Changing Colors
The new racial politics of New York.

he new racial political deck of New York, after Michael Bloomberg's stunning victory over Mark Green, may not be what it now seems. Media commentators and political gurus far and wide are crediting the defection of the Latino vote from the Democrats with Bloomberg's victory. Some even claim that it portends a new political dynamic for the ethnic politics of the city. Most are saying that the intense runoff Democratic primary between Mark Green and Fernando Ferrer led to the unenthusiastic (at best) support from the Latino community leadership for the eventual winner, Mark Green; and that this would lead to the disaffection of the Latinos for the Democrats on Election Day. Of course, the pundits are giving scant attention to other reasons for Green's demise: Bloomy's unprecedented expenditures (from his own pocket), the Guiliani endorsement, Green campaign missteps, and — of course — an unpredictable post-9/11 electorate. But a disproportionate amount of ink and electronic airspace has been given (and, I predict, even more will be in the future) to the 48 percent of Latinos, and to a lesser extent the 22 percent of blacks, that pulled the lever for the Republican candidate.

I fear that mayor-elect Bloomberg will learn the wrong lessons from his victory; I fear that Mayor Bloomberg will spend a disproportionate amount of time wooing the bloc of his coalition least likely ever to vote for him again, while ignoring the other groups within his winning coalition. If this prediction is true — and I pray it's not — it could spell doom for the Bloomberg mayoralty and his reelection prospects in 2005. But I'll talk more about that later. For now, I'll pay attention the sexy story of minority erosion from the Democrats.

There is no doubt that the 48 percent Latino and 22 percent of black share garnered by the Republicans is noteworthy, if not historic. At first glance it seemed the much-maligned, decades-old vision of my father, Roy Innis (national chairman of the Congress for Racial Equality), had been vindicated. Roy Innis has been singularly outspoken on minorities breaking up the one-party monolith voting for the Democratic party since the 1960s. There is no doubt that years of Democrats taking the minority vote for granted (nationally and in New York) have come back to haunt them. But this is not the whole story. The defection of half of Latinos and one-fifth of blacks to the Republican column is a part anti-Green and part pro-"anti-liberal Democratic party" phenomenon. The two parts are fundamentally different.

Group one (anti-Greens) is the much-celebrated group of blacks and Latinos who were angered by the contentious runoff between Green and Ferrer. These folk were offended by the Green campaign's portrayal of Ferrer and Sharpton as Siamese twins. For a black conservative who's been railing against the evils of racial demagoguery, the irony is delicious. First of all, politics is a contact sport, not tiddlywinks. Team Green's pointing out that Sharpton would have significant influence in a Ferrer administration was fair game and good politics, for the runoff. Considering the media-assisted bounce Ferrer got out of Sharpton's endorsement, the Green team's assertion was probably also quite accurate. But this did not stop Terry McAuliffe from banishing one of the Green team's members from the Democratic party for the "intolerant" tactic. The final irony in the series is that Sharpton's shadow likely would have loomed large in a Green administration as well. Green and his liberal fellow-travelers in politics and media should be renamed Dr. Frankenstein(s). They have helped transform the greatest racial demagogue of the day into a political demigod. The monster they created, just as Frankenstein's monster, can devour them just as easily as their enemies. The Democratic party has also made racial demagoguery part of its modus operandi. Remember when Vice President Al Gore, during the closing days of campaign 2000, implied that Republicans believed that a black was three-fifths of a person? It seems that most Democratic candidates in a tough race will inevitably throw the race deck. It was yet another sweet irony that soon after the defeat of Ferrer in the runoff, Sharpton launched an investigation — quickly aborted — into the alleged disenfranchisement of minority votes in a Democratic primary. You reap what you sow. And the Democrats' (and some Republicans', too) embrace of Sharpton and other professionally angry racial arsonists has changed the Democratic party forever, and spawned a rebellious faction in its midst.

Not all minorities that voted for Bloomberg did so as an expression of their anger at Ferrer being "dissed." Many of these blacks and Latinos are part of a larger group of whites. (Call them anti-Dems.) Most of these minority voters have moderate to conservative instincts. In the '93 Democratic primary, Roy Innis, though outspent 40 to one by an incumbent mayor, managed to garner 130,000 Democratic votes. His coalition was made up of some of these voters. In 1997, Rudy Giuliani got more than one-third of the Latino vote and one-fifth of the black vote. I think it's safe to say that, without the triple tragedies of Diallo, Louima, and Dorismond, Giuliani was well on his way to building a moderate pro-business, pro-family, and anti-crime minority constituency. This group does not embrace the brazen racial politics of the Sharptonlike demagogues. It would be foolish — and politically suicidal — for Bloomberg to ignore this group of minorities (which has strengthened in numbers and credibility since the events of 9/11), while bending over backwards to appease the others.

Bloomberg will not be able to keep the Sharpton/Ferrer-motivated on his team anyway. Particularly since Fernando Ferrer will most likely be the frontrunner for the panic-driven Democratic-party nomination in 2005 — for mayor. It is almost certain that the Democratic party will, in an attempt to show contrition for its "evil" doings in '01, promote Ferrer as the leader of the loyal opposition to Bloomberg over the next four years. This will either culminate in Ferrer's affirmative coronation as the Democratic candidate, or his handpicking of the nominee. The Dems hope this will bring many of those who voted against Green, back into the fold. Their hope will probably be realized.

With all the talk of rebelling minorities, the people who actually constitute the largest piece of Bloomberg's block of voters — the 65 percent of whites — are being ignored. This group is made up of political independents, moderate pro-business professionals, and conservative outer-borough (Queens, Staten Island, and parts of Brooklyn) residents. It's this group that's most likely to stay in the Bloomberg camp if he plays his cards right.

With a Democratic party registration advantage of five to one, New York City has nevertheless become a one-point-five-party (as opposed to a two-party) town. Let's call it Democrats and anti-Democrats. For four elections in a row ('89, '93, '97, '01), half or more of the city has voted against the liberal Democratic candidate for mayor. That's a generation of voters that have voted anti-Democrat. New York City Republicans have failed to maximize this trend by creating a vibrant and competitive Republican party; yet a loyal opposition has been born. Mr. Bloomberg can strengthen his chances for governing effectively, and winning reelection, by focusing on this reality. He can put together an intriguing coalition of pro-business libertarians and moderate to conservative outer-borough whites, along with a rising moderate black, Latino, and Asian population. This coalition, for all its diversity, will have strong similarities. This is Bloomberg's opportunity.