Strafe at Any Speed
Assessing the fast-paced events in Afghanistan.

onfusion reigns in Afghanistan, or at least it has a good foothold. This is the fog and friction of war magnified by distance, very limited information, and fast-paced events. Make note that even the U.S. military planners from the Pentagon and General Franks's staff were apparently surprised at the rapidity and success of the Northern Alliance campaign. The Taliban, if not yet "defeated," is clearly on the ropes. Taliban resistance seems to be focused in the cities of Kunduz and Kandahar. Is it a sophisticated, just-in-time shift to guerilla warfare that would embroil the U.S. in a quagmire? They might be able to think of such a strategy, but they lack the wherewithal to carry it off. Temporary reversal of fortunes is always a possibility, but the end of organized Taliban resistance is likely coming soon.

There are already well-defined reports of an increased U.S. presence in northern Afghanistan and air bases in Tajikistan. Surprisingly, defense officials are also releasing information that there are about a hundred U.S. Special Forces operating in the vicinity of Kandahar, on "special vehicles" (militarized dune buggies, perhaps). They are reportedly searching for Taliban and al Qaeda leadership, spotting for bombers, and shooting when the opportunity arises. Some media report that the U.S. has focused its search on near two-hundred caves and bunkers, with bin Laden always on the move.

What is the general shape of things to come? First, there will be continued support of Northern Alliance forces as they consolidate their gains and mop up pockets of resistance. The Taliban promises a fight to the death in defense of Kandahar. Maybe. Second, expect less bombing but increased ground action against (or in search of) what is left of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Third, there will be increased humanitarian-aid efforts. Coalition partners will likely provide the bulk of the work force for this task, but U.S. airlift is sure to be taxed.

Weapons Watch
About ten days ago there was a report of Marine AV-8s flying missions into Afghanistan. One suspects that their missions were multi-purpose: Familiarization with Afghan area-of-operations, assisting Navy fighter-bombers with some optempo relief, and supporting/escorting Marine Special Forces into southern Afghanistan. It appears that there is a Marine Expeditionary Unit — Special Operations Capable (MEU-SOC) — in that collection of amphibious forces off the shores of Pakistan. It is easy to visualize Marine units (experts in urban warfare) both engaged in Kandahar and helping search the caves of southeastern Afghanistan. With Marines comes Marine air support — such as AV-8s and helicopter gunships.

The airbase in Tajikistan will apparently be home to 70-plus Air Force jets — likely a mix of F-15s and A-10s. Both would be useful in the two missions just described. F-15s could continue to deliver precision munitions as well as provide very fast reaction times (from Tajikistan or from orbits over southern Afghanistan). The fast reactors could respond to ground-force requests for assistance, ground-force-designated emerging targets, or some helicopter trying to sneak bin Laden out of Afghanistan.

One should put only limited faith in the Pakistani forces sent to seal their border with Afghanistan and stop a bin Laden escape. Thousands of freedom fighters have drifted from Pakistan to Afghanistan in recent weeks with little effective border control (remember, the Pakistani intelligence community created and sustained the Taliban and its other owner/operator, al Qaeda).

The A-10s can patrol kill zones and are designed to assist ground forces in dangerous environments. The reported addition of three AC-130 gunships brings the total number supporting anti-Taliban operations to nine. That is nothing but very bad news for Taliban forces. Navy fighter bombers will continue to concentrate on precision bombing, but likely at a reduced rate. When the USS Stennis arrives, look for one aircraft carrier to redeploy closer to the Persian Gulf, or return home.

Nuclear Notes
The president announced on November 14 that he and President Putin of Russia have agreed to reduce strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 for each side, perhaps over the next ten years or so. Currently, each side has between 6,000 and 7,000 such weapons. The nuclear inventories are left-overs of the Cold War when deterrence strategies required large numbers of weapons. Today, a smaller number is probably correct for the emerging relationship between the two countries.

We must assume that planners believe the lowered numbers are sufficient, taking into account the growing Chinese nuclear capability as well as the arsenals of India and Pakistan. We must also assume that the potential nuclear capabilities of Iraq and North Korea were given consideration (maybe they will be covered by the missile-defense solution.) And, we must assume that the effectiveness of new precision munitions delivered by Stealth bombers have been factored in as substitutes for nuclear weapons. We would hope that while the raw number of weapons decrease, a portion of the nuclear laboratory structure is being preserved to develop specialized weapons to deal with the deeply buried targets, and the biological production and storage facilities, of several adversaries.