Ready for Winter
The taking of Mazar-e Sharif.

By Mackubin Thomas Owens, professor of strategy and force planning at the Naval War College & an adjunct fellow of both the Claremont Institute & the Ashbrook Center.
November 12, 2001 8:30 a.m.
 

vents in Afghanistan appear to have moved very rapidly over the last few days, leaving the media and many military "experts" in the dust. Just a week ago, the New York Times was decrying the looming Afghanistan "quagmire," even though military actions have only been underway for about a month.

Michael Gordon, the Times's respected military writer filed a story on Thursday, November 8, entitled "A Month in a Difficult Battlefield: Assessing US War Strategy." On the same day, Inside the Pentagon's Elaine Grossman wrote a story entitled "Pentagon Hears Growing Calls for Fresh Approach to Afghan War." The thrust of these stories was that the U.S. strategy for conducting the war in Afghanistan was not working. After all, the key northern city of Mazar-e Sharif remained in Taliban hands, despite U.S. air strikes in support of anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces. A stalemate seemed to be developing as winter approached.

But over the weekend, the Northern Alliance captured Mazar-e Sharif and there are reports that it has seized several other important cities in the north as well. Its spokesmen are talking seriously about taking Kabul before the end of the month. What does the fall of Mazar-e Sharif to the Northern Alliance mean, and what are the implications for the future?

First it seems to show that the administration's general approach to the war has been just about right, at least so far. The first phase, attaining air superiority, was achieved fairly early in the campaign, although given the geographic location of the Afghan theater of war and the corresponding "tyranny of distance," this was more difficult that some might think. The second phase, focusing air assets against the Taliban forces arrayed around Mazar-e Sharif, only began a few days ago, but appears to have achieved its goal of destroying the will of the Taliban fighters fairly quickly. The third phase will probably see the increasing use of US ground forces, certainly special operations forces (SOF) but most likely conventional infantry formations as well.

Second, the fall of Mazar-e Sharif appears to indicate that while air power is no panacea, it is the sine qua non of military success in the modern age when employed properly. Even given the limitations imposed on US air power by the tyranny of distance (the lack of air bases in the region means that heretofore, most sorties have been flown by Naval aviators flying from air craft carriers in the Arabian Sea and by long range Air Force bombers, preventing the US from generating the intensity of air attacks that most planners would prefer), air attacks on the Taliban eventually had the intended effect, which the Northern Alliance exploited over the weekend.

Third, it shows that the Northern Alliance can fight and that the Taliban are not invincible. This is critical for maintaining US public support for the war. Although the president has repeatedly warned us that this will be a long struggle, it is important for the American people to have tangible indications of success. The capture of Mazar-e Sharif is such an event.

But as important as the capture of Mazar-e Sharif may be for symbolic reasons, it also has serious military implications for the future. First, by opening a corridor to Uzbekistan, it provides an important logistics link between the Northern Alliance and the outside world, making it easier to provide the anti-Taliban forces with the military means to win as well as the supplies necessary to mitigate the looming humanitarian disaster looming over the winter.

Second, capturing Mazar-e Sharif has cut Taliban forces in the north into two isolated groups, making it easier for the Northern Alliance to destroy them in detail. Third, it provides a possible base from which U.S. air assets could operate, minimizing the impact of the tyranny of distance, and a jumping off place for a possible U.S. ground offensive in the spring, should the administration deem it necessary. Finally, it frees up Northern Alliance fighters who can now be shifted to the Kabul front.

It is likely that Kabul will be a tougher nut to crack. For one thing, the Taliban forces outnumber those of the Northern Alliance on the Kabul front. As was the case with Mazar-e Sharif, opposition success on the ground will depend a great deal on US air power to weaken the Taliban. Even if the Northern Alliance is able to penetrate the Taliban defenses, fighting inside Kabul will be a nightmare if the Taliban chooses not to abandon the city. Of course, many were saying the same thing about Mazar-e Sharif only a few days ago.

It is still very likely that conventional U.S. ground forces will be needed at some point if we are to translate military success into political success. The political complications for the Northern Alliance increase as they move farther away from their ethnic base in the north and penetrate the Taliban strongholds of the Pashtun south and west of Kabul.

No matter what happens in Kabul over he next few weeks, the capture of Mazar-e Sharif before the onset of winter is an important success. The U.S. and the Northern Alliance will be able to use the winter to their advantage, building up forces for operations in the spring and while keeping up the pressure on Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network by employing SOF to hunt and destroy them. Recent reports indicate that many in the SOF community believe that it actually will be easier to target and destroy these targets during the winter. It is pretty clear that they will get to find out if they are correct.

 
 

BACK TO NRO


 
 
shim
shim