Cities Fall. What Next?
Suddenly, the Northern Alliance runs over Afghanistan.

he fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, then Herat, then Kabul, to Northern Alliance forces in a matter of about four days, was illustrative of the uncertainties of war. About five weeks ago the Northern Alliance was advertised as "controlling" 10 percent of Afghanistan; now the number is "over half" and growing.

Taliban forces are reported to be streaming (running away) West and South toward their "stronghold" of Kandahar. This does not mean that they have disintegrated as a military force and that the war is over, although that is certainly a leading candidate for what is coming soon. Other war developments could include the Taliban regrouping in their "stronghold" areas around Kandahar and hanging on as best they can (more footage of air strikes); the Taliban adopting guerilla tactics and fighting on in their region; or the Taliban fighting door to door in one last burst of urban warfare before departing this world for parts unknown.

The elements of the U.S. success have included:

· Increasingly intense precision air strikes focused on Taliban fielded forces. Recall the strikes on individual artillery sites and armored vehicles, complemented by attacks on bunkers, garrisons, trench lines, and wider area targets. Supporting strikes throughout Afghanistan on Taliban fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and command and control sites were important elements of this effort as well.

· Increasingly effective intelligence gathering and target identification provided by what military planners call a maturing theater-intelligence system. One can imagine the wealth of national overhead systems (spy satellites), and related analytic services, focused on Afghanistan and reinforced by tactical military systems (spy planes and unmanned aerial vehicles). The final addition of significant numbers of Special Forces positioned and equipped for scouting and calling in air strikes put the nail in the coffin.

· Increasingly fruitful support of the Northern Alliance forces. Even the trickle of uniforms, ammunition, and rations (apparently including fodder) that will now turn into a waterfall of assistance make a real difference. One suspects that the "advice" and liaison provided by the Special Forces greatly aided the cause as well.

(This scenario has played out surprisingly like dozens of wargames the Pentagon sponsored over the past ten years in its studies of future warfare. In those games, the ground forces were determined to need to be as "Special Forces-like" as possible — small units, dispersed across the battlefield, exceptionally well-informed (high-tech), very mobile (high-tech again), and supported by (and directing) distant, precise fires (high-tech, yet again). The games also emphasized a wide variety of information gathering platforms in the air and space, and the extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles for snooping and shooting. Is this perhaps what the SECDEF has meant by the new warfare?)

News reports are currently unclear as to what attacks, if any, are taking place against the road-bound Taliban forces. There is media speculation that the U.S. is holding back on creating a "highway of death" because of fears of hitting aid workers being used as shields in the "columns." There could be a legitimate concern about collateral damage against refugees. There also could be a limitation on the number of sorties available. One would not want to let the Taliban escape in order to fight again, but the impression is growing that our picture of the battlespace does not develop as quickly as we would like. It could be that the hunt for al Qaeda and bin Laden are using some important assets.

The recently offered bases in Tajikistan for use by U.S. land-based airpower will greatly increase the aerial firepower available to General Franks; the intensity of air attacks throughout Afghanistan will double or triple very quickly. Unless the Taliban completely fall apart, air strikes against them will continue. It may even take a few days to get Special Forces in place to assist in those attacks. That Franks wanted more strike sorties is illustrated by his request for more Navy support and the subsequent deployment of a fourth U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Stennis, to the area. Naval tactical air power has borne the brunt of the sorties to date, flying distances and sustained rates for which they are not designed. Their ability to generate 60 to 80 strikes per day from their current inventory of about 180 to 200 strike aircraft on three carriers is a tribute to their dedication to the mission. The fourth carrier will add another 60 or so strike aircraft.

The al Qaeda threat — that they possess weapons of mass destruction — rings fairly hollow. They could certainly have chemical weapons, and perhaps some canisters of biologicals (terrorists trade in awful markets). They might even have some radioactive waste or "plutonium power" to scatter in a battle. While the Soviets did a terrible job of keeping track of their tactical nuclear weapons after the Cold War, there is apparently no indication that one has ended up in the hands of bin Laden. None of these weapons is particularly helpful in the kinds of battles we are seeing in Afghanistan. Chemicals and biologicals (in mists for example) have to be released in huge volume to have military effect, after which they are quickly dispersed by strong winds. U.S. and Allied Special Forces, on the other hand, could find some nasty surprises in those caves.

There are many uncertainties right now, but General Franks will keep his eye on the ball. First, he'll make clear to nations that harbor terrorists that military disaster is coming. Second, he'll lead the effort to find and destroy the al Qaeda terror network and bin Laden (the search for the al Qaeda network is a less visible mission, and very difficult). Support to humanitarian relief will certainly be an important element of his job as well.

Daisy Notes:
Weekend-before-last, the U.S. dropped two BLU-82 15,000 pound bombs (nicknamed Daisy Cutters) on frontline Taliban locations. These bombs were designed and first used in Vietnam in March 1970 to create instant landing zones. They were essentially steel propane tanks filled with a slurry explosive; now they are more formally constructed affairs using powdered aluminum.

The original bombs were dropped by C-130 aircraft, resting on a cradle until extracted and stabilized by parachutes. A detonating rod protruded about 4 feet or so below the bomb. The explosion created a clearing of about 250 feet in diameter in jungle-covered terrain — a typical zone looked like a field of cleared daisies with just the stems (tree stumps) standing a few feet off the ground. The bombs variously were used to precede helicopter assaults, help establish fire bases, and attack truck parks and artillery positions.

The lack of trees and jungle in Afghanistan would tend to expand the kill zone; one can imagine the overpressures generated in a nearby bunker or trench. Caves might be susceptible to attacks as well. In Vietnam, impact errors averaged 197 feet; that accuracy should be about double today. This munition creates carnage. It also creates shock, fear, disorientation, and perhaps side-switching.