Success and Victory
Much work remains to be done.

he overthrow of the Taliban is an important achievement in the war on terrorism. The two-month campaign in Afghanistan has showcased the long reach and deadly effectiveness of American military power. It has also demonstrated our willingness to track down and eliminate terrorists and their sponsors with a seriousness that had been notably absent in recent years.

The Taliban's demise gives the United States several benefits. Most concretely, American and allied troops now enjoy much greater freedom to hunt down al Qaeda's members and eliminate its infrastructure in Afghanistan. If we are fortunate, Osama bin Laden will not live to see the new year. The elimination of the Taliban regime also sends a powerful message to those who aid and abet terrorists. Rather than tossing a handful of cruise missiles at the problem and wishing it would go away, as it did repeatedly during the 1990s, the United States has made a sustained commitment to eradicating international terrorist groups and their supporters. The leaders of other state sponsors of terrorism would be well advised to take heed.

While we should welcome the demise of one of the world's most brutal and repressive regimes, we must not confuse success with victory. Our celebration must be tempered with the realization that much work remains to be done. The Doolittle raid on Tokyo did not ensure the defeat of Imperial Japan. Nor did the Berlin airlift guarantee the demise of the Soviet Union. Rather, each action was but the first step in a protracted conflict. Thus it will be in this war. Success will demand a sustained effort. Victory will come not as a result of spectacular battlefield successes, but by breaking the will of our adversaries. This will demand not only the use of military force, but also the deployment of all the instruments of national power.

Observers have tended to equate success in this war with control over territory and the capture or elimination of Osama bin Laden. This approach is at best incomplete, at worst misleading. It may delude us into declaring victory prematurely, or cause us to ignore the more important but less tangible dimensions of the struggle. To be successful, we must not only eliminate the leadership and infrastructure of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, but also induce their members to defect and make it unattractive for others to take their place. We must deny them the spectacular successes that increase their stature. And we must remove the grievances that give their aims the air of legitimacy. This war will not be won in the mountains of Afghanistan or the deserts of Iraq. Rather, it will be won, if it is to be won, in the heart and soul of the Islamic world.

The United States faces two main challenges at this point in the war. First, we must exploit the momentum provided by our victory in Afghanistan. The rapid overthrow of the Taliban has already shifted Arab opinion. Those in the Islamic world who criticized the United States now realize that they must shoulder at least part of the blame for the radicalization of Islam. The al Jazeera television network, which until recently portrayed Osama bin Laden as a folk hero, has now begun to expose his apostasy. We must use our leverage to go after Islamic terrorist organizations across the globe. Groups that are constantly worried about their survival will be less threatening than those that are secure. The United States must use its new-found credibility to pressure states that support terrorism to reform. We must also insist that those who turn a blind eye to terrorist organizations — such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt — change their ways.

Second, President Bush needs to articulate a vision of what this war is all about. In his speech before Congress on September 20, he made a powerful case for military action in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban served to focus U.S. efforts. With al Qaeda's operatives in Afghanistan dead, on the run, or in hiding and the Taliban deposed, the administration will face a considerable challenge in crafting a rationale for the next phase of the war. It will also need to develop a strategy that judiciously combines spectacular successes with the invisible but ultimately more important job of sapping support for Islamic extremism. Of the two challenges, this will prove to be most difficult.