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 he
heavy fighting that erupted in Afghanistan over the weekend is a
reminder that a great deal remains to be done in that country, even
as we begin to move against al Qaeda in other places. It also indicates
a course correction in the U.S. approach that led to problems earlier
this year around Tora Bora.
The "Afghan
Model," the employment of heavy and accurate air power in conjunction
with allied fighters, supported by a small number of U.S. special-operations
forces (SOF) to plan and coordinate air strikes, has been touted
by some as the wave of the future for the American military. The
model seemed to work well earlier in the war as the Taliban collapsed
and city after city fell to America's Afghan allies. It seemed to
work again as the al Qaeda base area around Tora Bora was pulverized
by massive air strikes.
But even as
the campaign in Afghanistan moved from one apparent success to another,
dissenters raised some troubling questions. The British press reported
that unnamed sources within the Special Air Service (SAS), Britain's
elite SOF, argued that the U.S. approach allowed Osama bin Laden
and his ranking al Qaeda lieutenants to escape.
They claimed
that the allies had reliable intelligence regarding the location
of Osama bin Laden, and that he could have been killed or captured
in a raid by the SAS or U.S. SOF, but that the U.S. decision to
rely almost exclusively on anti-Taliban Afghans to carry the bulk
of the ground combat gave the al Qaeda leadership time to slip away.
On the one hand, the anti-Taliban fighters did not place the same
priority on capturing or killing the al Qaeda leaders. On the other,
press reports indicate that Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants
had vast amounts of cash available to bribe local warlords and tribesmen,
enabling them to make good their escape when the time came. Critics
also took the U.S. to task for not adequately sealing the border
between Afghanistan and Pakistan
Hindsight is
always 20/20, but the current round of fighting indicates that the
U.S. has modified its approach to the war. It appears that U.S.
ground troops are more directly involved in the fighting and that
they are taking the lead in sealing off al Qaeda escape routes into
Pakistan. The risk associated with this change is already apparent
— the likelihood of heavier U.S. casualties.
But we don't
have any choice. Ultimate success in Afghanistan will require ground
troops beyond SOF and more direct employment of those ground forces
in combat. U.S. air power will continue to be the cornerstone of
the war effort, but it is more effective when used in conjunction
with ground forces. To use a Zen analogy, air power and ground forces
are like the blades of a pair of scissors. Both blades are necessary
for cutting.
The intensity
of the fighting indicates that the modified approach is working.
At Tora Bora, the enemy was able to slip away to fight another day.
This time it appears that their escape routes have been cut off.
Having been fixed by the ground effort, they now present a lucrative
target for massive, concentrated air strikes.
We have entered
into is a more dangerous phase of the war and it is entirely possible
that there will be more U.S. casualties. Whether it will be the
last phase of the war remains to be seen, but it is a necessary
one on the road to final success.
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