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flexibility of the U.S. military is something to behold. It can
rapidly turn a force designed for one mission to success in another.
It routinely engages in what the folks at the Santa Fe Institute
call complex, adaptive behaviors. Consider:
B-2 bombers were originally designed for hunting mobile nuclear
missiles deep inside the Soviet Union. They were later reinvented
to deliver a significant number of highly precise munitions in "strategic
attacks," going "downtown" against regional foes.
Now they are flying halfway around the world to bomb the corrupt
government of a fourth-world nation and its terrorist owners. It
is not too hard to imagine a B-2 delivering the 5,000-pound bunker
buster that seals the fate of bin Laden.
In the Gulf War, the Navy was criticized for spending too many missions
on defending its carriers and having scant precision-strike capabilities.
Now, U.S. aircraft carriers in the waters off Pakistan are launching
strike aircraft on 1,400-mile roundtrip missions of 6-to-7 hours
in length in attacks against Taliban and al Qaeda targets. That's
roughly 3-times their normal operating times and distances.
In response to the limitations on basing rights in the region, we
sailed our own "bases" into range. An aircraft carrier
will also apparently be used as a floating Special Forces base.
Not only does that translate to less pressure on our coalition partners,
it also means far fewer prying eyes.
Air
Force refueling aircraft, originally conceived as flying gas stations
for nuclear bombers, now are the indispensable elements of power
projection for airlift aircraft, short-range fighter bombers, and
global-range conventionally armed bombers (and for Navy airplanes,
too).
Since
the Gulf War, the U.S. military has transformed its emphasis from
global thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union to conventional war
against regional adversaries to high-tech military-revolution-based
campaigns dominated by information superiority. All the while the
military has actually executed operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti,
Bosnia, and Kosovo.
Fixed-wing
aerial gunships were developed in the Vietnam war to provide firepower
to bases surrounded by hostile countryside and put of range of artillery
support. Anyone who has seen the John Wayne movie The Green Berets
is familiar with Puff the Magic Dragon — a C-47 with a side-firing
Gattling gun. This is now a highly sophisticated platform (the AC-130)
with superior sensors, firing computers, and a variety of guns,
including a 105 MM cannon. They are reported to primarily train
to support Special Ops, but they can also be used for power projection
(the attack of enemy ground forces in the Taliban's case).
Now, in the
early stages of what promises to be a long, difficult, complicated,
global war on terrorism, we hear press reports that the secretary
of defense is considering a radical reorganization of the U.S. military
precisely because he is not sure the current structure is right
for the new warfare. Currently, U.S. military forces operate (conduct
warfare and supporting activities) under the authority of commanders-in-chief
(CINCs, pronounced sinks). The military services transfer command
of their units to the CINCs for war fighting. The regional CINCs
for Europe, the Pacific, South America, and Southwest Asia are powerful
entities in the joint military command structure that has evolved
since the Goldwater-Nichols military reform legislation of the 1980s.
They are joined by CINCs for such functions as special operations,
strategic (essentially nuclear) operations, transportation, and
space, plus joint-forces command in charge of joint training and
military experimentation.
The system
has its roots in World War II, when the world was divided into two
major spheres and powerful military leaders were assigned responsibilities
for each. Modern day CINCs are statesmen, grand strategists, bureaucrats,
and operators all rolled into one. The weakness of the system is
at the seams. The global terrorist threat is home-based across Northern
Africa (under European Command jurisdiction), through Southwest
Asia (under Central Command), and on to Indonesia (under Pacific
Command). Special operations within a region fall under the authority
of the regional commander. In short, the war will be global, but
the core military organizations are sub-optimized to deal with regional
problems and perspectives. The structure makes sense for limited,
theater-based conflicts, but it is too clunky for the challenges
it now faces.
Details of
options under consideration are sketchy, but serious consideration
is apparently being given to creating a military command for homeland
defense, as well as various combinations of a smaller number of
more powerful CINCs. The bureaucratic strength of the CINC system
is formidable; the defense secretary may elect to leave it in place
and appoint a senior officer to run the war from Washington, with
the CINCs supporting the new supreme commander as required.
Follow
Up
At a news conference Monday, the so called-bombing of Karam was
clarified. The U.S. struck two tunnels in the area with bunker-busting,
5,000-pound bombs — which apparently went right through the
tunnel entrances, recalling the laser-guided bombs going down the
air shafts of the Iraqi military headquarters in the Gulf War. The
attack was followed by more than three hours of secondary explosions;
it may be that the village was involved in those. The Pentagon reported
no bomb craters in the village. The tunnels, not caves, must have
been crammed with weapons and explosives. Given the hint of the
enemy's sophistication, gleaned from the Pentagon briefing, one
wonders what else was being manufactured there.
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