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Both presidents brought moral vision to their situation. Bush 1 recognized Saddam as a threat to the international order and acted decisively to check him. President Bush's call for reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA) cuts to the heart of the matter — when the Palestinian people have lawful government they will be able to make peace with Israel. But both father and son wavered when following their moral visions to their logical conclusions — removal of the offending regime. The logic behind these failures is similar. Both administrations were worried about anarchy in the wake of a regime change, or worse, radical Islam filling the vacuum. Both administrations held out hope that senior officials would replace the offending leader and produce a more mild dictatorship. In the face of this vacillation Saddam reestablishing himself at American expense — combining defiance with occasional token gestures. Now the United States finds itself preparing for war against Saddam under unfavorable international conditions. Similarly Arafat will redraw the PA police org charts and promote sensitivity training for the thugs of the PA security services. He will hold sham elections, like the 1996 elections. He will promise greater accountability and transparency. But these pro forma reforms will not lead to good government. But they will increase the legitimacy of the Palestinian entity and push Israel and the United States into a corner regarding concessions to a still dangerous Palestinian entity. To avoid this fate, the administration needs to reexamine its bogeymen and its grail. American hopes that Arafat will be removed or edged aside through a coup are in vain. With assets no greater than his own mystique, Arafat survived 25 years of attempts to push him to the margins. The top leadership echelon will not help edge Arafat out — they hold their positions because of their loyalty to Arafat, and they are all schooled in the same radical ideologies. Finally, and most importantly, Arafat completely controls the PA and PLO money, personally directing even small disbursements. Unless Arafat is exiled and permanently cut off from the West Bank and Gaza, he will soon re-establish himself in center stage. The fact that there is no single figure to replace Arafat does not mean that Palestinian society will slide into anarchy if the PA were removed. There are a many local leaders — village mukhtars, businessmen, and clan leaders — who would readily make pragmatic arrangements with Israel, sharing intelligence in exchange for basic services and renewed working rights in Israel. Palestinian society is traditional and these figures carry substantial weight. The periods when Israel cooperated with local notables were the most peaceful of Israel's administration of Gaza and the West Bank. From these modest beginnings a new Palestinian leadership could emerge, a moderate leadership. A moderate, pragmatic government devoted to responding to the real needs of the Palestinian people would be planted in fertile ground. Prior to Arafat's establishment of the PA in 1994, the Palestinians had a growing civil society with a well-developed network of NGOs. (Arafat forced NGOs to register with his intelligence services and funnel their donations through PA coffers.) Palestinian intellectuals are familiar with and many admire Israeli democracy. Many have asked why Israel has achieved democracy and rule of law and why the Palestinians have not. But such a leadership cannot arise in the face of Arafat's tens of thousands of heavily armed security forces. Arafat's history of murdering his opponents discourages them from taking power. But there are extensive arsenals in private Palestinian hands. If Arafat's forces were neutralized, local leaders could, with some external support, defend themselves from lower level threats, such as Hamas. At its most popular Hamas has support from less than 30 percent of the Palestinians. A substantial portion of that support represents a protest vote against the PA. More importantly, Hamas has, at most, a couple thousand armed activists — nothing like Arafat's massive security infrastructure. The U.S. lost substantial international prestige as Saddam survived two American presidents. We risk playing the same game with Arafat, who has already survived four Israeli premiers. Allowing Israel to remove Arafat now will spare us greater difficulties later. But most importantly, it is the only path that does not promise more of the same and will free the long-suffering Palestinian people from the grip of radical ideology. — Aaron Mannes is a Washington-based writer & Middle East analyst. |
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American and international pressure, Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman
Yasser Arafat acquiesced to holding elections. But all this pressure accomplished
was to deal Arafat a new deck, as he insisted that Palestinian elections
could only occur in the wake of an Israeli withdrawal. History is repeating
itself, as President Bush in his dealings with Arafat follows the path
trod by his father after the Desert Storm Victory.
