Do Donations Alter Votes?
What the evidence shows.

By John R. Lott Jr., senior research scholar at the Yale University School of Law. One of his recent studies on campaign-finance reform can be downloaded.
March 30, 2001 8:30 a.m.

his week the U.S. Senate was locked in fierce debate over whether donations to candidates should be limited to either $2,000 or $2,500. To some, such as Senate Minority leader Tom Daschle, that $500 difference would determine whether the entire reform package made "a mockery of reform." Yet, there is no evidence that the limits being debated have anything to do with preventing corruption. Instead, what limits clearly do is protect incumbents.

Public-interest groups and the press keep on telling us that politicians vote in accord with their donors’ interests. The claim is that the only reason for donations is to buy influence. There is little doubt that campaign contributions and voting records often go together. But few mention that this relationship might simply reflect that donors only support candidates whose views they share.

Fortunately, there are cases where we can separate out these two motives. Consider a retiring politician. He has little reason to honor any “bribes,” for reelection is no longer an issue. Even if earlier there were corrupting influences from donations, the politician would now have freedom to vote according to his own preferences. Therefore, if contributions are “bribes” to make the politician vote differently from his beliefs, there ought to be a change in the voting record when the politician decides to retire.

Yet, this proves not to be the case. Together with Steve Bronars of the University of Texas, I have examined the voting records of the 731 congressmen who held office for at least two terms during the 1975 to 1990 period. We found that retiring congressmen continued voting the same way as they did previously, even after accounting for what they do after their retirement or focusing on their voting after they announce their retirement. Despite retiring politicians only receiving 15 percent of their preceding term’s political-action-committee contributions, their voting pattern remains virtually the same: they only alter their voting pattern on one issue out of every 450 votes.

If anything, these statistically insignificant changes even move in the wrong direction. Retiring politicians are slightly more--not less--likely to favor their former donors. This makes no sense if indeed contributions had been buying votes.

The voting records also reveal that politicians are extremely consistent in how they vote over their entire careers. Those who are the most conservative or liberal during their first terms are still ranked that way when they retire. Thus the young politician who does not yet receive money from a PAC, does not suddenly change when that organization starts supporting him.

The data thus indicate that politicians vote according to their beliefs, and supporters are giving money to candidates who share their beliefs on important issues. A reputation for sticking to certain values is important to politicians. This is why political ads often attack policy “flip-flops” by the opponent--if a politician merely tells people what they want to hear, voters lack assurance that he will vote for and push that policy when he no longer faces reelection. Voters instead trust politicians who show a genuine passion for the issues.

If donations were really necessary to keep politicians in line, why would individual donors ever give money to a politician who is running for office for the last time? If politicians simply took positions to get elected, why would voters ever elect such a politician who would then be able to vote anyway that he likes?

Proponents of campaign-finance reform have managed to claim the mantle of dislodging the entrenched political establishment. But, in fact, the reverse is true: Allowing large contributions is instead the key to letting new faces into politics. Existing federal and state donation expenditure limits have entrenched incumbents, who can rely on voters’ greater familiarity with them as well as use their government resources to help them campaign and generate news coverage.

It is very difficult for challengers to raise numerous small donations. Incumbents have an advantage here, as they have had years to put together long mailing lists as well as making a wide array of contacts. Allowing large donations would make it easier for newcomers to raise large sum from a few sources.

For example, Sen. Eugene McCarthy, nicknamed “Clean Gene,” would--under current restrictive rules--not have been able to challenge Lyndon Johnson for the presidency in 1968. He relied on six donors who bucked the party establishment and almost entirely financed his campaign. McCarthy raised as much money (after adjusting for inflation) as George W. Bush has so far in this election, but Bush has had to raise the money from 170,000 donors.

In another case, George McGovern was able to continue his 1972 presidential primary campaign only because of extremely large donations from one person, Stuart Mott.

The small donations also complicate things by requiring that fundraising start long before the race begins. This means that if a candidate falters, it is virtually impossible for other candidates to enter in at the last moment.

Donation limits have reduced the number of candidates running for office; cut in half the rate at which incumbents are defeated; given wealthy candidates an advantage, raised independent expenditures; increased corruption of the political process; as well as led to more “negative” campaigns. More of the same will follow if we continue the path of stricter and stricter campaign “reform.”