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 he B-52H models now being used
to bomb Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan entered the
Air Force inventory in 1961 and 1962. The 94 B-52s left in the Air
Force are the remains of a fleet of 744 aircraft, originally conceived
and designed to deliver nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.
The current U.S. Air Force plans to keep these B-52s in the inventory
until 2037. That would be 76 years of service — a substantial
return on investment.
The B-52H can deliver a wide variety of U.S. conventional and nuclear
munitions. They carry 45 to 51 five-hundred-pound "dumb bombs"
and varying numbers of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), Joint
Stand Off Weapons (JSOWs), Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs), and naval
mines. Because the airplane is pretty smart, the dumb bombs can
be dropped fairly close to friendly troops — within a few hundred
yards. The B-52s also carry and fire Air Launched Cruise Missiles.
These planes fly 7,000 to 8,000 miles un-refueled, at five-hundred
to six-hundred miles an hour. Their five person crew is trained
to operate the aircraft from about 50,000 feet down to very low
altitudes (at night, in tough terrain).
The media reports that B-52s have been conducting carpet-bombing
raids in the vicinity of Mazar-e-Sharif and Bagrum airfield near
Kabul. "Carpet bombing" is one of those terms of military
art that make even uniformed planners a bit nervous. The term likely
originated in World War II, when precision bombing wasn't very precise
(you could often tell where the aim point was by identifying the
one church steeple still standing after a raid) and when de-housing
campaigns were sometimes accepted procedure. Today, many associate
carpet bombing with B-52 raids against square miles of seemingly
empty jungle in Vietnam. In reality, the B-52 Arc Light bombing
missions in Vietnam were often very effective.
So far in Afghanistan, it appears that B-52 area bombing has been
aimed at training facilities and some other garrison-like sites,
perhaps with a mixture of high explosives and cluster bomb units.
The attacks we have seen on the network news shows this week looked
to be fairly precise, well-targeted bombing runs. In one case, I
counted 14 or 15 mini-mushrooms in a row, implying that a string
of emplacements, trenches, and bunkers were under attack. The Joint
Chief's briefer mentioned that such capabilities could also be used
against convoys. If you match up two or three B-52s in a V formation
and have them drop all their bombs together in a tight box, then
you have real carpet bombing. (Earlier models of the B-52 did just
that, dropping 84 five-hundred-pound bombs each.)
The heavy bombing of the Taliban field positions, aided by significantly
improved intelligence provided by on-the-ground U.S. Special Forces,
should cause significant death and destruction, and set the conditions
for a major ground offensive to capture the Mazar-e-Sharif area,
and perhaps Bagrum airport as well. Those conditions would include
significantly reduced command and control capabilities (can't ask
for help; can't get help), awful logistics (especially food, fuel,
and ammunition), poor and dangerous lines of communication, and
significant disorientation. When coupled with the loss of Taliban
artillery and tank firepower, these conditions are very favorable
to the U.S. Round-the-clock, all-weather U.S. air power capable
of both precise and area targeting is another very favorable condition.
It is not at all clear that the opposition forces are up to such
a drive on their own; they would likely require the direct involvement
of U.S. Special Forces and elements of the 10th Mountain Division
and the 101st Airborne Division. The battles would be furious. The
U.S. would have logistic, firepower, mobility, and night-fighting
advantages. The Taliban could have the advantages of terrain and
desperation. They will most certainly use their own countrymen as
shields in some fashion. In the end, they will lose Mazar-e-Sharif
and Bagrum. The U.S. would have the distinct disadvantage of conducting
complex military operations in conjunction with an unfamiliar partner.
Such a win would put enormous pressure on the Taliban both politically
and militarily, giving the U.S. a base of operations within Afghanistan
proper — a huge military advantage. Of course, that "base"
would have to be protected; it ought to draw significant Taliban
counter-attacks, both conventional and unconventional. Such an area
would also draw tens if not hundreds of thousands of refugees who
would need to be fed, clothed, housed, and policed. Possession of
such a "base" would greatly enable U.S. efforts to defeat
the Taliban and to find and destroy the al Qaeda terror network
and its leader Osama bin Laden.
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