|
 he
new racial political deck of New York, after Michael Bloomberg's
stunning victory over Mark Green, may not be what it now seems.
Media commentators and political gurus far and wide are crediting
the defection of the Latino vote from the Democrats with Bloomberg's
victory. Some even claim that it portends a new political dynamic
for the ethnic politics of the city. Most are saying that the intense
runoff Democratic primary between Mark Green and Fernando Ferrer
led to the unenthusiastic (at best) support from the Latino community
leadership for the eventual winner, Mark Green; and that this would
lead to the disaffection of the Latinos for the Democrats on Election
Day. Of course, the pundits are giving scant attention to other
reasons for Green's demise: Bloomy's unprecedented expenditures
(from his own pocket), the Guiliani endorsement, Green campaign
missteps, and — of course — an unpredictable post-9/11
electorate. But a disproportionate amount of ink and electronic
airspace has been given (and, I predict, even more will be in the
future) to the 48 percent of Latinos, and to a lesser extent the
22 percent of blacks, that pulled the lever for the Republican candidate.
I fear that
mayor-elect Bloomberg will learn the wrong lessons from his victory;
I fear that Mayor Bloomberg will spend a disproportionate amount
of time wooing the bloc of his coalition least likely ever to vote
for him again, while ignoring the other groups within his winning
coalition. If this prediction is true — and I pray it's not
— it could spell doom for the Bloomberg mayoralty and his reelection
prospects in 2005. But I'll talk more about that later. For now,
I'll pay attention the sexy story of minority erosion from the Democrats.
There is no
doubt that the 48 percent Latino and 22 percent of black share garnered
by the Republicans is noteworthy, if not historic. At first glance
it seemed the much-maligned, decades-old vision of my father, Roy
Innis (national chairman of the Congress for Racial Equality), had
been vindicated. Roy Innis has been singularly outspoken on minorities
breaking up the one-party monolith voting for the Democratic party
since the 1960s. There is no doubt that years of Democrats taking
the minority vote for granted (nationally and in New York) have
come back to haunt them. But this is not the whole story. The defection
of half of Latinos and one-fifth of blacks to the Republican column
is a part anti-Green and part pro-"anti-liberal Democratic
party" phenomenon. The two parts are fundamentally different.
Group one (anti-Greens)
is the much-celebrated group of blacks and Latinos who were angered
by the contentious runoff between Green and Ferrer. These folk were
offended by the Green campaign's portrayal of Ferrer and Sharpton
as Siamese twins. For a black conservative who's been railing against
the evils of racial demagoguery, the irony is delicious. First of
all, politics is a contact sport, not tiddlywinks. Team Green's
pointing out that Sharpton would have significant influence in a
Ferrer administration was fair game and good politics, for the runoff.
Considering the media-assisted bounce Ferrer got out of Sharpton's
endorsement, the Green team's assertion was probably also quite
accurate. But this did not stop Terry McAuliffe from banishing one
of the Green team's members from the Democratic party for the "intolerant"
tactic. The final irony in the series is that Sharpton's shadow
likely would have loomed large in a Green administration as well.
Green and his liberal fellow-travelers in politics and media should
be renamed Dr. Frankenstein(s). They have helped transform the greatest
racial demagogue of the day into a political demigod. The monster
they created, just as Frankenstein's monster, can devour them just
as easily as their enemies. The Democratic party has also made racial
demagoguery part of its modus operandi. Remember when Vice President
Al Gore, during the closing days of campaign 2000, implied that
Republicans believed that a black was three-fifths of a person?
It seems that most Democratic candidates in a tough race will inevitably
throw the race deck. It was yet another sweet irony that soon after
the defeat of Ferrer in the runoff, Sharpton launched an investigation
— quickly aborted — into the alleged disenfranchisement
of minority votes in a Democratic primary. You reap what
you sow. And the Democrats' (and some Republicans', too) embrace
of Sharpton and other professionally angry racial arsonists has
changed the Democratic party forever, and spawned a rebellious faction
in its midst.
Not all minorities
that voted for Bloomberg did so as an expression of their anger
at Ferrer being "dissed." Many of these blacks and Latinos
are part of a larger group of whites. (Call them anti-Dems.) Most
of these minority voters have moderate to conservative instincts.
In the '93 Democratic primary, Roy Innis, though outspent 40 to
one by an incumbent mayor, managed to garner 130,000 Democratic
votes. His coalition was made up of some of these voters. In 1997,
Rudy Giuliani got more than one-third of the Latino vote and one-fifth
of the black vote. I think it's safe to say that, without the triple
tragedies of Diallo, Louima, and Dorismond, Giuliani was well on
his way to building a moderate pro-business, pro-family, and anti-crime
minority constituency. This group does not embrace the brazen racial
politics of the Sharptonlike demagogues. It would be foolish —
and politically suicidal — for Bloomberg to ignore this group
of minorities (which has strengthened in numbers and credibility
since the events of 9/11), while bending over backwards to appease
the others.
Bloomberg will
not be able to keep the Sharpton/Ferrer-motivated on his team anyway.
Particularly since Fernando Ferrer will most likely be the frontrunner
for the panic-driven Democratic-party nomination in 2005 —
for mayor. It is almost certain that the Democratic party will,
in an attempt to show contrition for its "evil" doings
in '01, promote Ferrer as the leader of the loyal opposition to
Bloomberg over the next four years. This will either culminate in
Ferrer's affirmative coronation as the Democratic candidate, or
his handpicking of the nominee. The Dems hope this will bring many
of those who voted against Green, back into the fold. Their hope
will probably be realized.
With all the
talk of rebelling minorities, the people who actually constitute
the largest piece of Bloomberg's block of voters — the 65 percent
of whites — are being ignored. This group is made up of political
independents, moderate pro-business professionals, and conservative
outer-borough (Queens, Staten Island, and parts of Brooklyn) residents.
It's this group that's most likely to stay in the Bloomberg camp
if he plays his cards right.
With a Democratic
party registration advantage of five to one, New York City has nevertheless
become a one-point-five-party (as opposed to a two-party) town.
Let's call it Democrats and anti-Democrats. For four elections in
a row ('89, '93, '97, '01), half or more of the city has voted against
the liberal Democratic candidate for mayor. That's a generation
of voters that have voted anti-Democrat. New York City Republicans
have failed to maximize this trend by creating a vibrant and competitive
Republican party; yet a loyal opposition has been born. Mr. Bloomberg
can strengthen his chances for governing effectively, and winning
reelection, by focusing on this reality. He can put together an
intriguing coalition of pro-business libertarians and moderate to
conservative outer-borough whites, along with a rising moderate
black, Latino, and Asian population. This coalition, for all its
diversity, will have strong similarities. This is Bloomberg's opportunity.
|
