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Saudi Arabia is many things to many people. To the U.S. government, it is a vital energy link, an important promontory in the Middle Eastern muck, and a critical element in the recent war on terrorism. To the Arab world, it is the custodian of the holy mosques, a wealthy patron, and the bastion of conservative Islam in the form of what is known in the West as Wahhabism. To the rest of the world, it is a religious and monarchical society that sits on 25 percent of the world's oil reserves and thus basically holds the global economy by the neck as the ultimate guarantor of stable oil prices. And to much of the U.S. press, it is simply evil incarnate. What are the charges against it? The Saudi government funds Islamic charities, groups, and governments that sponsor terrorism. Wahhabism is an extremist, state-sponsored religion that preaches violence against all nonbelievers. The Saudi peace proposal was a hypocritical sham designed to deflect criticism from the fact that most of the Sept. 11 hijackers came from within its borders. The Saudis oppose any U.S.-led military action against Iraq, condemning Israel and the U.S. to imminent nuclear attack from Saddam. The Saudis are forcing the U.S. military to leave their soil on account of American servicewomen wearing their hair down, and other breaches of Islamic etiquette. Such are the charges — all of which are false. The Saudi government does not fund terrorism. Why? Because it would be the first target of such terrorism. It would be like the NAACP giving money to the Ku Klux Klan. Islamic charities are a vast, global network touching almost every country in the world. Saudi Arabia is a primary funder to this network. Most of this giving, and the system that filters it, came about in the 1980s, so its methods are antiquated and not quickly changed. In Saudi culture, it is standard to give money and not ask where it goes. This is akin to the thrill many Westerners get out of anonymous gifts. When some member of the royal family gives $10 million to a fund in Morocco, Mauritania, or Pakistan, he doesn't have the time or inclination to find out where every dollar goes. I am working on a study on this very issue for the French government, so let me present one case in point. There was a project outside Casablanca that needed $5.3 million for building a school, mosque, community center, and football field — an Islamic social space for the disenfranchised. In 1996, a senior member of the Saudi royal family was asked for the money; he gave it from his own personal funds, and that was that. In 1999, the head of the prince's private charity organization was alerted, by a senior Moroccan security official, to the fact that the project had stalled because there weren't enough funds. The charity organization went through the records and found that 50 percent of the money was missing. Also missing was the project manager. Moroccan officials believe this man is now in Pakistan. Though this is only one case, it typifies how Islamic charity funds can find their way into places other than hospitals and community centers. But, despite the image the U.S. press is giving us, the Saudis are actually doing something to stop such misappropriation. In all the commercial banks in the kingdom, the government has set up a special unit to investigate every account that might be risky. Each unit reports directly to the Saudi Central Bank, SAMA (the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency). Every major Saudi charity now has an audit committee that is directly linked to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. And though the program is still in its infancy, the government is taking steps through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop a system for tracking where Saudi private donations end up internationally. Tied to the idea that Saudis directly fund terror is the notion that the U.S. is meeting with resistance in its effort to gain Saudi cooperation in closing down suspect charities. The fact is, however, that the Bush administration's information on such charities has been vague, inaccurate, and outdated. Some of the lists that the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control handed to the Saudis included businessmen who had been dead for over ten years. The same goes for long-defunct organizations and corporations. If the U.S. wants action, it is going to have to provide compelling evidence and accurate information from which the Saudis can operate. And to the Saudis' credit, they have done the best they can with the information they've received. Wahhabism is also getting a bad rap in the press. This brand of Islam, however, is not as evil as assumed. Wahhabism is undoubtedly the purest and most austere form of Islam, with its strict interpretation of the words of the Koran. But the vast majority of Saudi Arabia's 10,000-plus religious clerics are not involved at all in preaching violence against disbelievers. This noise is coming from the hundred or so extremist clerics spread throughout a couple of regions of the kingdom. They are completely in the minority, and marginalized by the senior Ulema representing the highest hierarchy of the religious establishment. And the Saudis are reining them in. It all started in the waning weeks of 2001, when Crown Prince Abdullah called the senior religious leadership together and told them that extremism would no longer be tolerated by the government. This event was televised and broadcast throughout the kingdom and the region. Around the same time, a royal directive was issued that all known radical clerics must have their Friday sermons pre-approved by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. The grand mufti and the minister of Islamic affairs have given strong instructions to stop using extremist language and to concentrate on the virtues of moderation. Little of this is known, because it is not in the Saudi culture to publicize such internal measures, but it is happening — and it has had a tremendous effect on toning down the extreme religious discourse in Saudi society. To the next charge: Certainly the hypocrisy of the Saudis is proven by the crown prince's cynical, anti-Israeli peace initiative, which was merely a trumped-up smokescreen designed to deflect criticism of the kingdom's role in terrorism and support for suicide bombers? Wrong again. The Saudi peace proposal was a real and novel attempt, by arguably the leading Arab figure, not only to end the violence in the region through a mutually agreeable settlement, but also to begin the process of Arab recognition of Israel. Attempts to disclaim the peace proposal are smokescreens themselves, designed to deflect attention away from U.S. failure in maintaining peace in the region. Because of the following and prominence of Crown Prince Abdullah among the Saudi populace, only he could have publicly proposed the idea of accepting Israel's right to exist without arousing deep conservative Saudi public sentiment. That he did so is to his credit. Even Ariel Sharon, Israel's prime minister, seemed for a moment to realize the positive nature of such a gesture, which was lost on much of the U.S. press. Crown Prince Abdullah's reform-minded approach to internal and external affairs (and there are a handful of other reformers in the royal family) is having some serious and positive effects on Saudi society and regional politics. He has already instituted several domestic economic-reform programs, including increasing foreign investments, enhancing participation in the Saudi natural-gas sector, and privatizing key industries. The crown prince has also created a Supreme Economic Council to push for privatization and a Supreme Petroleum Council to streamline the critical Saudi energy sector. Further, on several occasions he has spoken of expanding the role of women in Saudi society. Finally, the Saudi Family Council has been created to deal with the royal family's personal affairs, in order to guarantee that there are checks and balances on their spending. The next charge involves Saudi Arabia's resistance to a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq for the purpose of finally erasing Saddam Hussein's regime. How can the Saudis oppose removing the maniac on their border who overran Kuwait — and indirectly threatened to invade them — only twelve years ago? What the Saudis are saying, however, is more complex than simply "don't invade," and the U.S. administration is secretly thankful for the advice. The Saudi message is that an invasion is not possible while the Palestinians are under siege. Fix that, then see what's possible. And the Bush administration is listening. Any invasion that is planned will only happen once the U.S. is seen as brokering a peace deal that saves Palestinian lives. This will mitigate ire in the Arab streets and make a coalition against the Iraqi president possible. Finally, there's the issue of the small number of U.S. troops on Saudi soil. Some believe that the Saudis' asking the U.S. to move their remaining troops is a slap in the face for the Americans. The truth, however, is that such a move makes sense for both countries — and both countries know it. With major U.S. military installations in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, the strategic possibilities are the same as in Saudi Arabia, but both the Saudi royal family and the Bush administration can then alleviate the criticism directed at them for placing "infidel" troops in the country where Mecca and Medina are located. Here, again, the Saudi position is not anti- but pro-U.S. The slander of Saudi Arabia can be best captured in a few recent press events. First, there's the coverage given just this last month of the pro-Palestinian telethons taking place in the kingdom. The money given to these charities is earmarked for the rebuilding of infrastructure — institutional buildings, homes, highways, and airports — that has been destroyed by the Israelis; not for the families of suicide bombers. It is Saddam Hussein, not Crown Prince Abdullah, that is offering money to parents to send their children, draped in bombs, into Israeli restaurants. Second, there's the false-rumor-turned-fact of Crown Prince Abdullah demanding that no women air-traffic controllers be allowed to guide his plane when he met with President Bush in Texas during his recent Crawford visit. My point is not to say that Saudi Arabia should be accepted into the Union. The kingdom is beset by a number of self-perpetuated problems. Its unemployment rate is increasing due to a booming youth population and stagnant uncompetitive sectors; it has yet to fully control the exorbitant spending and fiscal mismanagement that has plagued its government for more than 30 years. The national educational system remains rigid and incapable of preparing its people for the competitive global economy, and it suffers from a number of human-rights abuses — including gross limitation on the rights of women. Crown Prince Abdullah and the other senior princes still have a long way to go if they really mean to seriously reform the kingdom's domestic affairs. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is not guilty of many of the charges that have been brought against it in the U.S. press since September 11. What those who hurl these false charges fail to comprehend is that the Saudi government and the U.S. government are in exactly the same boat. Remember, if you will, that Osama bin Laden's biggest gripe was with the Saudi royal family and its "corruption and alliance with the American Satan." The same goes for most radical Islamic groups, which view the royal family as unholy intruders on the holy land. The leaders of Saudi Arabia would like nothing more than to see the war on terrorism won by the United States. At the same time, however, they must balance this goal with the demands of their traditions, the opinions of their people, and their pivotal role in the Arab and wider Muslim worlds. It is disingenuous and hypocritical of the American press to think that the Saudis should simply swallow everything the Bush administration throws at them. Rather than see their recent actions as antagonistic to U.S. interests, the American public should see them as a form of friendly mediation, designed to ensure American success in an outrageously complex political arena. Success is what the Saudis want, for the U.S. and for themselves. The U.S. media should stop mocking their initiatives and start seriously accepting their assistance. — Nawaf Obaid is a Saudi oil and security analyst. |
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press is trying to implicate Saudi Arabia as the fourth member of the
"Axis of Evil," but the kingdom is still the most strategically
vital ally the U.S. has in the Middle East.
