March
5, 2003, 9:30 a.m.
KSM in Custody
Wartime status
check.
By Matthew
A. Levitt
he
capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, al Qaeda's operational commander and
9/11 mastermind, demonstrates that the United States can, in fact, walk
and chew gum at the same time. The fact that the greatest success to date
in the war on terrorism occurred well into the planning stages of the
war to liberate Iraq should give pause to critics who said these two wars
could not be fought at once. Indeed, the information investigators are
already collecting from his interrogation and the materials seized
when he was captured, including his laptop, cell phones, "pocket
litter," and other documents, to the sudden surge in international
phone and e-mail "chatter" officials are monitoring strongly
suggests there will be more such successes in the war on terror in the
near future.
MANAGING
INTEL
Over the past few months, several respected terror analysts have aired the
legitimate concern that fighting a conventional war in Iraq would drain
precious intelligence resources from the ongoing, more dangerous, and immediate
war on terror. And it is true that supporting military action has historically
trumped other intelligence functions in times of war. By many estimates,
traditional war fighting demands as much as 80 percent or more of the intelligence
community's resources to support forces on the ground. But this fails to
account for two critical factors: (1) the introduction of highly sophisticated
communication and information technologies into combat, and (2) the experience
and know-how, built up over the past year and a half, of managing and balancing
finite intelligence resources in the war on terror. So, while the military
still will require enhanced intelligence support to liberate Iraq, the demand
on the intelligence community will be far less draining that in the past.
Meanwhile, the intelligence community is better prepared today than it was
pre-9/11 to manage its scarce resources personnel, technical tools,
funding to support both the ongoing war on terror and emergent crises
like the war in Iraq. Other areas like counter-narcotics and anti-crime
may suffer, as they already have since 9/11, but the critical areas of national
security like counterterrorism and counterproliferation will continue to
function at full capacity. And the arrest of KSM suggests they will be highly
successful.
BODY
BLOW
Even more significant that the vindication of capturing the mastermind
behind the 9/11 attacks is the devastating impact the arrest will have
on al Qaeda. According to a U.S. law-enforcement official, the arrest
of KSM "will hit Qaeda like a body blow and send shock waves throughout
the organization. This is not something they will be able to overcome
easily." While al Qaeda truly is a network of loosely affiliated
terrorist cells with no clear organizational hierarchy, especially true
now that their Afghan operations base has been destroyed, KSM was the
one man in a position to know more about al Qaeda's global tentacles than
anyone else. This is true not only because of his position as al Qaeda's
chief of operations, but because of his personal involvement in practically
every major attack attributed to the al Qaeda network since 1993. KSM
established many of the front companies supporting these cells and their
operations, through which he established personal relationships throughout
the al Qaeda network.
KSM's capture brings
his international terror career full circle. It started, after going to
college in North Carolina and then fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan,
with the 1993 World Trade Center attack led by his nephew, Ramzi Yousef,
and Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the Blind Sheikh. It ended after authorities
arrested the Blind Sheikh's son, Muhammed Abdel Rahman, and traced KSM
to the home of a senior Pakistani Islamist based in part on Rahman Jr.'s
interrogation. Along with KSM, authorities captured Mustafa Ahmed al Hawsawi,
who served as KSM's financial intermediary funding the 9/11 hijackers
and receiving unspent funds just hours before the attacks. According to
the Financial Times, al-Hawsawi held a supplemental Visa cash card
in the name of Abdullah al-Fakasi al-Ghamdi. Authorities identified the
photo from the Visa-card application as KSM.
KEY
NODE IN THE AL QAEDA MATRIX
What sets KSM apart, in the words of a senior U.S. law-enforcement official,
is that "he was at the center of everything." For example, after
recruiting the operatives to work with his nephew Ramzi in the Philippines,
KSM financed the "Bojinka" plot to down a dozen U.S. airliners
over the Pacific Ocean through a Malaysian-based import-export company
that dealt in Sudanese honey called Konsonjaya. One of the companies'
directors was Riduan Isamudin, better known as Hambali, the operational
head of the Jemaah Islamiya terrorist network. Though unknown at the time,
Hambali is now the "most wanted" man in Southeast Asia for his
role in several bombings in the Philippines, the foiled plot to bomb U.S.
and other targets in Singapore in December 2001, and the October 2002
Bali bombings.
Authorities stumbled
on the apartment Yousef and his associates were using to mix the components
for their bombs when their chemistry experiments started a small fire.
Investigators searching the apartment discovered the terrorists were also
behind the bombing of Philippine Airlines flight PR434 in December 1994
and planned to assassinate the pope during his visit to Manila. They also
discussed crashing an airplane into CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia,
a technique KSM would later employ in his second strike against the Twin
Towers. Police also found a note in the Manila apartment which was signed
"Khaled Sheikh Bojinka." Investigation later determined that
KSM spent time in Manila with the cell led by Yousef, proactively involving
himself in the plot's planning and oversight just as he later would for
the 9/11 Hamburg cell led by Mohammad Atta.
In fact, KSM and
Hambali were both present at the January 2000 planning meeting in Malaysia
at which the final touches were put on the plot to bomb the USS Cole
(a plot to bomb the USS Sullivans had just failed) and the decision
was made to carry out the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Also in attendance
at this key meeting were two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and
Khalid Almidhar, Cole planner Tawfiq bin Attash, and others.
KSM is said to have
personal connections to terrorists across the globe. The names of people
in the United States were said to be found on his person at the time of
his capture, his business travels for his front companies took him from
Malaysia to Brazil, and in between he even spent time as a Qatari civil
servant. Officials note that hundreds of al Qaeda operatives caught since
9/11 admitted under interrogation to having had recent conversations with
KSM. In one conversation intercepted by German authorities, Nizar ben
Mohammed Nawar, the suicide bomber in the April 2002 Djerba synagogue
bombing in Tunisia, called KSM three hours before the bombing with a final
status update on the operation. A captured al Qaeda affiliate tied to
the kidnapping and assassination of Wall Street Journal reporter
Daniel Pearl implicated KSM in that attack as well.
ONGOING
THREAT
From the 1993 WTC attack until his arrest, KSM continued to plot, fund,
and coordinate spectacular terror attacks against the United States. Homeland
Security Secretary Tom Ridge noted that KSM was tied to "a significant
terrorist plot" planned for the United States that was behind the
recent elevated threat warning level. According to several press reports,
intelligence analysts feared KSM was planning a large-scale attack in
Manhattan, possibly involving fuel tracks, gas stations, and suspension
bridges.
KSM was also actively
plotting attacks outside the U.S. According to a Canadian Secret Intelligence
Service interrogation report obtained by the New York Times and
Discovery Channel, Muhammad Mansur Jabarah, the KSM lieutenant and Jemaah
Islamiya liaison, confessed that it was KSM who gave him money and instructions
for attacks in Southeast Asia targeting "soft" targets frequented
by Americans. According to Filipino authorities, "Jabara himself
admitted that he was introduced by Osama personally to Mohammed to oversee
some terrorist operations in Southeast Asia."
FIGHTING
MULTIPLE WARS
The capture of KSM will enable officials to foil ongoing plots and apprehend
more al Qaeda operatives. Since his relationships cut across the al Qaeda
network, including multiple terrorist groups and commanders and foot soldiers
alike, his capture is likely to damage the network of international terrorists
like none before him. Supporting the military war in Iraq will not impede
the intelligence and law enforcement communities' ability to continue
prosecuting the war on terror. Indeed, with all the new lead information
gleaned from KSM's capture, one war the war on terror received
its biggest boost to date just before the second war the liberation
of Iraq commences.