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fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, then Herat, then Kabul, to Northern Alliance
forces in a matter of about four days, was illustrative of the uncertainties
of war. About five weeks ago the Northern Alliance was advertised
as "controlling" 10 percent of Afghanistan; now the number
is "over half" and growing.
Taliban forces
are reported to be streaming (running away) West and South toward
their "stronghold" of Kandahar. This does not mean that
they have disintegrated as a military force and that the war is
over, although that is certainly a leading candidate for what is
coming soon. Other war developments could include the Taliban regrouping
in their "stronghold" areas around Kandahar and hanging
on as best they can (more footage of air strikes); the Taliban adopting
guerilla tactics and fighting on in their region; or the Taliban
fighting door to door in one last burst of urban warfare before
departing this world for parts unknown.
The elements
of the U.S. success have included:
·
Increasingly intense precision air strikes focused on Taliban
fielded forces. Recall the strikes on individual artillery
sites and armored vehicles, complemented by attacks on bunkers,
garrisons, trench lines, and wider area targets. Supporting strikes
throughout Afghanistan on Taliban fuel, ammunition, maintenance,
and command and control sites were important elements of this
effort as well.
·
Increasingly effective intelligence gathering and target identification
provided by what military planners call a maturing theater-intelligence
system. One can imagine the wealth of national overhead systems
(spy satellites), and related analytic services, focused on Afghanistan
and reinforced by tactical military systems (spy planes and unmanned
aerial vehicles). The final addition of significant numbers of
Special Forces positioned and equipped for scouting and calling
in air strikes put the nail in the coffin.
·
Increasingly fruitful support of the Northern Alliance forces.
Even the trickle of uniforms, ammunition, and rations (apparently
including fodder) that will now turn into a waterfall of assistance
make a real difference. One suspects that the "advice"
and liaison provided by the Special Forces greatly aided the cause
as well.
(This scenario
has played out surprisingly like dozens of wargames the Pentagon
sponsored over the past ten years in its studies of future warfare.
In those games, the ground forces were determined to need to be
as "Special Forces-like" as possible — small units,
dispersed across the battlefield, exceptionally well-informed (high-tech),
very mobile (high-tech again), and supported by (and directing)
distant, precise fires (high-tech, yet again). The games also emphasized
a wide variety of information gathering platforms in the air and
space, and the extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles for snooping
and shooting. Is this perhaps what the SECDEF has meant by the new
warfare?)
News reports
are currently unclear as to what attacks, if any, are taking place
against the road-bound Taliban forces. There is media speculation
that the U.S. is holding back on creating a "highway of death"
because of fears of hitting aid workers being used as shields in
the "columns." There could be a legitimate concern about
collateral damage against refugees. There also could be a limitation
on the number of sorties available. One would not want to let the
Taliban escape in order to fight again, but the impression is growing
that our picture of the battlespace does not develop as quickly
as we would like. It could be that the hunt for al Qaeda and bin
Laden are using some important assets.
The recently
offered bases in Tajikistan for use by U.S. land-based airpower
will greatly increase the aerial firepower available to General
Franks; the intensity of air attacks throughout Afghanistan will
double or triple very quickly. Unless the Taliban completely fall
apart, air strikes against them will continue. It may even take
a few days to get Special Forces in place to assist in those attacks.
That Franks wanted more strike sorties is illustrated by his request
for more Navy support and the subsequent deployment of a fourth
U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Stennis, to the area. Naval
tactical air power has borne the brunt of the sorties to date, flying
distances and sustained rates for which they are not designed. Their
ability to generate 60 to 80 strikes per day from their current
inventory of about 180 to 200 strike aircraft on three carriers
is a tribute to their dedication to the mission. The fourth carrier
will add another 60 or so strike aircraft.
The al Qaeda threat — that they possess weapons of mass destruction
— rings fairly hollow. They could certainly have chemical weapons,
and perhaps some canisters of biologicals (terrorists trade in awful
markets). They might even have some radioactive waste or "plutonium
power" to scatter in a battle. While the Soviets did a terrible
job of keeping track of their tactical nuclear weapons after the
Cold War, there is apparently no indication that one has ended up
in the hands of bin Laden. None of these weapons is particularly
helpful in the kinds of battles we are seeing in Afghanistan. Chemicals
and biologicals (in mists for example) have to be released in huge
volume to have military effect, after which they are quickly dispersed
by strong winds. U.S. and Allied Special Forces, on the other hand,
could find some nasty surprises in those caves.
There are many
uncertainties right now, but General Franks will keep his eye on
the ball. First, he'll make clear to nations that harbor terrorists
that military disaster is coming. Second, he'll lead the effort
to find and destroy the al Qaeda terror network and bin Laden (the
search for the al Qaeda network is a less visible mission, and very
difficult). Support to humanitarian relief will certainly be an
important element of his job as well.
Daisy
Notes:
Weekend-before-last, the U.S. dropped two BLU-82 15,000 pound bombs
(nicknamed Daisy Cutters) on frontline Taliban locations. These
bombs were designed and first used in Vietnam in March 1970 to create
instant landing zones. They were essentially steel propane tanks
filled with a slurry explosive; now they are more formally constructed
affairs using powdered aluminum.
The original
bombs were dropped by C-130 aircraft, resting on a cradle until
extracted and stabilized by parachutes. A detonating rod protruded
about 4 feet or so below the bomb. The explosion created a clearing
of about 250 feet in diameter in jungle-covered terrain — a
typical zone looked like a field of cleared daisies with just the
stems (tree stumps) standing a few feet off the ground. The bombs
variously were used to precede helicopter assaults, help establish
fire bases, and attack truck parks and artillery positions.
The lack of
trees and jungle in Afghanistan would tend to expand the kill zone;
one can imagine the overpressures generated in a nearby bunker or
trench. Caves might be susceptible to attacks as well. In Vietnam,
impact errors averaged 197 feet; that accuracy should be about double
today. This munition creates carnage. It also creates shock, fear,
disorientation, and perhaps side-switching.
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