer of security cooperation (which was hollow and ultimately
meaningless). In both cases, Arafat was always going through the motions
to seem like a statesman, while in reality signing documents that would
ultimately snuff out the lives of Israeli civilians. It is quite possible
that, in a post-Arafat world, the radical elements within Palestinian
society would take control of the territories. These organizations fall
into two categories, the Islamist and the secular. The Islamists are represented,
primarily, by Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Islamic Jihad is an operational
entity, not a political one. They exist to run terrorist operations and
have no ability to rule. Hamas, on the other hand, has two arms —
the operational end and the "social" one. In addition to their
terrorist operations, they have an extensive web of social welfare organizations
(all created to service their operations capability) and therefore would
be in a better position to replace Arafat. While they are a popular and
well-funded organization — primarily from an extensive array of worldwide
charities, as well as fiscal backing from Iran — they would find
taking over the territories a challenging task. They would face difficulty
fighting against both local warlords and the secular radicals. They do
not have full access to the military infrastructure that has been stockpiled
over the last decade by the Palestinian Authority, and simply do not have
the foot soldiers.
The other radical
organization is the secular Tanzim. The Tanzim were created by Arafat
as a paramilitary force and an offshoot of Arafat's Fatah organization.
This provided for Arafat a level of distance, and therefore a degree of
deniability when it came to terrorism, despite Arafat's direct financing
of the organization. They are made up of young radicals who were led,
prior to his arrest, by Marwan Barghouti. Barghouti has long been a critic
of the "Tunisians," the Palestinian old guard, and has been
on the forefront for pushing reform among the Palestinian Authority. Along
with coordinating suicide attacks, the Tanzim are also in control of many
of the West Bank and Gaza municipalities, which has given them experience
in the art of governance. As a result of their relationship with Arafat,
they are much closer to the military infrastructure, which gives them
a larger amount of credibility when it comes to taking control in a post-Arafat
Palestine. Like Hamas, they openly embrace terrorism, and one would hope
that the international community would see them for the terrorists they
are — but probably they won't.
Another scenario
would be that the former leaders of the various security forces would
create their own enclaves in their areas of greatest support, and rule
as warlords. The most prominent of them, although not the only ones, are
Mohammed Dahlan in Gaza, and Jibril Rajoub (who has recently been asked
by Abbas to come back into service) in the West Bank. They are members
of the younger and more moderate guard and — thanks to their position
within the Palestinian Authority security framework — have access
to arms and the thousands of soldiers necessary to control their particular
areas of influence. Furthermore, their forces have been trained and funded
by the CIA. These two in particular were the golden boys of Washington,
and in some ways Israel. Both are fluent in Hebrew and are considered
moderate forces. Unfortunately, of late they have become more militant,
and Israel has intelligence that they have at least indirectly participated
in the planning of some of the suicide attacks. Having said that, if they
were to control their areas of influence, they once again could be moderating
forces, especially with the help of Egypt in the case of Dahlan, and Jordan
in the case of Rajoub. In such a scenario, Israel might be able to strike
separate interim deals with different warlords, allowing the international
community to assist in the development of a longer lasting and more politically
stable "national" government.
Israel cannot be
expected to negotiate and strike deals with a Palestinian entity whose
leader, Arafat, uses his puppet prime minister to mouth peaceful words
even while simultaneously conducting terrorist operations. It is bizarre
that Israel would be forced to endure such a discordant and intolerable
situation, particularly in light of the United States prosecution of a
war on terrorism. Arafat is a terrorist plain and simple, and no amount
of dressing will change that — not a new prime minister, not continued
meetings with the European foreign ministers. Arafat deserves nothing
short of being erased from the scene. Whatever rises from the chaos that
would no doubt ensue within the Palestinian entity after his departure
would leave Israel in a more tenable situation than the dangerous limbo
it finds itself in now.
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he
optimists thought that Fatah, represented by Arafat and Abbas, had decided
to give the roadmap a chance to work, but instead Arafat is playing a
two-headed game. While Abbas is performing as the peacemaker, his organization
has continued the violence. Despite the "ceasefire" sniper attacks
continue to create an ominous cloud over Israelis. Fatah has taken credit
for several of these shootings. Abbas's true intentions are irrelevant,
he does not have the ability to achieve any of the goals he set out in
Aqaba. Arafat controls the military and political apparatus and is using
the former to engage in continued acts of terrorism The option of Israel
ridding themselves of Arafat is still a viable option. Arafat has proven
himself time and time again to be, not a statesman, but a cold-blooded
terrorist who once threw a crippled American out of a boat to drown in
his wheelchair and once massacred Israeli children in their kindergarten.
His Fatah organization has eclipsed Hamas in the number of terror attacks
over the past two years. Now is the time to free ourselves of this most
dangerous of menaces.
