Blacks for Profiling
Criminal vs. terrorist profiling.

By Robert A. Levy, senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute
February 6, 2002 8:35 a.m.

 

ccording to the Gallup Organization, 71 percent of African Americans approve of profiling Arabs to combat terrorism. Yet an overwhelming percentage of African Americans condemn racial profiling in the war against crime. Do those two seemingly contradictory positions suggest an underlying hypocrisy? Not necessarily.

To determine whether African Americans are being hypocritical or just plain sensible, consider these three questions: How important is the objective that the profile seeks to accomplish? How effective is the profile in advancing that objective? What is the potential for abuse?

Let's begin by examining the goal of the profile, and the benefit if that goal is achieved. The gain from a criminal profile can range from, say, identifying a drug dealer to capturing a serial murderer. The gain from a terrorist profile might reach from halting an airline hijacking to preventing madmen from using a weapon of mass destruction.

Indisputably, the potential benefit of a criminal profile, while certainly not trivial, extends at most to saving a small number of lives. That pales in comparison with the potential benefit of a terrorist profile — a matter of saving thousands or conceivably hundreds of thousands of lives. On those grounds alone, it seems rational to protest the former while applauding the latter.

Next, how effective is a racial or ethnic profile in stopping crime or terrorism? Imagine, for the sake of argument, that all terrorists are Arabs. Only a fool or a masochist would then prohibit Arab ethnicity from being added to a multi-factor profile of suspected terrorists. Indeed, all of the 9/11 terrorists were reportedly of Middle Eastern descent. Yet, self-evidently, all criminals are not African Americans. Thus, other things being equal, the fit of a terrorist profile that included ethnicity would likely be tighter than the fit of a criminal profile that included race.

To be sure, behavior profiling — that is, monitoring conduct rather than immutable characteristics such as race or ethnicity — is less invasive and may be equally effective. In fact, law-enforcement officials who focus on race and ethnicity may ignore more productive profiles based on behavior. Obvious tip-offs include nervousness, conflicting answers to questions, one-way travel arrangements, no luggage for a long trip, lots of cash, no driver's license, or the use of a rental car. Yet the question remains: Does the addition of race or ethnicity to a behavior-based profile significantly improve the ability of the profile to ferret out criminals or terrorists? On the basis of the events of 9/11, the answer is more likely to be "yes" when profiling terrorists than when profiling ordinary criminals.

Finally, consider the potential for abuse. No doubt, African Americans' anxiety about criminal profiling stems from our country's troubled history of racial discrimination. We have no comparable history of bias against Middle Easterners, nor have responsible persons suggested that airport searches, for example, are motivated by traditional bigotry toward Arabs or Muslims. Because the principal objection to profiling is its exploitation at the hands of officials animated by deep-rooted prejudice, on that score, African Americans have more cause for concern than do Middle Easterners.

Moreover, perverse incentives operate to encourage criminal profiling. Those same incentives, which are notorious in the African-American community, do not likewise promote terrorist profiling. First, criminal profiling is inextricably linked to the war on drugs. We spend $37 billion a year trying to stop willing suppliers from selling drugs to willing consumers. In that victimless-crime context, the culprits will not be identified through the use of specific information from what are typically satisfied customers. And without individualized evidence, police are forced to rely on more readily available tools, like statistical profiles.

Second, asset-forfeiture laws give police an enormous incentive to grab drug suspects so they can seize and keep money and property. The Justice Department reports that local police and sheriffs' departments received nearly $650 million in "cash, goods, and property from drug asset forfeiture programs during fiscal 1997." Gene Callahan and William Anderson, writing in the August-September 2001 issue of Reason, put it this way: "If the police begin harassing every motorist in a particular locale, support for their activities will soon evaporate. However, if they can identify a minority group… and if they know that members of that group are not politically powerful, then the police can focus on those people in order to enhance departmental revenue."

Here's what it all means: It may be entirely logical to condemn criminal profiling of African Americans while advocating terrorist profiling of Middle Easterners. In the terrorist context, the damage that could be prevented is measured in thousands of lives, the profiles are probably more effective for fingering guilty parties, and it is much less likely that abusive practices will be driven by institutionalized racism.

 
 

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